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BINARY GOVERNANCE: LESSONS
FROM THE GDPR’S APPROACH TO
ALGORITHMIC ACCOUNTABILITY
MARGOT E. KAMINSKI*
Algorithms are now used to make significant decisions about
individuals, from credit determinations to hiring and firing. But they are
largely unregulated under U.S. law. A quickly growing literature has split
on how to address algorithmic decision-making, with individual rights and
accountability to nonexpert stakeholders and to the public at the crux of the
debate. In this Article, I make the case for why both individual rights and
public- and stakeholder-facing accountability are not just goods in and of
themselves but crucial components of effective governance. Only individual
rights can fully address dignitary and justificatory concerns behind calls for
regulating algorithmic decision-making. And without some form of public
and stakeholder accountability, collaborative public-private approaches to
systemic governance of algorithms will fail.
In this Article, I identify three categories of concern behind calls for
regulating algorithmic decision-making: dignitary, justificatory, and
instrumental. Dignitary concerns lead to proposals that we regulate
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algorithms to protect human dignity and autonomy; justificatory concerns
caution that we must assess the legitimacy of algorithmic reasoning; and
instrumental concerns lead to calls for regulation to prevent consequent
problems such as error and bias. No one regulatory approach can effectively
address all three. I therefore propose a two-pronged approach to
algorithmic governance: a system of individual due process rights combined
with systemic regulation achieved through collaborative governance (the
use of private-public partnerships). Only through this binary approach can
we effectively address all three concerns raised by algorithmic decisionmaking, or decision-making by Artificial Intelligence (“AI”).
The interplay between the two approaches will be complex. Sometimes
the two systems will be complementary, and at other times, they will be in
tension. The European Union’s (“EU’s”) General Data Protection
Regulation (“GDPR”) is one such binary system. I explore the extensive
collaborative governance aspects of the GDPR and how they interact with
its individual rights regime. Understanding the GDPR in this way both
illuminates its strengths and weaknesses and provides a model for how to
construct a better governance regime for accountable algorithmic, or AI,
decision-making. It shows, too, that in the absence of public and stakeholder
accountability, individual rights can have a significant role to play in
establishing the legitimacy of a collaborative regime.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2011, fifth-grade teacher Sarah Wysocki was fired by a machine.1
Wysocki had been a star teacher, receiving rave reviews from both parents
and her principal. But these positive reviews from humans were outweighed
by a low score Wysocki received from an algorithm (a computer program),
and the school district was required by policy to fire her, along with 205
other teachers.
When Wysocki and others questioned this outcome and asked how the
scores were calculated, they were told that the algorithm was too complicated
for them to understand. Wysocki suspected, however, that the model relied
heavily on standardized test scores and that due to cheating, over half of her
students started the school year with artificially inflated exam scores. When
she tried to make her case to the school district, however, she was told that
the decision was final.2
Algorithms—that is, computer programs, including AI—are now used
to make a host of decisions about human beings that have significant impacts
on human welfare and dignity.3 Decisions about whether to extend credit,
whether to hire or fire somebody, how to price discriminate, and what
1. CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION 11 (2016); Bill Turque, ‘Creative . . .
Motivating’ and Fired, WASH. POST (Mar. 6, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/c
reative--motivating-and-fired/2012/02/04/gIQAwzZpvR_story.html.
2. Recently, Houston-area teachers who were similarly fired based on the use of a secret computer
algorithm successfully argued that their dismissals may have violated their procedural due process rights.
Houston Federation of Teachers, Local 2415 v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1168,
1180 (S.D. Tex. 2017). This ruling, however, applies only to government actions and to dismissals during
the term of a contract or a continuing contract. Id. at 1173–74. Thanks to Mark MacCarthy for identifying
this case.
3. For more extended descriptions and definitions of decision-making algorithms, see Jessica M.
Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism Risk, 67 EMORY L.J. 59, 67–88 (2017) (discussing the actuarial
algorithms used in recidivism risk assessment); David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing with the Data: What
Legal Scholars Should Learn About Machine Learning, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653, 658–62 (2017)
(discussing machine-learning algorithms).
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educational track to put a student on now can all involve algorithmic
decision-making, or a heavy reliance on suggestions arrived at by
algorithms. These decisions, when made by the private sector, go largely
unregulated in the United States.4 The types of algorithms used can present
significant challenges to our legal system, as they are often secret, impossible
to predict, hard to explain to nonexperts, and continuously changing over
time.
Earlier calls for algorithmic accountability propose addressing
algorithmic decision-making through both individual “due process” rights
and an array of systemic accountability measures.5 The systemic measures
include public disclosure of source code, agency oversight, expert boards,
and stakeholder input. More recent literature, however, moves away from
these proposals, questioning both the value of individual rights and
stakeholder input by nonexperts and the costs of public disclosure. Publicfacing accountability and individual due process in particular have become
4. This is not to say that algorithmic decision-making goes entirely unregulated. There are a
number of existing laws in the United States that were not written for, but may be applicable to,
algorithmic decision-making. For example, the Department of Housing and Urban Development charged
Facebook in 2019 with allegedly violating the Fair Housing Act, by using machine learning algorithms
to discriminate in housing advertisements against users based on membership in protected
classes. Facebook, Inc., FHEO No. 01-18-0323-8 (U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. Mar. 28, 2019),
https://www.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/Main/documents/HUD_v_Facebook.pdf. As the Obama White House
noted, however, the use of big data has “the potential to eclipse longstanding civil rights protections in
how personal information is used in housing, credit, employment, health, education, and the
marketplace.” JOHN PODESTA ET AL., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA (2014), http://obama
whitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/big_data_privacy_report_5.1.14_final_print.pdf. For a
more detailed analysis of the difficulties inherent in applying antidiscrimination laws, such as Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act, to algorithmic decision-making, see Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big
Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671, 714–23 (2016) [hereinafter Barocas & Selbst,
Disparate Impact]. But see James Grimmelmann & Daniel Westreich, Incomprehensible Discrimination,
7 CALIF. L. REV. ONLINE. 164, 170 (2017) (arguing that with judicial adaptations antidiscrimination law
can address algorithmic decision-making). The Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), too, contains due
process-like and explanatory requirements for credit reporting agencies that apply to the use of
algorithmic decision-making. Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process
for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 16–18 (2014) (discussing the coverage and limitations
of the FCRA); Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal of Explainable Machines, 87
FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1100–05 (2018) [hereinafter Selbst & Barocas, Intuitive Appeal] (discussing the
FCRA and Equal Credit Opportunity Act). In the context of employment decisions where the employer
is in the public sector, due process rights may also apply. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
5. I join several scholars in calling for governance of algorithmic decision-making that
incorporates both individual rights and systemic oversight. Danielle Citron and Frank Pasquale
presciently propose a mix of individual rights with systemic governance, as do Jason Schultz and Kate
Crawford. These scholars do not, however, characterize their proposed systemic regulation as
collaborative governance nor discuss at length the interaction between the individual and systemic
approaches. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 4, at 27–32; Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and
Due Process: Toward a Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 124–28
(2014). And as other scholars in this space have since pushed back against the efficacy of individual
rights, it is worth revisiting their value.
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the straw men of algorithmic accountability: held up as ineffective or even
harmful, in contrast to the specific tools a particular author or set of authors
propose in their place.
In this Article, I make the case for both individual rights and publicand stakeholder-facing accountability not just as goods in and of themselves
but as crucial components of effective governance. I begin by examining the
reasons behind calls for algorithmic accountability and find that this explains
the split in the literature over the role of individual rights. Then, unlike earlier
authors, I draw on regulatory design literature—specifically on collaborative
governance, or governance through public-private partnerships—to explain
why both public- and stakeholder-facing accountability are not luxuries but
necessary tools.
My claims are both descriptive and normative. As a descriptive matter,
I identify that many recent calls for systemic approaches to algorithmic
accountability are in fact calls for collaborative governance. I also identify
that the EU’s GDPR represents an attempt to use collaborative governance
towards algorithmic accountability, combined with a system of individual
rights.
As a normative matter, I make two claims. First, governing algorithmic
decision-making should include both individual rights and systemic
approaches. Recent authors are correct that individual rights are not the best
way to approach instrumental goals, but should not so readily dismiss
dignitary and justificatory concerns about algorithmic decision-making.
These concerns dictate a need for some form of individual process, at least
when decisions have a significant effect on an individual. But at the same
time, a systemic approach is necessary to address risks on a system-wide
level and to target the various stages of development and training when
algorithms (or really the humans who build them) are more amenable to
regulation.
Second, if we are going to use the tools of collaborative governance to
govern algorithmic decision-making—and there are good reasons, at least on
paper, to do so—we have to be vigilant about designing a regulatory system
that is legitimate, immunized from capture, and strong enough that it is
different in kind from self-regulation. Collaborative governance is described,
in brief, as a better way to govern fast-changing, risky systems with a high
degree of technological complexity. There are reasons to think it might be a
good fit for governing algorithmic decision-making. But effective
collaborative governance requires both a regulator with real power (for
example, the GDPR’s famously stringent fines) and what Jody Freeman has
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called “aggregate accountability”:6 accountability that runs through the
system as a whole, and accounts not just to a regulator or group of technical
experts but to representatives of affected stakeholders and to the public.
Otherwise, the regulatory system will be both less legitimate and less
effective. It will be less legitimate because of the high risk of capture. And
it will be less effective because it will fail to deploy those third-party
resources—from external expertise, to increased enforcement power, to
naming and shaming, to market feedback, to public input into policy—that
make collaborative governance appealing to resource-strapped regulators in
the first place.
If we fail to design the regulatory system with these inputs and outputs
in place, then—as I argue in Part III is the case with the GDPR—we may
find ourselves needing to rely on individual transparency rights to
accomplish systemic accountability goals. This forms yet another argument
for putting individual rights into place. That is, if the systemic side of
governance involves only the government in dialogue with affected parties,
then third-party stakeholders and members of the public will need to devise
creative ways of using individualized disclosure about algorithmic decisionmaking to ensure the system of governance is not captured and remains
legitimate.
This Article proceeds as follows: in Part I, I discuss at length the three
distinct categories of reasons behind calls for regulating algorithmic
decision-making. The first is a dignitary rationale, concerned with both
personhood and autonomy in the face of complex and secret profiling and
decision-making systems. The second is a justificatory rationale, concerned
with ensuring that decisions are made based on socially and legally
acceptable reasoning and are legitimized by acceptable process or oversight.
The third is an instrumental rationale, advocating regulation to ensure that
algorithmic decisions are not erroneous, faulty, biased, or outright
discriminatory. These rationales often overlap, and regulating in the name of
one will often help address another. But distinguishing them explains both
why articles on algorithmic decision-making currently speak past each other
and why a number of recently proposed regulatory solutions are incomplete.
If governments wish to address all three concerns, they will need to
adopt a two-pronged, or binary, approach to algorithmic accountability. Part
II describes this proposed system. The first prong, based on individual due
process, addresses dignitary and justificatory concerns, but may be less
6.

Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 664–67 (2000).
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effective at producing a system-wide, instrumental impact. The second
prong, a systemic regulatory approach, addresses some systemic justificatory
concerns, but largely serves the instrumental goals of addressing error,
unfairness, bias, and discrimination.
In Part II, I identify that the systemic governance prong of the
regulatory system will involve collaborative governance, or “new
governance”—that is, public-private partnerships in governance.7 This claim
is, again, both descriptive and normative. It is descriptive in that a number
of calls for algorithmic accountability in fact already deploy the tools of
collaborative governance without realizing they are doing so: auditing,
whistle-blower protection, risk assessments, and more.8 It is normative in
that collaborative governance—which is not to be confused with selfregulation or deregulation—has several advantages in these circumstances
over purely top-down, command-and-control regulation. Collaborative
governance is generally described as better suited for regulating highly
complex systems that create hard-to-calculate risks, change too quickly for
traditional regulatory approaches, and involve technical and industry
7. See, e.g., id. at 592−664; Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State,
45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 21–33 (1997); Orly Lobel, New Governance as Regulatory Governance, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF GOVERNANCE 65, 66–67 (David Levi-Faur ed., 2012) [hereinafter Lobel, New
Governance]; Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 371–76 (2004) [hereinafter Lobel, The Renew
Deal].
8. Only a handful of scholars have explicitly considered using collaborative governance, in
sector-specific contexts, to govern algorithmic decision-making or AI. See Maayan Perel & Niva ElkinKoren, Accountability in Algorithmic Copyright Enforcement, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 473, 529–31
(2016) (“We advocate a collaborative-dynamic regulation . . . .”); W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating
Black-Box Medicine, 116 MICH. L. REV. 421, 465–71 (2017) (discussing collaborative governance of
black box, medical algorithms). Sonya Katyal has called for the greater involvement of the private sector
in algorithmic accountability, pointing to both self-regulation and whistleblower protection, but does not
situate this approach in the literature of collaborative governance. Sonya K. Katyal, Private
Accountability in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 66 UCLA L. REV. 54, 61 (2019) (“[W]e are looking
in the wrong place if we look to the state alone to address issues of algorithmic accountability. . . . [I]t
makes sense to explore opportunities for greater endogeneity in addressing civil rights concerns,
particularly given the information asymmetry between the industries that design AI and the larger
public.”). Michael Guihot and others have similarly outlined “this decentering of regulation and . . .
examples of peer or self-regulation that has begun to proliferate in the vacuum of government control,”
discussing responsive regulation but noting that in the case of AI no backdrop regulatory framework is
currently in place. Michael Guihot et al., Nudging Robots: Innovative Solutions to Regulate Artificial
Intelligence, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 385, 427 (2017). They suggest that a “[r]eally [r]eally
[r]esponsive [r]isk-[b]ased [r]egulation” might be appropriate, ultimately calling for a mix of selfregulation and risk regulation in the form of soft-law, regulatory “nudges.” Id. at 441, 445. Alicia SolowNiederman has joined this conversation about possible regulatory toolkits and regulatory design, in a
forthcoming piece. Alicia Solow-Niederman, Administering Artificial Intelligence, 93 S. CAL. L. REV.
(forthcoming May 2020).
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expertise that regulators and legislators are unlikely to have.9 Collaborative
governance, at least in theory, should be well suited to improving not just
algorithms but the complex human systems around them.10 It should be
better suited to addressing solutions towards design and training phases,
rather than just addressing the running model.11
Identifying the use of collaborative governance in establishing
algorithmic accountability lets us (1) take a thorough and system-wide
approach to accountability rather than deploy partial solutions; (2) engage
with existing governance literature and examples rather than attempt to
reinvent the regulatory wheel; (3) expand the existing algorithmic
accountability toolkit; and (4) recognize that the accountability problem is in
fact multilayered. Because regulators will be delegating rulemaking of sorts
to private parties, we need not just transparency and oversight over the
algorithm, but second-order transparency and oversight over that rulemaking
and compliance process.12
By characterizing algorithmic accountability as collaborative
governance, this Article identifies a second-order accountability problem
that largely has gone ignored. Calls for transparency of algorithmic decisionmaking cannot so easily be dismissed by those who focus on instrumental,
rather than dignitary or justificatory, concerns. Transparency and deeper
forms of accountability play an essential role not just in protecting human
dignity but in establishing a legitimate and well-functioning system of
collaborative governance.
Part II closes by discussing the interaction between the two parts of this
proposed binary system: individual process and systemic regulation
involving collaborative governance. The interaction between these two
prongs will be complex. At times they will be complementary, and at other
times their goals and approaches will conflict.
9. See Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private Firms, Decisionmaking, and
Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 DUKE L.J. 377, 385–92 (2006).
10. Mike Ananny & Kate Crawford, Seeing Without Knowing: Limitations of the Transparency
Ideal and Its Application to Algorithmic Accountability, 20 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 973, 983–84 (2018)
(discussing algorithmic “assemblages” of humans and machines); Lehr & Ohm, supra note 3, at 657
(“Because playing with the data occurs earlier in time and entails much more human involvement than
the running model, this phase provides more opportunities and behavioral levers for policy
prescriptions.”).
11. Lehr & Ohm, supra note 3, at 655–58.
12. IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION 57–60 (1992); Ian Ayres & John
Braithwaite, Tripartism: Regulatory Capture and Empowerment, 16 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 435, 491
n.137 (1991); see also Margot E. Kaminski, Regulating AI Risk Through the GDPR 31–32 (June 24,
2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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By way of illustration, Part III of this Article turns to Europe’s GDPR,
which takes a complex, binary approach to regulating algorithmic decisionmaking.13 This Article identifies that the GDPR’s systemic approach to
governing algorithms relies heavily on collaborative governance. It is the
first to discuss the GDPR’s approach to algorithmic accountability as a
binary system that illustrates how an individual rights approach might
interact with its collaborative governance aspects. Understanding the GDPR
in this way both illuminates its strengths and weaknesses and provides a
model for how to construct a better regulatory regime for algorithmic
decision-making.
I. WHY REGULATE ALGORITHMIC DECISION-MAKING?
A growing body of literature calls for regulating algorithmic decisionmaking.14 This Part identifies three categories of concerns behind these calls:
dignitary (which includes autonomy), justificatory, and instrumental.15
These categories can overlap, but they also lead to divergent regulatory
solutions. To understand current divides in the literature, it is necessary to
understand the three goals motivating calls for algorithmic accountability.
13. Council Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 (EU).
14. See, e.g., Ananny & Crawford, supra note 10, at 984–85; Lee A. Bygrave, Minding the
Machine: Article 15 of the EC Data Protection Directive and Automated Profiling, 17 COMPUTER L. &
SECURITY REP. 17, 21–22 (2001); Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1249, 1301–13 (2008); Citron & Pasquale, supra note 4, at 18–28; Crawford & Schultz, supra note
5, at 109–10; Deven R. Desai & Joshua A. Kroll, Trust but Verify: A Guide to Algorithms and the Law,
31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 5–6 (2017); Guihot et al., supra note 8, at 427; Mireille Hildebrandt, The Dawn
of a Critical Transparency Right for the Profiling Era, in DIGITAL ENLIGHTENMENT YEARBOOK 2012, at
41, 49–54 (Jacques Bus et al. eds., 2012); Katyal, supra note 8, at 107–08; Pauline T. Kim, Auditing
Algorithms for Discrimination, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 189, 197–202 (2017); Joshua A. Kroll et al.,
Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 696–99 (2017); Isak Mendoza & Lee A. Bygrave, The
Right Not To Be Subject to Automated Decisions Based on Profiling, in EU INTERNET LAW 77, 96–97
(Tatiani-Eleni Synodinou et al. eds., 2017); Price, supra note 8, at 432–37; Neil M. Richards & Jonathan
H. King, Big Data Ethics, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 393, 408–09 (2014); Matthew U. Scherer,
Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems: Risks, Challenges, Competencies, and Strategies, 29 HARV.
J.L. TECH. 353, 373–76 (2016); Paul Schwartz, Data Processing and Government Administration: The
Failure of the American Legal Response to the Computer, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1321, 1374–86 (1992);
Solow-Niederman, supra note 8; Daniel J. Steinbock, Data Matching, Data Mining, and Due Process,
40 GA. L. REV. 1, 64–78 (2005); Andrew Tutt, An FDA for Algorithms, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 83, 105–11
(2017); Tal Z. Zarsky, Transparent Predictions, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1503, 1530–53.
15. Selbst & Barocas, Intuitive Appeal, supra note 4, at 1117–19 (identifying the three overlapping
reasons for calls for transparency in the literature as (1) “autonomy, dignity and personhood”; (2) an
“instrumental value [to] . . . educat[e] the subjects of automated decisions about how to achieve different
results”; and (3) “the idea that explaining the model will allow people to debate whether the model’s rules
are justifiable”); see also Lilian Edwards & Michael Veale, Slave to the Algorithm? Why a ‘Right to an
Explanation’ Is Probably Not the Remedy You Are Looking for, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 18, 27–43
(2017) (identifying regulatory reasons as “[d]iscrimination and [u]nfairness,” “[i]nformation[] [p]rivacy,”
and “[o]pacity and [t]ransparency”).
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More importantly, to design a regulatory solution that works, we have to
articulate what we want regulation to accomplish.
Calls for algorithmic decision-making often start from the premise that
it replaces something worse: decision-making by humans. Human decisionmaking can be deeply, terribly flawed. Human decision makers can be
outright discriminatory; can hold deep-seated biases about race, gender, or
class; and can exhibit a host of cognitive biases that invisibly influence
outcomes.16 The example of “redlining” in which banks denied (and in some
cases, continue to deny) housing loans to African Americans, Latinos, and
other minorities exemplifies outright discrimination by human decision
makers.17 A 2016 study of interview practices by elite law firms evidenced
bias against candidates on the basis of both social class and gender.18 And
thanks largely to Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, the legal literature
has become aware of the host of cognitive biases that human decision makers
have.19 Human decisions are influenced, for example, by anchoring—people
tend to rely heavily on one piece of information, often the first piece of
information acquired, rather than equally weight relevant inputs.20 Humans
are subject to confirmation bias—the tendency to read all information in a
way that confirms already-held opinions.21 These and other cognitive biases
suggest that human decision makers, even when not being overtly
discriminatory, are not impartial or even particularly accurate.
It is thus tempting to believe that machines will be better. But even
complex algorithms are simplifications of reality, and these simplifications
involve human choices along a number of axes.22 As Cathy O’Neil has
16. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Certainty: Heuristics and
Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY 3, 3−8 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds, 1982); Jon D. Hanson
& Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 630, 643–45 (1999); Tamara R. Piety, “Merchants of Discontent”: An Exploration of the
Psychology of Advertising, Addiction, and the Implications for Commercial Speech, 25 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 377, 402–03 (2001) (describing cognitive biases).
17. JOHN PODESTA ET AL., supra note 4, at 53 (“‘Redlining,’ in which banks quite literally drew—
and in cases continue to draw—boundaries around neighborhoods where they would not loan money,
existed for decades as a potent tool of discrimination against African-Americans, Latinos, Asians, and
Jews.”).
18. Lauren A. Rivera & András Tilcsik, Class Advantage, Commitment Penalty: The Gendered
Effect of Social Class Signals in an Elite Labor Market, 81 AM. SOC. REV. 1097, 1108–11 (2016).
19. For further discussion on this topic, see generally JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra
note 16.
20. Hanson & Kysar, supra note 16, at 667–69; Piety, supra note 16, at 403.
21. Piety, supra note 16, at 402; see also Hanson & Kysar, supra note 16, at 647–50.
22. O’NEIL, supra note 1, at 20–21; Eaglin, supra note 3, at 63 (describing the “normative
judgments embedded in actuarial risk assessment tools’ construction”); Katyal, supra note 8, at 67 (“Since
algorithmic models reflect the design choices of the humans who built them, they carry the biases of the
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written, algorithms are not neutral: “Models are opinions embedded in
mathematics.”23 Turning to algorithmic decision-making risks cloaking the
very things we find problematic in human decision-making under a veneer
of technical impartiality. And where human decision-making can often be
contested, algorithmic decision-making, as we saw in the example of teacher
Wysocki above, is often taken at face value and left unchallenged and
unchallengeable.24
Algorithms are, effectively, mathematical models of the real world.25
Statisticians, or “data scientists,” construct algorithms to take in data and find
correlations or make predictions. Humans actively design algorithms in a
number of ways: they pick an algorithm’s objectives, decide what the input
will be, decide whether to use proxies, decide how to weight the data, decide
how to clean the data, choose what type of algorithm to use, decide how to
“validate” the algorithm (check that it is working), and determine how
reliable the decisions need to be—and, once the model is running, decide
whether and how to confirm in practice that it is producing correct results.
Increasingly sophisticated algorithms can create their own rules and produce
“intuitions” humans do not have.26 But for any kind of algorithm, human
choices and assumptions go into its construction, training, and oversight—
or lack thereof.
In some applications—for example, in those used regularly in
baseball—algorithms work extraordinarily well.27 The clearer and more
mathematical the objective (“Show me the player who is most likely to hit a
home run”) the more detailed and direct the data (measurements of actual
performance rather than proxies for it), the more transparent the inputs and
code (so that they can be double-checked by others), the more easily
verifiable the outcomes (home runs hit or not), and the more likely it is that
an algorithm tracks what you want it to track and produces “fair” or
observer or instrument.”); Lehr & Ohm, supra note 3, at 705 n.187 (“[A]t the machine-learning stages
we consider here, not only do analysts have to consider technical methods for achieving fairness, but they
have to wrestle with highly normative questions of what kind of fairness matters most in a given
context.”); see also Danah Boyd & Kate Crawford, Critical Questions for Big Data, 15 INFO., COMM. &
SOC’Y 662, 667 (2012) (observing that the process of “‘data cleaning’ . . . is inherently subjective”).
23. O’NEIL, supra note 1, at 21.
24. Citron, supra note 14, at 1271–72 (describing the tendency to defer to machine decisions).
25. But see O’NEIL, supra note 1, at 19; Eaglin, supra note 3, at 91; Lehr & Ohm, supra note 3, at
684.
26. Steven Strogatz, One Giant Step for a Chess-Playing Machine, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 26, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/26/science/chess-artificial-intelligence.html (“Most unnerving was
that AlphaZero seemed to express insight.”).
27. O’NEIL, supra note 1, at 17 (“Baseball is an ideal home for predictive mathematical
modeling.”).
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“accurate” outputs.28 But when an objective is hard to measure or articulate
in mathematical terms (“Show me the best teacher”); the data is limited,
muddy, and filled with proxies (standardized test scores or teacher
evaluations); the algorithm itself is hidden (whether by technology, policy,
or law); the results are hard to test or produce a skewing feedback loop (fired
teachers cannot redeem themselves and, thus, prove that the model was
wrong); then the risk that an algorithm will produce bad outputs goes up.29
Thus the dominant rationale for regulating algorithmic decision-making
is an instrumental (or consequentialist) rationale. We should regulate
algorithms, this reasoning goes, to prevent the consequences of baked-in bias
and discrimination and other kinds of error. Algorithmic decision-making
can be erroneous, based on incorrect facts or derived from incorrect
inferences.30 Algorithmic decision-making can be biased, reflecting biased
decisions made by programmers or historic discrimination baked into the
data sets on which algorithms are trained.31 Algorithmic decision-making
can be intentionally discriminatory, hiding discriminatory motives behind
proxy rationales.32 Or, algorithms can work perfectly well but be used for
bad objectives, such as targeting individuals for exploitative payday loans.33
Machine learning systems can also crash or function in extraordinarily outof-the-box ways compared to human decision-making.
The instrumental rationale for regulating algorithmic decision-making
counsels that regulation should try to correct these problems, often by using
systemic accountability mechanisms, such as ex ante technical requirements,
audits, or oversight boards, to do so.34 Accountability for individual
28. Id.
29. Id. at 4–11.
30. See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 4, at 8; Crawford & Schultz, supra note 5, at 104; Zarsky,
supra note 14, at 1506.
31. See Barocas & Selbst, Disparate Impact, supra note 4, at 677–94; Citron, supra note 14, at
1262; Citron & Pasquale, supra note 4, at 13–14; see also Joy Buolamwini, How I’m Fighting Bias in
Algorithms, TED (Nov. 2016), https://www.ted.com/talks/joy_buolamwini_how_i_m_fighting_bias_in_
algorithms?language=en.
32. Barocas & Selbst, Disparate Impact, supra note 4, at 691–92.
33. O’NEIL, supra note 1, at 82–83.
34. See, e.g., Desai & Kroll, supra note 14, at 39 (“[I]f an algorithm was not ‘designed with future
evaluation and accountability in mind,’ no amount of software testing—even aided by total
transparency—will always work to elucidate any particular question.” (citation omitted)); Edwards &
Veale, supra note 15, at 76, 82 (referring to a “structural approach” to accountability; calling for a “focus
a priori on the creation of better algorithms, as well as creative ways for individuals to be assured about
algorithmic governance”; and advocating for “creating better systems, with less, opacity, clearer audit
trails, well and holistically trained designers, and input from concerned publics[, which] seems eminently
more appealing than” individual transparency (footnote omitted)); see also Kroll et al, supra note 14, at
659.
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decisions may have some place in this approach (for example, when experts
such as lawyers or physicians might need to overrule recommendations made
by algorithms),35 but scholars driven primarily by instrumental concerns tend
to discount the value of individualized transparency or process and instead
emphasize a systemic regulatory approach, for reasons discussed further in
Part II.
The other two rationales for regulating algorithmic decision-making,
however, suggest that systemic oversight is not enough. Both dignitary and
justificatory reasoning point towards including individual rights. Sometimes
vague in the abstract and thus often discounted, dignitary and justificatory
rationales suggest that fired teachers deserve a chance to understand and
contest the data, the reasoning, and even the objectives behind their firing. It
is not just that the system as a whole needs to be refined or corrected. The
individual subject to decisions by the system is intuitively owed some form
of process; the big questions are why, when, and what.
The dignitary argument—which for U.S. readers skeptical of dignity
includes what are often characterized as autonomy concerns—posits that an
individual human being should be respected as a whole, free person. Being
subjected to algorithmic decision-making threatens individuals’ personhood
by objectifying them.36 Objectification defeats autonomy: the freedom to
make choices, be offered opportunities, or otherwise move freely through the
world.37 Objectification can take a variety of forms ranging from directly
denying autonomy to treating somebody as fungible (that is, exchangeable
with someone else).38 Dignitary critiques of algorithmic decision-making
reflect this range.
It may help to pin down some more specific versions of the dignitary
35. Daniel N. Kluttz & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Automated Decision Support Technologies and the
Legal Profession 37 (June 22, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (“Technical design
should seek to put professionals and decision support systems in conversation, not position professionals
as passive recipients of system wisdom who must rely on out-of-system mechanisms to challenge them.
For these reasons, calls for explainability . . . should be replaced by governance approaches that promote
contestable systems.”).
36. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 36 (James W. Ellington
trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 3d ed. 1993) (1785) (“Act in such a way that you treat humanity . . . always at
the same time as an end and never simply as a means.”); James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures
of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1180–89 (2004) (describing the German
philosophical origins of privacy law).
37. Zarsky, supra note 14, at 1545–50.
38. Martha C. Nussbaum, Objectification, 24 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 249, 256–57 (1995) (arguing that
there are seven forms of objectification: instrumentalizing to achieve a further purpose; denying
autonomy; treating as inert, as fungible, as violable, as owned by another person; and denying
subjectivity).
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criticism.39 The first, largely European, criticism of algorithmic decisionmaking is that allowing a decision about humans to be made by a machine
inherently treats humans as objects, showing deep, inherent disrespect for
peoples’ humanity.40 This particular version of a dignitary concern has been
embraced by European legislators, while U.S. lawmakers and many U.S.
persons have rejected it.
A second type of dignitary concern appeals, however, across cultural
divides. Automatically making decisions based on what categories an
individual falls into—that is, what correlations can be shown between an
individual and others—can fail to treat that individual as an individual.41 If
algorithmic decision-making does not allow individuals to proclaim their
individuality (“I may look like these other people, but I am not in fact like
them”), then it violates their dignity and objectifies individuals as their traits,
rather than treating an individual as a whole person.42 Both decisional
discretion and individual process rights are, under this reasoning, necessary
not just to prevent error but to adequately recognize and respect
individuality.43
This version of a dignitary concern resonates across the Atlantic with
the legal tradition of equity. Long concerned with the unfairness of
formalistic application of legal rules, the principles and practices of equity
allow otherwise unfair decisions to be adapted to individual circumstances.44
Decisions in equity can permit courts to look beyond factors the law
ordinarily considers, to think about fairness in a particular set of
circumstances. Similarly, the subject of an automated decision should be
able to explain why an algorithm’s framing is not the full picture and to
introduce individualizing, sometimes mitigating, factors an algorithm has
not considered.
Take, for example, the United States Department of Agriculture
(“USDA”) algorithm that decided that Somali-owned grocery stores in
Seattle would no longer be permitted to accept food stamps because
39. Selbst & Barocas, Intuitive Appeal, supra note 4, at 1119 (“[T]he personhood rationale can be
converted to a more actionable legal issue . . . .”).
40. Meg Leta Jones, The Right to a Human in the Loop: Political Constructions of Computer
Automation and Personhood, 47 SOC. STUD. SCI. 216, 231 (2017); Tal Z. Zarsky, Incompatible: The
GDPR in the Age of Big Data, 47 SETON HALL L. REV. 995, 1016–17 (2017).
41. See Zarsky, supra note 14, at 1545–50.
42. Thanks to Alon Harel for helping to clarify this point at the Tel Aviv University Faculty
seminar.
43. See Citron, supra note 14, at 1304.
44. See, e.g., Golden Press, Inc. v. Rylands, 235 P.2d 592, 596 (Colo. 1951) (en banc).
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customer behavior purportedly indicated cash-for-stamp fraud.45 The
algorithm responded to “suspicious transactions,” such as even dollar
amounts and large purchases made in short time spans. But the grocers had
credible contextual explanations for these purportedly “unusual” practices:
the shopping patterns of East African immigrants, which include shopping
in groups and shopping for meat by whole-dollar amounts at Halal
butchers.46 In addition to having instrumental implications—the algorithm
incorrectly identified this behavior as fraud—the system’s failure to consider
contextualizing factors to which the algorithm was blind led to unfair
outcomes that objectified decisional subjects in too-broad strokes (“I may
look like a cheat but I am not”).
This notion that a person is more than the sum of her abstracted traits
resonates with a concern in the privacy literature over the notion of the “data
double”: a shadow self consisting of data points gathered about an individual,
often without permission.47 People constantly engage in the process of selfconstruction, determining both how they appear to others and who they are
to themselves.48 A data double objectifies an individual by taking this
dynamic, participatory process and placing it in the hands of other entities
and out of the hands of the individual.
Secret profiles and decisions made based on secret profiling can
threaten personhood and thus dignity by proscribing active individual
involvement in the construction of this objectified version of the self.49 This
again resonates with aspects of U.S. law, even given the absence of federal
data privacy law: the right of publicity and appropriation torts, which permit
individuals to sue to protect use of their likenesses without permission;
protection against public disclosure of private fact; and defamation, which
45. Somali Grocers: Feds Urged To Requalify Grocers for Food Stamps, KITSAP SUN
(Apr. 14, 2002), https://products.kitsapsun.com/archive/2002/04-14/0038_somali_grocers__feds_urged
_to_req.html. Thanks to Deirdre Mulligan for pointing to this example. For an overview of the USDA
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program algorithm, see H. Claire Brown, How an Algorithm Kicks
Small Businesses Out of the Food Stamps Program on Dubious Fraud Charges, NEW FOOD ECON. (Oct.
8, 2018), http://newfoodeconomy.org/usda-algorithm-food-stamp-snap-fraud-small-businesses.
46. Chris McGann, Somali Grocers Lose Right To Use Food Stamps, SEATTLE POSTINTELLIGENCER (Apr. 8, 2002, 10:00 PM), https://www.seattlepi.com/news/article/Somali-grocers-loseright-to-use-food-stamps-1084746.php.
47. See, e.g., David Lyon, Surveillance, Snowden, and Big Data: Capacities, Consequences,
Critique, BIG DATA & SOC’Y, July–Dec. 2014, at 1, 6; see also Evelyn Ruppert, The Government
Topologies of Database Devices, THEORY, CULT. & SOC’Y, Oct. 4, 2012, at 116, 123–26.
48. JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF 49–50 (2012); Hildebrandt, supra note
14, at 47–48.
49. Bygrave, supra note 14, at 18 (explaining that the “ ‘data shadows’ . . . threaten to usurp the
constitutive authority of the physical self despite their relatively attenuated and often misleading nature”).
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allows individuals to legally contest certain lies made about them.50 The
rights of correction or amendment in select sectoral U.S. privacy laws—for
example, the Privacy Act51 and the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act’s (“HIPAA’s”) Privacy Rule52—also reflect this
dignitary concern with individual participation in the creation of an objectself.
Finally, dignitary concerns include concerns (more familiar to
Americans) about individual autonomy. Algorithmic decision-making
founded on individual profiling limits the choices and, thus, the freedom a
person will have.53 A teacher’s autonomy is circumscribed when the teacher
is fired based on information and reasoning she cannot contest. There are
fewer choices and, thus, less freedom in what employment opportunities the
teacher can go on to pursue. Algorithms, too, determine the online ads we
see, often on the basis of individual profiling.54 Ads for higher-paid,
executive level, and science, technology, engineering, and math jobs have
been shown to target men over women.55 Companies have been shown to
target African Americans with ads for payday loans and credit cards with
disadvantageous terms.56 Limiting the choices we see—whether by failing
to show opportunities or by offering only bad options—limits our freedom
to make choices.
Failing to be transparent about the fact that individuals are being
targeted or the reasons why they are targeted itself may threaten autonomy.
Secret profiling and decision-making can lead to manipulation.57 Without
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 558, 652A, 652C, 652E (AM. LAW. INST. 1977);
William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
51. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d)(2) (2018)).
52. 45 C.F.R. § 164.526 (2019) (establishing the right to request amendment of records and right
to submit a statement of disagreement if amendment is denied).
53. Tal Zarsky, The Trouble with Algorithmic Decisions: An Analytic Road Map To Examine
Efficiency and Fairness in Automated and Opaque Decision Making, SCI., TECH., & HUM. VALUES 118,
129–30 (2016) [hereinafter Zarsky, Trouble]; Zarsky, supra note 14, at 1541–50.
54. Patrick Kulp, Facebook Has Discriminated Against You, and It’s Not Going To Stop,
MASHABLE (Nov. 12, 2016), https://mashable.com/2016/11/12/facebook-google-ad-discrimination.
55. Tom Simonite, Probing the Dark Side of Google’s Ad-Targeting System, MIT TECH. REV.
(July 6, 2015), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/539021/probing-the-dark-side-of-googles-adtargeting-system.
56. Alvaro Bedoya & Clare Garvie, Center on Privacy & Technology at Georgetown Law,
Comment Letter on Follow the Lead: An FTC Workshop on Lead Generation (Dec. 18,
2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_comments/2015/12/00017-99877.pdf;
O’NEIL, supra note 1, at 157−58.
57. Zarsky, supra note 14, at 1541−53; see also FREDERIK J ZUIDERVEEN BORGESIUS, IMPROVING
PRIVACY PROTECTION IN THE AREA OF BEHAVIORAL TARGETING 62 (2015) (“Privacy isn’t merely about
control. Privacy is about not being controlled. . . . Privacy as identity construction concerns protection
against unreasonable steering or manipulation—by humans or by technology.” (footnote omitted)).
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knowing how we are being targeted or why, we can be manipulated into
making choices that are not autonomous at all.58 Concerns about autonomy
and the potential for manipulation, to a great degree, motivated the
indignation around Cambridge Analytica’s targeted manipulation of U.S.
voters prior to the 2016 election (and motivated the California legislature to
enact the California Consumer Privacy Act in 2018).59
The third category of concerns about algorithmic decision-making,
justificatory concerns, aims to ensure the legitimacy of a decisional system.60
Justificatory concerns resonate strongly with calls for rule of law.
Justificatory concerns about state action might be addressed through
imposing individual due process or through creating a broad system of
accountability like the Administrative Procedure Act.61 Justificatory
concerns are not solely about fixing errors or bias; fixing errors or bias is a
byproduct of ensuring that a decisional system is fair, valid, and legitimate.
Rule-of-law values require not just explanations of decisions but
justifications that are legitimate within a particular mode of reasoning.62 For
58. See, e.g., Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 1031–34
(2014); Rory Van Loo, Helping Buyers Beware: The Need for Supervision of Big Retail, 163 U. PA. L.
REV. 1311, 1326–31 (2015). Dignitary and autonomy concerns, in fact, share values with concerns about
information asymmetries, or market failure. For a classic explanation of calls for regulation in the face of
market failures, see Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 7, at 445 (describing market failures as occurring
when there are “distributional inequities, unincorporated externalities, collective action failures and free
rider problems, information asymmetries, cognitive biases, . . . scale inefficiencies[,] . . . national
monopolies, . . . commons[,] . . . and ‘anticommons’ ” (footnote omitted)).
59. Kevin Granville, Facebook and Cambridge Analytica: What You Need To Know as Fallout
Widens, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/technology/facebook-cam
bridge-analytica-explained.html (explaining that in March 2018, it came to light that tens of millions of
people had their personal data misused by a data mining firm called Cambridge Analytica; a series of
congressional hearings highlighted that our personal information may be vulnerable to misuse when
shared on the Internet; as a result, our desire for privacy controls and transparency in data practices is
heightened).
60. Selbst & Barocas, Intuitive Appeal, supra note 4, at 1119 (“To the extent that the personhood
rationale can be converted to a more actionable legal issue, it is reflected in the concept of ‘procedural
justice’ . . . .”).
61. Citron, supra note 14, at 1278–79 (noting the “separate, yet parallel, procedural regimes that
govern individual adjudications and rulemaking” and that “computers both render decisions about
important individual rights and engage in rulemaking”).
62. Kiel Brennan-Marquez, “Plausible Cause”: Explanatory Standards in the Age of Powerful
Machines, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1249, 1288 (2017) (“A key tenant of legality, separating lawful authority
from ultra vires conduct, is the idea that not all explanations qualify as justifications.”). The justificatory
rationale importantly goes beyond enabling people to challenge a particular decision or enabling people
to change their behavior so as to obtain a different decision the next time. Sandra Wachter et al.,
Counterfactual Explanations Without Opening the Black Box: Automated Decisions and the GDPR, 31
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 841, 880 (2018) (“[C]ounterfactual explanations do not attempt to clarify how
decisions are made internally.”). It requires that enough be visible of decision-making substance and
process so that its systemic legitimacy can be assessed. The justificatory rationale also differs from the
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example, a police officer may explain that he has pulled you over because
you drive the same car as his ex-girlfriend. That is an explanation, but not a
legally or socially acceptable justification. Whether a decision is legally
justified is largely given content by what rights the legal system gives to an
individual to challenge a decision. For example, if legislators decide to give
an individual the right to sue prospective employers for using genetic
information in hiring determinations, they have effectively decided that
hiring decisions cannot be justified by reference to an individual’s genetic
background.63 Transparency is often necessary for justification; nobody can
challenge the validity or legitimacy of a decision if they cannot see the
reasoning it was based on.64
Algorithmic decision-making triggers a particular set of justificatory
concerns. When we replace human decision makers with nonhuman decision
makers, we potentially eliminate important work that a human decision
maker does to both fill in and circumscribe decisional context in a particular
case.65 Human decision makers fill in context by carrying with them cultural
knowledge about what is or is not an appropriate decisional heuristic in a
particular case (“You are driving too fast” versus “You remind me of my
ex”). Human decision makers have the capacity to expand decisional context
when it seems unfair to ignore information a machine might not know is
relevant (“You are speeding on the way to the hospital”). Human decision
makers might also circumscribe context by knowing when it seems unfair to
rely on information that strikes them as too far afield (“Because you use an
iOS operating system, I am going to give you a ticket based on the likelihood
computer science concept of accountability, which is concerned only with ensuring that a system applies
the same rules to all individuals within it—that is, guaranteeing that there is no individual discrimination
or arbitrariness. Desai & Kroll, supra note 14, at 9–12; Kroll et al., supra note 14, at 702–05. That version
of accountability neither presents justifications for analysis nor creates a procedural hook or other kinds
of oversight to ensure the legitimacy of the decisional system.
63. See generally Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122
Stat. 881 (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of someone’s genetic information). Similarly, as we see
in Section III.B.1 below, the GDPR gives individuals transparency rights that are closely tied to their
ability to contest a decision or correct information.
64. Selbst & Barocas, Intuitive Appeal, supra note 4, at 1120–22.
65. Thanks to Michael Birnhack for this point. Kiel Brennan-Marquez and Andrew Selbst, it turns
out, have debated exactly this issue of algorithmic decision-making and context. Brennan-Marquez, supra
note 62, at 27 (“[T]he whole point of a[n] [algorithmic] tool . . . is to make predictions from correlative
variables out of context—a process that, by its nature, frustrates inquiry into the tool’s case-by-case
performance . . . .”); Andrew D. Selbst, A Mild Defense of Our New Machine Overlords, 70 VAND. L.
REV. EN BANC 87, 92 (2017) (explaining that an algorithmic decision-making “system would not be able
to give a useful answer . . . unless the system has some way to connect that information to the context it
needs”).
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that you’ll speed in the future”).66 When we use algorithmic decisionmaking, we take these human capacities and temporally remove them from
the point at which an individual decision is made. Human decisions about
how to treat context may be incorporated, to some extent, into the design of
an algorithm, but they are absent at the end point when an algorithm is
applied to a particular individual. Algorithms, as programmed entities fed
both goals and datasets by humans who are more remote from a particular
decision, are often or even inherently culturally or contextually incomplete.
Algorithmic decision-making thus lacks certain capacities when compared
to even a lousy human decision maker.
Human contextual knowledge can clearly have much-discussed
negative effects—for example, by bringing human biases and discrimination
into decision-making.67 But it also serves an important role. It means that
human decision makers will, for the most part, not produce particularly
random explanations—that is, acontextual explanations that we are
particularly likely to view as unjustified, such as connecting loan decisions
to your smartphone choice or your choice about the color of your socks.68 It
also means that human decision makers will easily weed out certain kinds of
extreme error, like the decision by an algorithm to kill the pilot in the flight
simulator because it realized it could obtain a perfect landing score by
crashing the plane.69 Because algorithms both fail to import context and fail
to circumscribe context as human decision makers do, we should ask for at
least as much, if not more, justificatory transparency and process from
algorithms as from human decision makers making the same decision.
The justificatory rationale leads to more than calls for transparency.
Justification requires process. Justification is not just about showing one’s
66. Louise Matsakis, Your Smartphone Choice Could Determine if You’ll Get a Loan, WIRED
(May 8, 2018, 11:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/your-smartphone-could-decide-whether-youllget-a-loan.
67. See Jane Bambauer, Hassle, 113 MICH. L. REV. 461, 500 (2015). For a longer discussion of
cognitive biases beyond discrimination, see generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, supra note 16.
68. Ed Felten, What Does It Mean To Ask for an “Explainable” Algorithm?, FREEDOM TO TINKER
(May 31, 2017), https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2017/05/31/what-does-it-mean-to-ask-for-anexplainable-algorithm.
69. Janelle Shane, When Algorithms Surprise Us, AI WEIRDNESS (Apr. 13, 2018, 10:59 AM),
http://aiweirdness.com/post/172894792687/when-algorithms-surprise-us. Thanks to Christina Mulligan
for this pointer. Another great example—“[A]n algorithm that was supposed to sort a list of numbers.
Instead, it learned to delete the list, so that it was no longer technically unsorted.” Id.; see also Daniela
Hernandez & Ted Greenwald, IBM Has a Watson Dilemma, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 11, 2018, 12:19 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/ibm-bet-billions-that-watson-could-improve-cancer-treatment-it-hasnt-wo
rked-1533961147 (quoting Dr. Lukas Wartman of Washington University School of Medicine on IBM’s
Watson cancer system: “The discomfort that I have—and that others have had with using it—has been
the sense that you never know what you’re really going to get”).
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reasoning, but about ensuring the legitimacy of a decisional system. Affected
individuals are more likely to perceive a decisional system as legitimate
“when they play a meaningful role in the process.”70 Different forms of
process may apply to different kinds of algorithmic decision-making, as in
the law. For example, procedural due process requires individualized notice
and an opportunity to be heard, but only in some contexts.71 The U.S. legal
system also contains systemic justificatory systems beyond individual due
process, such as the Administrative Procedure Act, which is less discussed
in the algorithmic governance literature.72
In fact U.S. law is full of different kinds of justificatory obligations. A
warrant requirement can be understood as a justificatory requirement,
requiring the police to justify why they believe they have probable cause for
search or seizure.73 The legal standard for admitting expert evidence, the
Daubert standard, can be understood as a justificatory requirement, requiring
parties to justify bringing expert information that has authority outside of the
law into the legal system.74 Even open government law, such as the Freedom
of Information Act and Federal Advisory Committee Act, can be
characterized as justificatory in nature, demonstrating the legitimacy of
government decision-making through both transparency and process
requirements. In many areas of the law, a combination of substantive and
procedural requirements serves to demonstrate that a decision-making
process is both based on normatively and legally acceptable justifications
and is procedurally fair.
Thus subscribing to the justificatory rationale for regulating algorithmic
decision-making can lead to both calls for individual due process and calls
for systemic oversight and accountability.75 When an individual is subjected
70. Freeman, supra note 6, at 656 (“[P]arties are more likely to view outcomes as legitimate when
they play a meaningful role in the process . . . [and are] included in the enterprise, taken seriously, and
offered explanations for decisions.”). Procedural justice is not an empty concept; individuals are more
likely to accept a decision if they believe the process was fair. Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice,
Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30 CRIME & JUST. 283, 317–18 (2003).
71. Crawford & Schultz, supra note 5, at 113 (“[T]he level of due process required differs
according to the gravity of the deprivation and the magnitude of the countervailing state interest . . . .”).
72. The exception to this is Citron, supra note 14, at 1279, 1288–91 (emphasizing both individual
due process and systemic accountability under the Administrative Procedure Act and noting that the use
of automated systems “creates confusion about the procedures owed individuals, interfering with both
due process guarantees and rulemaking procedures”).
73. See generally Brennan-Marquez, supra note 62 (characterizing the Fourth Amendment’s
probable cause requirement as a “plausible cause” or justifiability requirement).
74. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 598–99 (1993); see also Citron, supra
note 14, at 1307 (discussing Daubert).
75. Zarsky, supra note 14, at 1519–21 (discussing the need for interpretability to go beyond
correlations to understandings of causality).
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to a decision that has significant effects on that individual, we traditionally
require individualized justifications.76 But when we make broad systemic
decisions or write rules that will govern everyone, we often look to collective
or proxy systems for justification. Because algorithmic decision-making is
really both kinds of decisional systems (broad policies for many people
coupled with individual decisions with deep effects on individuals), both
approaches to justification may apply.77 This results in calls for individual
due process and explanations (“Let me show you how and why this decision
was made about you and let you contest it”) coupled with calls for third-party
accountability (“Let me assure you that neutral experts are providing
oversight to make sure this decision was made fairly and for fair reasons”).
As discussed at greater length below,78 in a binary system, systemic
accountability measures also serve more than one purpose: they may bolster
individual rights by providing oversight in the name of protecting
individuals, and provide the accountability necessary to oversee
collaborative governance, as companies create and implement rules.
The dignitary and justificatory rationales often significantly overlap. A
decisional system flouts rule-of-law values if individuals do not have
meaningful dignity or autonomy within it.79 It lacks legitimacy if individuals
cannot meaningfully invoke procedural safeguards or assess its logical
underpinnings. Similarly, tools used to provide justification and procedural
legitimacy can contribute substantially to improving a decision’s impact on
human dignity and autonomy by enabling individual participation and
allowing challenges to decisions when a person has been characterized by
that person’s traits instead of treated as an individual.
Of the three concerns, however, the instrumental concern about
algorithmic decision-making is by far the most prevalent in recent
scholarship.80 Perhaps this is because, as with privacy harms in general,
dignity can be hard to pin down.81 Or it may be that some scholars do not
76. See infra Section II.A.
77. Citron, supra note 14, at 1253 (noting that algorithmic decision-making combines individual
adjudication with rulemaking).
78. See infra Section II.C.
79. Hildebrandt, supra note 14, at 48 (“[P]rivacy is also a public good that concerns a citizen’s
‘freedom from unreasonable constraints on the construction of her identity.’ This freedom is a
precondition for democracy and rule of law . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
80. See, e.g., Kroll et. al, supra note 14, at 636. (listing three slightly different harms: “incorrect,
unjustified, or unfair” (discriminatory) outcomes from computers); Zarsky, supra note 14, at 1569
(describing the use of machine learning decision-making as potentially “ineffective, error-ridden,
generat[ing] chilling effects, lead[ing] to unfair discrimination, and . . . prone to enable or even encourage
function creep”).
81. See, e.g., Selbst & Barocas, Intuitive Appeal, supra note 4, at 1119 (“Ultimately, that there is
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subscribe to either the dignitary or justificatory arguments. Those scholars
who reject individualized algorithmic due process and individualized
transparency largely implicitly reject both the dignitary and justificatory
rationales for them.82 They understand regulating private-sector algorithms
as being largely about correcting error or discrimination and bias. They view
the problems of algorithmic decision-making as consumer protection
problems, best addressed not through individual rights but through a broader,
more systemic regulatory approach.
The next Part addresses the “what” of governing algorithmic decisionmaking:83 What kinds of regulation do we put in place, given the above three
rationales for regulating? But one final preliminary discussion is necessary
before moving on to the regulatory framework. Just as not every government
action triggers the same level of due process,84 not every use of algorithms
in decision-making might trigger a full regulatory regime. The threshold
question is what uses of algorithms should be covered.
The EU’s GDPR illustrates how this threshold question of coverage
might be answered. For one, it might be a matter of how much human
inherent value in explanation is clear. But as a practical matter, those concerns are difficult to
administer . . . .”).
82. See, e.g., Zarsky, supra note 14, at 1552 (describing the EU idea that dignitary harms justify a
freedom from machine decision-making as “an anachronistic notion” stemming from “neo-Luddite”
tendencies). Elsewhere Zarsky does recognize other dignitary interests. See, e.g., Zarsky, Trouble, supra
note 53, at 129. Dignity also sometimes gets outright ignored. See generally Kroll et al., supra note 14
(discussing this topic without mentioning dignity at all); Wachter et al., supra note 62 (same).
83. See infra Part II.
84. Ambrosino v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 899 F. Supp. 438, 446 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that
termination of membership based on a physician's previous drug addiction violated the common law right
to fair procedures); St. Agnes Hosp., Inc. v. Riddick, 748 F. Supp. 319, 336–42 (D. Md. 1990); Cotran v.
Rollings Hudig Hall Int'l, Inc., 948 P.2d 412, 422 (Cal. 1998) (stating that “good cause” in context of
implied employment contract requires an “appropriate” investigation, which is “not arbitrary or
pretextual,” and includes “notice of the claimed misconduct and a chance for the employee to respond”);
Pinsker v. Pac. Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 526 P.2d 253, 267–68 (Cal. 1974) (holding that orthodontist
society must use fair process in rejecting application for membership); Silva v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 76
Cal. Rptr. 2d 382, 387 (Ct. App. 1998) (“[I]nvestigative fairness contemplates listening to both sides and
providing employees a fair opportunity to present their position and to correct or contradict relevant
statements prejudicial to their case, without the procedural formalities of a trial.” (citing Cotran, 948 P.2d
at 422)); Curl v. Pac. Home, 239 P.2d 481, 483–84 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952) (involving nursing home
termination of residence and analogizing residence to membership in private organization); Falcone v.
Middlesex Cty. Med. Soc'y, 170 A.2d 791, 799–800 (N.J. 1961) (holding that membership decisions by
county medical society are subject to judicial review and may not be arbitrary, unreasonable, or contrary
to public policy); Freeman, supra note 6, at 588–91 (describing examples of due-process-like protections
applied to the private sector); see also Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for
Profit, 43 HARV. L. REV. 993, 999–1010 (1930); F. Eric Fryar, Note, Common-Law Due Process Rights
in the Law of Contracts, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1021, 1041–49 (1988).
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involvement or oversight there is over the decision-making.85 Only “solely”
automated decisions are subject to the GDPR’s requirements of explanation
and contestation.86 If a decision by an algorithm is subject to meaningful
human review, meaning a human decision maker has the capacity and ability
to contest that decision, then a number of the GDPR’s individual rights do
not apply. This suggests that in the EU, at least, human involvement in
decision-making is seen as somehow mitigating the dignitary, justificatory,
and even instrumental concerns about algorithmic decision-making.
Second, whether an algorithmic decision should be targeted for
regulation might turn on the extent and nature of the impact the decision has,
as with procedural due process. The GDPR regulates algorithmic decisionmaking differently from general data processing only if it produces “legal
effects” or “similarly significant[]” effects.87 The denial of a loan is a
significant effect; whether being subjected to targeted advertising is a
significant effect has been subject to some debate.88
Third, algorithmic decision-making might be regulated differently or
trigger regulation at different thresholds in different policy contexts and
against the backdrop of different areas of the law. For example, concerns
about algorithmic decision-making are heightened in the criminal context,
where state action is clear and the consequence of imprisonment is harsh and
concrete.89 By contrast, in the medical context, while the effects of a decision
may be equally serious, we may be less concerned with a patient’s ability to
challenge or understand the rationale behind a decision (especially as
patients often delegate decision-making to a trusted expert) and more
concerned instrumentally with making sure the decision is unbiased, correct,
and overseen and contextualized by a trusted medical professional. Existing
laws, too, such as evidence and criminal procedure in the criminal context
and fiduciary responsibilities and Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”)
regulations in the medical context, may interact with, affect, or even be
85. See Citron, supra note 14, at 1307; Meg Leta Jones, The Ironies of Automation Law: Tying
Policy Knots with Fair Automation Practices Principles, 18 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. 77, 118 (2015).
86. Margot E. Kaminski, The Right to Explanation, Explained, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 189, 201
(2019).
87. Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 22, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 46 (EU).
88. See Edwards & Veale, supra note 15, at 48; Kaminski, supra note 86, at 202.
89. There, too, the identity of the regulated actor may complicate the concept of collaborative
governance. When the state acquires technology from private companies, as is often the case,
collaborative governance might be applied to those companies, and procurement methods may be a
vehicle for regulation. When the state builds its own technology, while many of the tools of collaborative
governance may still work (impact assessments, expert boards, audits, etc.), the governance of a state
actor is not usually considered within the purview of collaborative governance.
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vehicles for introducing the type of regulatory regime discussed in Part II. 90
It is beyond the scope of this Article to fully address threshold coverage
questions or to contextualize the regulatory approach proposed below to
specific legal contexts or applications. It may be that this binary approach is
not the right fit everywhere. Or it may be the case that the binary approach
is necessary but not sufficient, and that it will need to be calibrated along
with substantive rights—for example, in antidiscrimination law. But in
identifying the reasons behind calls for regulating algorithmic decisionmaking and tracing those reasons to regulatory design, this Article identifies
common threads in the literature and aims to form the basis for future
conversations about algorithmic decision-making in specific policy contexts.
II. THE BINARY APPROACH
Understanding that there are three different categories of concerns
behind calls for regulating algorithmic decision-making explains why the
proposed solutions thus far have involved such an array of regulatory
tactics—from explanations of individual decisions, to expert oversight
within companies, to specific design requirements for algorithms. Those who
are concerned about dignitary harm or individualized justification of
decisions call for individualized due process-like protections. Those who
focus, instead, on instrumental goals or systemic justification see less of a
value in individual rights because, as discussed below, individual rights are
not the best way to achieve instrumental goals and broad systemic oversight
might actually do more to legitimate a system than individual challenges.91
Identifying these three categories of concerns lets us explore how to
reconcile this conflict. It is possible to design a system of regulation to
address all three.
To address all three categories of concerns about algorithmic decisionmaking (dignitary, justificatory, and instrumental), we need a regulatory
system that employs a two-part, or binary, approach. An individual rights
regime can address dignitary and individualized justificatory concerns but is
less well suited to fix systemic problems such as bias or malfunction or
provide systemic legitimacy. Instrumental goals are better addressed through
90. Similarly, discussions of the use of algorithmic decision-making for content moderation online
trigger yet another set of policy concerns and a distinct legal landscape of First Amendment doctrine and
related intermediary liability law. See, e.g., Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and
Processes Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1609–13, 1636–37, 1636 n.263 (2018)
(especially note 263); Matthew Sag, Internet Safe Harbors and the Transformation of Copyright Law, 93
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 499, 511–13 (2017).
91. See infra Section II.A.
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a systemic approach, likely using collaborative governance, to affect both
the design of algorithms and the organizational design of the human systems
around them. A systemic approach may also be necessary to produce a
justified or legitimate decision-making system, given individual resource
constraints and limited expertise. But a systemic approach alone will not be
adequate, since it fails to capture significant dignitary and justificatory
concerns—and in some cases, may miss out on the capacity of individual
challenges to correct bias and error or provide accountability for the system
as a whole. To effectively govern algorithmic decision-making, we need
both.
Several existing proposals—most prominently from Danielle Citron,
Frank Pasquale, Kate Crawford, and Jason Schultz—call for both
approaches: individual rights combined with some form of systemic
governance.92 These authors, however, do not identify that systemic
approaches to algorithmic accountability are functionally attempts at
collaborative governance. This leads to some missed insights from the
literature on private-public partnerships, discussed below.93 Nor do these
authors explore the interactions between individual rights and systemic
governance. The binary approach explored here goes beyond porting
individual due process and systemic oversight mechanisms from other areas
of law, and from existing data privacy principles, to discuss overall
regulatory design. This Part asks how these different regulatory features
serve the goals of regulation, how they interact, where they might conflict,
and how they work as a system.
A. AN INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS REGIME
An individual rights regime can address both dignitary and justificatory
concerns about algorithmic decision-making. By giving individuals
transparency and input into profiling or decision-making, we respect their
dignity and prevent objectification. By providing individual transparency,
explanation, and participation rights, we address justificatory concerns about
the legitimacy of an algorithmic decisional system. Such a system would let
someone like Wysocki, the fired teacher, receive notice that she was subject
to algorithmic decision-making; receive an explanation of some kind of why
the decision was made; and have some kind of right to challenge the decision.
92. Citron, supra note 14, at 1305, 1308–13 (addressing public sector use of algorithmic decisionmaking and calling for both individual rights and “[r]eplacing [r]ulemaking [p]rocedures” with testing,
stakeholder involvement, and more); Citron & Pasquale, supra note 4, 1301–13; Crawford & Schultz,
supra note 5, 125–28.
93. See infra Section II.B.
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This idea of algorithmic due process is not new. Several scholars have
argued at length for individual due process-like protections.94 In the context
of government actions, procedural due process requires that individuals
deprived of a significant interest be provided both notice and an opportunity
to be heard before a neutral arbiter before the deprivation occurs.95 The
algorithmic due process literature ports these requirements and others into
the context of algorithmic decision-making.
The literature argues that individual due process protections should be
put in place even when the algorithmic decision is made by a private,
nonstate actor.96 It largely analogizes from the regime of due-process-like
rights established under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), which
applies to private sector “consumer reporting agencies.” The FCRA requires
disclosure of your credit score and the information a consumer reporting
agency holds on you (“file disclosure”); creates a right to dispute incomplete
or inaccurate information; and creates a right to be told if information in the
file has been used against you, among other things.97
There are a number of examples available in U.S. law beyond the FCRA
of due-process-like protections applied to decisions made by private parties
with particularly significant consequences. For example, courts have put in
place due process-like requirements for employment decisions, for
membership decisions by professional organizations, and for decisions to
terminate residence in a nursing home.98 Congress, too, has enacted privacy
laws that give individuals rights of access and correction for information held
by private companies.99 These laws and decisions suggest an intuition by
U.S. courts and legislators that significant decisions made by private parties
can be made subject to individual process “rights.”
The algorithmic due process literature calls for various types of
individualized “meaningful notice.” These notice proposals include
94. Citron, supra note 14, at 1313; Citron & Pasquale, supra note 4, at 19−20; Crawford & Schultz,
supra note 5, at 120–21.
95. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267–68 (1970); see also Houston Federation of Teachers,
Local 2415 v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1172–73 (S.D. Tex. 2017); Crawford &
Schultz, supra note 5, at 111.
96. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 4, at 19; Crawford & Schultz, supra note 5, at 121–28.
97. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 4, at 16–17; Selbst & Barocas, Intuitive Appeal, supra note 4,
at 1101.
98. See supra note 84.
99. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)(B) (2018) (tasking the Federal Trade Commission with
creating means for parents to access children’s information gathered by websites); 47 U.S.C. § 551(d)
(giving cable subscribers access to personally identifiable information collected and maintained by a
cable operator and a “reasonable opportunity to correct any error in such information”); 16 C.F.R. § 312.6
(2019) (stating the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act rule).
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notifying individuals that a decision is going to be made,100 notifying
individuals of the general sources of data inputs,101 notifying individuals of
privacy risks,102 giving individuals the right to inspect data about them,103
and establishing and disclosing audit trails that record both facts and rules
supporting algorithmic decisions.104 Many of these notice requirements are,
in fact, aspects of the Fair Information Practices (“FIPs”) on which many
data privacy laws are based. To make notice effective and avoid
overwhelming nonexperts, several scholars have suggested using technology
that allows individuals to tinker with algorithmic decision-making to get a
sense of how it works.105 As discussed in Part III, there is a hearty debate
ongoing in the EU over whether individuals should be afforded an
explanation of an algorithmic decision and, if so, what kind of explanation
they should be afforded.106
Algorithmic due process proposals also call for multiple kinds of
opportunities to be heard. Proposals have called for individuals to have the
right to correct inaccurate data.107 This can involve allowing individuals to
challenge not just erroneous personal data but erroneous inferences and
scores.108 Proposals have called for individuals to be given an opportunity to
challenge a decision in front of a neutral third party, such as the Federal
Trade Commission (“FTC”).109 In that process, individuals could examine
evidence used against them, including the data, the algorithmic logic applied
and the audit trails.110 Or an opportunity to be heard could be less robust and
less neutral, internalized within a company as the opportunity to obtain
human involvement in an algorithmic decision, either during the process or
ex post.111
100. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 4, at 28.
101. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 4, at 20; Crawford & Schultz, supra note 5, at 125.
102. Crawford & Schultz, supra note 5, at 126 (stating that notification happens in a way
“reasonably calculated” to inform people of privacy risks).
103. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 4, at 20.
104. See Citron, supra note 14, at 1305.
105. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 4, at 28–30; see also Hildebrandt, supra note 14, at 53–54. For
a similar suggestion in the copyright law context, see Maayan Perel & Niva Elkin-Koren, Black Box
Tinkering: Beyond Disclosure in Algorithmic Enforcement, 69 FLA. L. REV. 181, 190–200 (2017).
106. Kaminski, supra note 86, at 198.
107. Crawford & Schultz, supra note 5, at 126–27; Kaminski, supra note 86, at 213 (discussing the
right to correction in the GDPR).
108. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 4, at 28.
109. Crawford & Schultz, supra note 5, at 127.
110. Id. at 127–28.
111. Putting a human in the loop or on the loop raises the specter of automation bias—the human
tendency to take as authoritative decisions made by machines. See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 4, at 6–
8 (describing the levels of automation spoken about in autonomous weapons literature, including humans
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Algorithmic due process would address both dignitary and justificatory
concerns about algorithmic decision-making. Disclosing secret systems and
allowing individuals to participate in and correct both profiling and decisionmaking respects human dignity.112 Individualized procedural protections
would also address justificatory concerns to the extent that they make visible
the bases of decisions and create accountability through process.113
As has been argued in the literature, these individual rights would also
have at least some instrumental value. Individual due process has been
described as a form of system management, uncovering and correcting
systemic errors, bias, and discrimination.114 By allowing individuals the
opportunity to correct both factual and legal errors in their own proceedings,
individualized due process can lead to larger corrections in both the
application and creation of rules.115 It can decrease bias and outright
discrimination both by permitting challenges to individual decisions and by
exposing decisional systems to external evaluation for compliance with legal
principles and societal norms.116 In the context of expert decision-making,
in the loop, humans on the loop, and humans out of the loop). For alternative ways to classify automation
levels, see NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., PRELIMINARY
STATEMENT OF POLICY CONCERNING AUTOMATED VEHICLES 4-5 (2019), https://www.nhtsa.gov/
staticfiles/rulemaking/pdf/Automated_Vehicles_Policy.pdf (defining vehicle automation as having five
levels: “No-Automation” (Level 0), “Function-specific Automation” (Level 1), “Combined Function
Automation” (Level 2), “Limited Self-Driving Automation” (Level 3), and “Full Self-Driving
Automation” (Level 4)); NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP.,
AUTOMATED DRIVING SYSTEMS 4 (2017), https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/documents/
13069a-ads2.0_090617_v9a_tag.pdf (relying on levels designated by the Society of Automotive
Engineers to define automation); NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP.,
FEDERAL AUTOMATED VEHICLES POLICY 9–10 (2016), https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/
files/docs/AV%20policy%20guidance%20PDF.pdf (same); see also Paul Godsmark, The Definitive
Guide to the Levels of Automation for Driverless Cars, WONDER HOW TO, https://driverless.wonder
howto.com/news/definitive-guide-levels-automation-for-driverless-cars-0176009 (last updated Apr. 9,
2017, 9:51 PM). Humans could be trained on “automation bias” (the likelihood that a human will
unquestioningly accept an automated decision) and be required to “explain, in detail, their reliance on the
automated system’s decision.” Citron, supra note 14, at 1306−07.
112. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 4, at 27; Hildebrandt, supra note 14, at 47–48; Zarsky, supra
note 14, at 1548–49.
113. See Mireille Hildebrandt, Privacy as Protection of the Incomputable Self: From Agnostic to
Agonistic Machine Learning, 20 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 83, 119–20 (2019).
114. Crawford & Schultz, supra note 5, at 121.
115. Citron, supra note 14, at 1280, 1284–86; see also Crawford & Schultz, supra note 5, at 119
(listing the following due process values: “(1) accuracy; (2) the appearance of fairness; (3) equality of
inputs into the process; (4) predictability, transparency, and rationality; (5) participation; (6) revelation;
and (7) privacy-dignity” (footnotes omitted)).
116. Crawford & Schultz, supra note 5, at 120 (observing that due process is also a check and
balance—“a core function of due process is to separate those who write the legal code from adjudicators
who use it. . . . [In big data,] there is no system of checks and balances to ensure that biases are not present
in the system, which is especially crucial to a system of enforcement” (footnote omitted)).
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putting a human expert in the loop as a proxy or fiduciary for the affected
individual could prevent error by ensuring that individualized context is
included in the decision.
These are all good reasons for giving individuals transparency and
process rights over machine decisions. The problem, however, is that
individual rights are not a particularly good way to correct a complex,
opaque, and evolving system.117
B. COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE
While individual rights can address important dignitary and
justificatory concerns, there are better ways to identify and fix systemic
problems in algorithmic decision-making. A growing body of literature calls
for moving away from ex post, individualized transparency and due process
or, at least, supplementing them with regulations that target algorithmic
design at earlier stages and target the human systems around algorithms.118
This second camp of algorithmic accountability proposals ranges from
117. This is why the algorithmic due process literature also calls for systemic accountability on top
of individual due process. In addition to individual notice and an opportunity to be heard, the due process
literature contains proposals for publicly releasing the source code, releasing information about the
system’s logics, releasing information about the datasets (but not the datasets themselves), oversight by
a board of experts, third-party and government audits, and government agency oversight. Citron, supra
note 14, at 1308–10, 12; Citron & Pasquale, supra note 4, at 20–28, 31.
118. One set of scholars calls for moving away from individual transparency and process rights. See
Desai & Kroll, supra note 14, at 10; Edwards & Veale, Slave to the Algorithm, supra note 15, at 23; Kroll
et al., supra note 14, at 636−42. Tal Zarsky weighs the pros and cons of individual transparency against
a host of other interests. Zarsky, supra note 14, at 657–60. Zarsky and Jane Bambauer more recently
discuss the problem of gaming raised by individual rights. Jane Bambauer & Tal Zarsky, The Algorithm
Game, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 11–12 (2018). By contrast both Mike Ananny and Kate Crawford and
Andrew Selbst and Solon Barocas can be understood as saying that individual transparency is sometimes
necessary but not sufficient. Ananny & Crawford, supra note 10, at 982; Selbst & Barocas, Intuitive
Appeal, supra note 4, at 1088. And as discussed in supra note 117, the algorithmic due process literature
also emphasizes systemic accountability.
If there is a consensus between the divergent branches of the literature, it is that most call for
something like systemic “accountability by design.” Kroll and others call for implementing this earlier in
the design process, with specific technical recommendations. Kroll et al., supra note 14. David Lehr and
Paul Ohm similarly call for more of a focus on the training phase of machine learning. Lehr & Ohm,
supra note 3, at 716–17. Ananny and Crawford suggest a greater focus on the human-machine assemblage
rather than the machine itself. Ananny & Crawford, supra note 10, at 983–84. And Selbst and Barocas
similarly emphasize recording requirements, which will capture more of what happens at earlier phases.
Selbst & Barocas, Intuitive Appeal, supra note 4, at 1129–38. It is in fact a bit disingenuous of later
literature to characterize algorithmic due process only as a set of individual transparency and process
rights. Even the earlier-stage algorithmic due process literature called for instituting systemic
accountability measures beyond individual due process. Citron, supra note 14, at 1308–13; Citron &
Pasquale, supra note 4, at 20–27; Crawford & Schultz, supra note 5; see also FRANK PASQUALE, THE
BLACK BOX SOCIETY 140–88 (2015) (calling for a system of layered “qualified transparency”).
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suggesting specific technical requirements for building algorithms119 to
calling for a patchwork of systemic accountability mechanisms, such as
whistle-blower protections120 or impact assessments and other forms of
transparency.121
To some extent, this second camp is right about individual due process
rights. Individual rights are a limited tool for finding and fixing system-wide
problems such as error, bias, and discrimination in algorithms. In part this is
because of the limited capacity of rights-bearing individuals, whether
technical, behavioral, legal, or economic.122 In part this is because
uncovering systemic problems such as discrimination will be easier to do
with an eye to the system’s overall behavior, rather than by evaluating oneoff decisions.123 And in part this is because of timing. The ability to challenge
individual decisions or determinations after-the-fact or even at regular
intervals will not be as effective at fixing a machine learning algorithm as
designing a good system from the onset124 or monitoring for compliance on
an ongoing basis.125 This is because of the nature of machine learning
algorithms: much of the work happens at the design and training stages, and
it can be very hard or even impossible to assess and correct a running
model.126 Some algorithms, too, evolve over time. Trying to regulate the
quality of these systems through individual challenges will constitute an
elaborate game of whack-a-mole.127 Thus, more recent literature on
algorithmic accountability has either decried individual process and
transparency as inadequate by itself128 or rejected individual rights and called
119. Kroll et al., supra note 14, at 662–72.
120. Desai & Kroll, supra note 14, at 42–64; Katyal, supra note 8, at 99–141.
121. A. Michael Froomkin, Regulating Mass Surveillance as Privacy Pollution: Learning from
Environmental Impact Statements, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1713, 1757–58; Price, supra note 8, at 466
(describing a mandatory disclosure regime); Andrew D. Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing,
52 GA. L. REV. 109, 169–72 (2017); David Wright & Charles D. Raab, Constructing a Surveillance
Impact Assessment, 28 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 613, 616–22 (2012).
122. Edwards & Veale, supra note 15, at 74–75.
123. Selbst & Barocas, Intuitive Appeal, supra note 4, at 1111–13.
124. Desai & Kroll, supra note 14, at 41–42 (discussing the limits of ex post testing); Kroll et al,
supra note 14, at 656–78.
125. Ananny & Crawford, supra note 10, at 982 (discussing ongoing disclosure and noting that
“[a]ny notion of transparency or auditing without temporal dimensions misses seeing previous iterations,
understanding how they worked, why they changed, and how their interacting components actually
constituted different systems”).
126. Kroll et al., supra note 14, at 640; Lehr & Ohm, supra note 3, at 657.
127. Desai & Kroll, supra note 14, at 41 (“[D]ynamic systems . . . , especially highly dynamic
systems, that are not designed for evaluation pose perhaps a larger problem . . . .”).
128. Ananny & Crawford, supra note 10, at 984 (“[T]ransparency alone cannot create accountable
systems.”).
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for different kinds of accountability mechanisms altogether.129 More recent
literature, too, has pushed back against public transparency, arguing instead
for court and expert oversight. 130
The literature has arrived at an important inflection point: it shows that
individual due process is not the best way to address instrumental concerns
about algorithmic decision-making. But the discussion is also incomplete. It
fails to capture the bigger picture of what exactly the proposed array of
accountability tools is meant to accomplish. I argue that what these proposals
are driving at is collaborative governance of algorithmic decision-making.131
1. Collaborative Governance
Collaborative governance, or “new governance,”132 deploys privatepublic partnerships towards public governance goals. Collaborative
governance should not be confused with self-regulation, though it may
include or even rely in substantial part on private governance. In its ideal
form, collaborative governance is not hands-off or deregulatory.133 It exists
on a spectrum between traditional command-and-control regulation and
private ordering, and may employ significant aspects of each.134
On one end of this spectrum are top-down, government-dominated
129. Desai & Kroll, supra note 14, at 56–64 (calling for whistleblower protection and a public
interest cause of action); Edwards & Veale, Slave to the Algorithm, supra note 15, at 74–80 (describing
the aspects of the GDPR that go beyond individual rights); Kroll et al, supra note 14, at 639-640.
130. Kroll et al, supra note 14, at 657–60.
131. Only a handful of scholars, as mentioned, have explicitly called for the collaborative
governance of algorithms. See Guihot et al., supra note 8, at 456; Perel & Elkin-Koren, supra note 8, at
530; Price, supra note 8, at 421.
132. See Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 7, at 346–47. As Orly Lobel has explained,
[T]he governance model emerges from a myriad of recent scholarly theories including . . .
reflexive law, soft law, collaborative governance, democratic experimentalism, responsive
regulation, outsourcing regulation, reconstitutive law, post-regulatory law, revitalizing
regulation, regulatory pluralism, decentering regulation, meta-regulation, contractarian law,
communicative governance, negotiated governance, destabilization rights, cooperative
implementation, interactive compliance, public laboratories, deepened democracy and
empowered participatory governance, pragmatic lawyering, nonrival partnership, and a daring
legal system.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
133. Lobel, New Governance, supra note 7, at 69 (“These approaches . . . do not, however, entail a
complete shift from command-and-control regulation to self-regulation. . . . [T]he central challenge . . .
is to maintain an effective role for law and regulation amidst the shifts to more private efforts of
governance.”).
134. Bamberger, supra note 9, at 396 (“[T]he delegation of decisionmaking discretion to private
firms does not change their nature as parties who must follow the law. . . . [I]mposing civil or criminal
penalties provides an important means of ex post punishment . . . .”); see also Emily S. Bremer, Private
Complements to Public Governance, 81 MO. L. REV. 1115, 1116–22 (2016) (illustrating a spectrum of
public-private approaches).
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approaches, in which government institutions dictate and enforce the law’s
substance. On the other end is private ordering, in which private sector actors
voluntarily undertake self-regulation in the absence of government action.135
Collaborative governance represents a hybrid or, in the case of “responsive
regulation,” an escalating approach.136 It may include but is not limited to
formal coregulation through the adoption of codes of conduct or certification
mechanisms.137 Collaborative governance is, at best, a highly tailored, sitecalibrated regulatory system that aims to pull inputs from, obtain buy-in
from, and affect the internal institutional structures and decision-making
heuristics of the private sector, while maintaining the legitimacy, efficacy,
and public-interest orientation of public sector governance.
There are a number of much-touted benefits to collaborative
governance compared to command-and-control regulation on the one hand
and self-regulation on the other.138 Proponents of purely private governance
(self-regulation) point out that some regulatory problems are ill-suited to a
command-and-control approach.139 This may be because the private sector
has technical expertise the government cannot obtain140 or because the
technology at issue is evolving at a rate top-down regulation cannot keep up
135. Bremer, supra note 134, at 1116.
136. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 12, at 4–7; William McGeveran, Friending the Privacy
Regulators, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 959, 983–85 (2016).
137. Formal coregulation—that is, the use of industry codes of conduct to set substantive standards
in the law and the sharing of government responsibility with industry for enforcement—can be understood
as a version of collaborative governance or a set of tools in the collaborative toolkit, although some
authors use the terms “coregulation” and “collaborative governance” interchangeably. CHRISTOPHER T.
MARSDEN, INTERNET CO-REGULATION 59–63 (2011) (contrasting a wide range of forms of collaborative
governance, which Christopher Marsden calls coregulation, from self-regulation, to “Potemkin”
regulators that have little to no power, to collaborative governance with significant teeth); Dennis D.
Hirsch, The Law and Policy of Online Privacy: Regulation Self-Regulation, or Co-Regulation?, 34
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 439, 465–66 (2011). Europe and countries like Australia have been experimenting
with versions of both formal coregulation and a spectrum of collaborative governance techniques for
years, especially in the Internet sector. Hirsch, supra note 137, at 442–43; see also IAN BROWN &
CHRISTOPHER T. MARSDEN, REGULATING CODE 3–4 (2013). There has been comparatively little
discussion of collaborative governance as applied to technology law in the U.S. landscape. Ian Brown &
Chris Marsden, Regulating Code: Towards Prosumer Law? 4 (Feb. 25, 2013) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2224263 (“Adoption of [coregulation] in the United
States has been slow . . . .”). But see Philip J. Weiser, The Future of Internet Regulation, 43 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 529, 552–84 (2009).
138. Bremer, supra note 134, at 1122–24 (suggesting looking to “the concept of comparative
institutional advantage” to decide when to turn to private governance); Hirsch, supra note 137, at 439–
44 (discussing the arguments for and against coregulation).
139. Bremer, supra note 134, at 1123–24; Guihot et al., supra note 8, at 435–36; Hirsch, supra note
137, at 455, 458–59.
140. Bremer, supra note 134, at 1123; Guihot et al., supra note 8, at 465.
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with (the so-called “pacing problem”).141 Even short of the pacing problem,
private institutions may be more nimble and efficient,142 self-regulation may
better approximate a market-driven optimum,143 and involving the private
sector in its own regulation may lead to greater buy-in and adherence to
voluntary rules over time.144
The central problem with self-regulation is, of course, capture. Inherent
in the notion of self-regulation is that the regulated set the substance of their
own regulation and participate in enforcement and compliance, often without
input by representatives of the public interest or competing voices from the
private sector.145 Even where the substance of self-regulation is publicly
oriented, self-regulating companies can lack mechanisms to enforce
compliance, and the risk of free riding means every actor has a strong
incentive not to comply.146 Private governance, too, is ill-suited for areas
with a high degree of divergence between interests, which may prevent
substantive agreement, thus thwarting the purported benefits of voluntary
buy-in and nimbleness or efficiency.147
Collaborative governance is a middle ground, a third way, that aims to
harness the benefits of self-regulation without its pitfalls.148 The government
stays significantly involved as a backdrop threat to nudge private sector
involvement, as a forum for convening and empowering conflicting voices,
as an arbiter or certifier in the name of the public interest, and as a hammer
that can come down to enforce compliance. Often in collaborative
governance, the government does some version of all of the above.149 The
toolkit of collaborative governance ranges from formal delegation to the
141. Guihot et al., supra note 8, at 421; Meg Leta Jones, Does Technology Drive Law? The Dilemma
of Technological Exceptionalism in Cyberlaw, 2018 J.L., TECH. & POL’Y. 249, 277–81; Scherer, supra
note 14, at 367–73; see also Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, New Governance, Chief
Privacy Officers, and the Corporate Management of Information Privacy in the United States: An Initial
Inquiry, 33 L. & POL’Y 477, 483 (2011) (“As the pace of technological and market change accelerated,
both rule-based and purely self-regulatory approaches have become increasingly less relevant to the
protection of privacy.”); Michael Birnhack, Reverse Engineering Informational Privacy Law, 15 YALE
J.L. & TECH. 24, 38–39 (2012); Freeman, supra note 7, at 28 (describing collaborative governance as “a
flexible, adaptive system capable of responding to advances in science, technology, knowledge . . . [when]
rules are shaped by, and responsive to, the particular contexts in which they are deployed”).
142. Bremer, supra note 134, at 1123.
143. Hirsch, supra note 137, at 455–57.
144. Bremer, supra note 134, at 1123.
145. Hirsch, supra note 137, at 458–59.
146. Id.
147. Bremer, supra note 134, at 1123–24.
148. Hirsch, supra note 137, at 465.
149. See Freeman, supra note 7, at 559–60, 671–73; Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 7, at 371–
404.
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private sector on one end—for example, in the form of government-certified
codes of conduct—to informal convening, nudging, and “responsive
regulation” on the other. To some degree, many systems that might at first
be characterized as hard-law regulation are, in fact, systems of collaborative
governance.
By involving the private sector and other third parties, collaborative
governance can purportedly (1) increase the amount of private sector
expertise in governance, (2) contribute to the perceived legitimacy of
governance, thus contributing to increased compliance, (3) harness
nongovernmental mechanisms towards compliance and enforcement, thus
increasing the state’s enforcement capacity, and (4) solve pacing problems
by shifting from onetime, specific rules to an ongoing, iterative system of
monitoring and compliance.150 Collaborative governance can thus, in theory
at least, address many of the regulatory challenges posed by algorithmic
decision-making.151 It has been touted as well suited to governing complex,
changing, and risky systems, including those in the field of privacy law.152
Rather than attempting to dictate in specific, detailed legal rules precisely
how to prevent the problems of algorithmic error, bias, and discrimination,
the state could structure, against a backdrop of significant state enforcement
resources, a system of delegation to and oversight over the private sector in
coming up with contextually appropriate solutions and maintaining ongoing
compliance with the regulatory regime.153 These solutions could address
problems that arise at an early design stage and could create ongoing
oversight and refinement.
150. See, e.g., Hirsch, supra note 137, at 467.
151. Guihot and others make a similar argument with respect to responsive risk regulation, and W.
Nicholson Price II has argued this in the context of black box medicine. See supra note 8.
152. See KENNETH A. BAMBERGER & DEIRDRE K. MULLIGAN, PRIVACY ON THE GROUND 12–13
(2015); COLIN J. BENNETT & CHARLES D. RAAB, THE GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY 121–22 (Ashgate
Publ’g Ltd. 2003); Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note 141, at 480; Dennis D. Hirsch, Going Dutch?
Collaborative Dutch Privacy Regulation and the Lessons It Holds for U.S. Privacy Law, 2013 MICH. ST.
L. REV. 83, 98–99, 157; Dennis D. Hirsch, supra note 137, at 464–67; Margot E. Kaminski, When the
Default Is No Penalty: Negotiating Privacy at the NTIA, 94 DENVER L. REV. 925, 927 n.11, 947–48
(2016); Ira S. Rubinstein, Privacy and Regulatory Innovation: Moving Beyond Voluntary Codes, 6 I/S:
J.L. POL’Y INFO. SOC’Y 355, 413–14 (2011); David Thaw, Enlightened Regulatory Capture, 89 WASH.
L. REV. 329, 343 n.69, 367–70 (2014). See generally COLIN J. BENNETT, REGULATING PRIVACY: DATA
PROTECTION AND PUBLIC POLICY IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES (1992) (comparing computer
privacy laws in the United States, Britain, West Germany, and Sweden); Kenneth A. Bamberger &
Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and on the Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV. 247 (2011) (discussing
the convergence of corporate privacy practices); Lauren E. Willis, Performance-Based Consumer Law,
82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1309 (2015) (suggesting a performance-based consumer law approach).
153. Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2029, 2038
(2005) (describing three stages: “the setting, implementation, and enforcement (including monitoring) of
standards”).
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However, collaborative governance is subject to many of the same
capture concerns as self-regulation. Accountability thus is the key to a
successful collaborative governance regime. I argue that characterizing the
systemic governance prong of algorithmic accountability as collaborative
governance more fully captures the kinds of accountability necessary for
addressing instrumental concerns about algorithmic decision-making. It also
highlights that while most scholars have been focusing on a first-order
accountability problem (ensuring that an algorithm is being overseen by
impartial but expert outsiders), they have failed to identify the second-order
accountability problem (ensuring that these delegated processes of
governance remain accountable to society at large).154
Accountability in a collaborative governance regime looks different and
serves different goals from the individualized transparency of due process.
Rather than protecting individual dignity or providing individualized
justification, accountability in a collaborative governance regime attempts to
ensure that private sector involvement in public governance both
substantively serves public goals and is procedurally legitimate.155
In other words, the problem of algorithmic accountability is not just
about letting a team of external computer scientists see the source code and
data set and play with the algorithm. It is also about, for example, putting in
place independence requirements that ensure those engineers do not get later
hired by that company, putting in place processes for those engineers to
report problems to a regulator or to the public, and putting in place
opportunities for stakeholders to have oversight over, or at least input into,
decisions made by these engineers. The first kind of accountability (letting
engineers see the source code) is concerned about oversight over how the
algorithm functions. The second (requiring independence or putting in place
ways for those engineers to trigger public reactions or regulatory
enforcement) is concerned with the legitimacy of the collaborative
governance system—of delegating substantive decisions about policy to
private actors—as a whole.
154. Kaminski, supra note 12, (manuscript at 21–23) (describing “first order” and “second order”
accountability issues).
155. This resonates with Danielle Citron’s important point that algorithmic governance is not just
about individual due process but also about creating overall accountability towards setting the rules of an
algorithmic system. See Citron, supra note 14, at 1302–03.
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2. The Collaborative Governance Toolkit
As discussed, collaborative governance is not the same thing as selfregulation or deregulation.156 Collaborative governance shifts from
commanding private actors to structuring both collaboration with and
delegation to them.157 I discuss a number of the available tools here.
First there is, crucially, still room for command-and-control
government in collaborative governance.158 State-set prohibitions and
parameters can ensure that both lawmaking and compliance do not move too
far from the public good.159 Additionally, the state can and should use
traditional enforcement when necessary to incentivize private participation
in both rule setting and compliance against the background threat of a
regulatory hammer (what I and others have referred to as a “penalty default,”
drawing on the literature on private ordering).160 Thus, for example, the state
might set a broad rule that algorithmic decision-making should not
discriminate and issue significant fines when a particular algorithmic
decision-making system produces discriminatory results.
Coupled with a traditional command-and-control approach, a
collaborative governance regime mixes soft and hard law along multiple
axes.161 The goal is to retain both enough give in the legal system that private
actors will be incentivized to participate and enough strength in the system
that they are motivated to do so towards the public good. Collaborative
governance tools range from the more to the less formal and deploy more or
less government involvement. More formal “coregulatory” methods include
negotiated rulemaking,162 legal safe harbors to encourage the adoption of
156. See supra Introduction.
157. Bamberger, supra note 9, at 386 (“Regulators no longer command, they delegate.”); Lobel,
The Renew Deal, supra note 7, at 377 (“[T]he role of government changes from regulator and controller
to facilitator, and law becomes a shared problem-solving process rather than an ordering activity.”).
158. See Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 7, at 452.
159. See id. at 371.
160. Kaminski, supra note 152, at 943–45; Price, supra note 8, at 466. This idea appears throughout
the literature but is not explicitly identified as a penalty default. David Dana, The New “Contractarian”
Paradigm in Environmental Regulation, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 35, 47; Freeman, supra note 6, at 666 (“The
background threat of regulation by an agency can provide the necessary motivation for effective and
credible self-regulation.”); see also Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 7, at 452 (quoting Dana, supra)
(“[C]ommand-and-control regulation is a precondition for contractarian regulation” as “actors that
recognize the possibility of regulation . . . have an incentive to voluntarily reach a cooperative
agreement.”) (referring to David Dana’s “contractarian regulation”).
161. See Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 7, at 388–95.
162. Cf. Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1, 34–35, 42–
51 (1982) (stating that coregulatory methods are less formal than rulemaking).
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industry codes of conduct,163 and the incorporation by reference of technical
standards.164 In these formal methods of collaborative governance, it is clear
that the government’s goal is structured delegation to or collaboration with
the private sector.
Less formal methods of collaborative governance include audited selfregulation,165 informally “delegating” the interpretation of broader standards
to private actors,166 applying performance standards instead of specific
rules,167 and encouraging private ordering in response to unappealing
defaults crafted in the law.168 These less formal methods may escape
identification as collaborative governance tactics or, indeed, may not be
deliberately collaborative on the part of the government at all. But they
perform collaborative functions by structuring the involvement of the private
sector in determining the substance or implementation of regulation and in
overseeing compliance with it.
There is no one-size-fits-all version of collaborative governance. A
particular regime will need to be tailored to a particular sector.169 The state
ideally calibrates a particular collaborative governance system to the features
of a particular industry, evaluating whether that industry contains repeat
players, whether its actors are motivated by professional reputation, how
firms are internally organized, including whether there is an established
compliance culture, and what kinds of network links exist between actors.
Extrinsic forms of motivation and accountability can lead to the creation of
very different kinds of collaborative legal regimes. So can other features of
the regulatory environment, including whether civil society players are well
established and well resourced and how great the technical barriers are to
163. See Rubinstein, supra note 152, at 356–60.
164. Emily S. Bremer, Incorporation by Reference in an Open-Government Age, 36 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 131, 133–39 (2013).
165. Bremer, supra note 134, at 1118–19.
166. Bamberger, supra note 9, at 386 (“Regulators no longer command, they delegate.”); Lobel,
New Governance, supra note 7, at 71 (“[R]egulations are often deliberately ambiguous. Instead of
regulating the details of behavior, agencies increasingly use broad policy goals such as 'risk management'
and allow the regulated industries to implement and interpret these mandates.”).
167. See, e.g., Willis, supra note 152, at 1330. But see Bamberger, supra note 9, at 389 (“Certain
public problems . . . lend themselves to neither specific behavioral commands nor measurable
outcomes.”).
168. See Bremer, supra note 134, at 1119 (calling these “second-order regulatory agreements . . .
‘agreements entered into between regulated firms and other private actors in the shadow of public
regulations’” (quoting Vandenbergh, supra note 153, at 2030)); see also Kristelia A. García, Penalty
Default Licenses: A Case for Uncertainty, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1117, 1122 (2014) (identifying “penalty
default licenses” and penalty defaults in general as mechanisms for inducing private ordering).
169. Jody Freeman refers to this approach as “microinstitutional[ism].” Freeman, supra note 6, at
674.
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participation by third parties.
i. The Problem of Accountability
Relying on the private sector and private third parties for rule-setting,
implementation, and enforcement, however, creates a significant problem: a
lack of accountability.170 Critics observe that such a regime can easily
become subject to collusion or capture.171 Collaborative governance in its
worst form becomes a way for powerful companies to cement their power
and evade regulation and oversight.172 Governance mechanisms can become
an “enablement paradigm” instead of an “empowerment paradigm,” with
purported accountability tactics providing a fig leaf that legitimizes bad
behavior and does not mitigate it.173
Accountability is thus the central problem of collaborative
governance.174 Accountability can mean many things.175 Accountability is
not synonymous with transparency. Transparency involves structuring
information flows—to the public, to experts, and to affected third parties.
But an accountable collaborative governance regime is not necessarily a
publicly transparent regime; nor is public transparency alone sufficient for
establishing accountability. The collaborative governance literature is filled
with calls for public transparency.176 But it also contains skepticism,
170. Bamberger, supra note 9, at 384 (“[D]ecisions assigned to regulated firms should also be
viewed through an accountability lens.”).
171. See, e.g., AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 12, at 55–56.
172. Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 7, at 458–59 (“A central challenge for the governance
model is therefore to understand how collaborative environments can be nurtured to produce equitable
results, especially in settings where vast power imbalances exist.”).
173. Bamberger, supra note 9, at 429 (“[T]he establishment of auditable controls often provides
firms with ways to signal legitimacy without addressing deeper problems inherent in existing routines
and structures.”); Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 7, at 385 (fearing that collaborative techniques will
be "used by management merely as mechanisms for monitoring, controlling, and exerting additional
pressures on workers").
174. Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion, 116 HARV.
L. REV. 1229, 1236–37 (2003) (identifying “accountability as the central issue requiring inventive work”
in public-private roles).
175. Bamberger, supra note 9, at 404; Desai & Kroll, supra note 14, at 6–23 (providing an overview
of accountability problems in both the public and private sectors); Minow, supra note 174, at 1260
(“Accountability . . . means being answerable to authority that can mandate desirable conduct and
sanction conduct that breaches identified obligations.”).
176. Bamberger, supra note 9, at 407 (“[A] certain level of decisional transparency [is] essential to
permitting meaningful review.”); Bremer, supra note 134, at 1124 (“[A] private governance system
should be transparent, so that both its participants and products are knowable to a public that may be
affected by that system.”); Freeman, supra note 6, at 635 (“As in other contexts, mandatory disclosure
could serve as one among other accountability mechanisms.”); Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 7, at
454 (“[G]overnance embraces the essential significance of transparency and information disclosure.”);
Minow, supra note 174, at 1263 (“Democratic governments promise accountability through transparency,
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including acknowledgments that accountability necessarily involves both
enforcement mechanisms and expert analysis, in addition to public
knowledge and engagement.177 This observation resonates with the literature
on algorithmic accountability, which more recently downplays public
transparency in favor of expert oversight.178 But it also pushes back against
more recent attempts to establish regulatory or expert oversight without any
public or third-party transparency.
Accountability in the context of collaborative governance has been
characterized as “checks on decision making” targeted at producing
legitimacy—that is, the public acceptability of a system.179 Accountability
involves both substantive and procedural goals. An accountable regime
produces substantively good regulation, in the name of the public good rather
than private interests.180 At the same time, an accountable collaborative
governance regime maintains procedural norms about fair decision-making
to produce public acceptance of private involvement in governance.181 This
can be understood as a concern about justification, in that it addresses the
perceived and real legitimacy of a decision-making system—not just the
algorithm, but the public-private partnerships around it.
In practice, accountability can take a variety of forms. Accountability
can take the form of participation and process requirements at the rulemaking
stage—for example, by requiring that an industry consult with civil society
a trendy term for public disclosure of key decisions and the information necessary to assess those
decisions.”).
177. Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 7, at 455−57 (“The Renew Deal vision must resist the
illusion of information and transparency—that the information age, through its own mechanisms, can
solve all problems. . . . At its best, the governance model should aim to combine expertise and
experience—involving representatives in many avenues while recognizing the importance of direct
engagement.”).
178. PASQUALE, supra note 118, at 153–56; Ananny & Crawford, supra note 10, at 984 (“If
transparency requires professional expertise to be understood and acted upon, then models of
accountability might examine how the system develops and deploys different types of authority and
specialized ways of seeing.”).
179. Freeman, supra note 6, at 664–66.
180. Bamberger, supra note 9, at 403 (defining accountability in terms of regulatory goals as
promoting the following: “rationality in choosing between solutions; responsiveness to public interests;
and reviewability by others”).
181. Id. at 404 (“[U]understand[ing] accountability . . . as ‘checks on decision making’ intended to
channel discretion so as to promote both effective and legitimate regulatory decisions.” (quoting Freeman,
supra note 6, at 664)). Bremer’s calls for accountability echo this attention to both substance and
procedural legitimacy. Emily Bremer, supra note 134, at 1124 (stating that transparency is necessary so
that “both [a private governance system’s] participants and products are knowable to a public that may
be affected by that system” and that “[r]ules to ensure openness and participation by a balanced range of
affected interests may similarly be necessary to preserve legitimacy and protect the substantive validity
of a private governance regime”).
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or external experts in coming up with policies or codes of conduct.182 For
example, the company Axon (formerly TASER), the world’s largest
producer of body-worn police cameras, established an AI Ethics Board
featuring academics and private sector actors, in the shadow of efforts to
regulate algorithmic decision-making in New York City.183 Absent input by
affected stakeholders and public transparency, the efficacy and legitimacy of
this board has been much questioned, as have other attempts at AI ethics
boards at other companies.184
A central aim of collaborative governance is to produce a more effective
compliance culture.185 Thus accountability can also take the form of
structuring industry self-assessment,186 by requiring the appointment of
independent compliance officers187 and requiring ongoing internal
reports.188 Accountability can also involve independent oversight over a
company’s behavior, such as third-party auditors or civil society assessments
of whether a company is actually behaving as it said it would.189
Collaborative governance emphasizes systemic accountability, or
aggregate accountability, which looks at the interplay between different
accountability mechanisms, over time.190 It does not rely, as the algorithmic
182. For the process used by the NTIA in coming up with codes of conduct, see generally Harter,
supra note 162; Kaminski, supra note 152.
183. Axon Ethics Board, POLICING PROJECT, https://www.policingproject.org/axon-ethics-board
(last visited Aug. 4, 2019); Julia Powles, New York City’s Bold, Flawed Attempt To Make Algorithms
Accountable, NEW YORKER: ANNALS OF TECHNOLOGY (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/
tech/annals-of-technology/new-york-citys-bold-flawed-attempt-to-make-algorithms-accountable.
184. Tom Simonite, Tech Firms Move To Put Ethical Guard Rails Around AI, WIRED (May 16,
2018, 4:32 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/tech-firms-move-to-put-ethical-guard-rails-around-ai
(noting an open letter by more than forty academic, civil rights, and community groups criticizing Axon
for “omit[ing] representatives from the heavily policed communities most likely to suffer the downsides
of new police technology”) .
185. Bamberger, supra note 9, at 446 (“[I]nternal firm decisionmaking is rendered more
accountable by outside influence on decision processes and structural design.”); Freeman, supra note 6,
at 644–45 (stating that self-monitoring is used to “inculcate management reforms”).
186. Freeman, supra note 6, at 663 (observing that management reform can occur through
(1) producing commitments and impact assessments before a program is implemented and (2)
periodically self-assessing compliance with those commitments and assessments over time); see also
Bamberger, supra note 9, at 448 (describing section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as producing an
annual set of internal commitments with legal force).
187. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 12, at 106; Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 7, at 463–
64 (providing the example of professional safety engineers in a firm); see McGeveran, supra note 136, at
988.
188. Bamberger, supra note 9, at 451–52 (requiring yearly benchmarks, an explanation of
alternative approaches that were rejected, and specific factors to be considered in risk assessment).
189. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 12, at 102; Freeman, supra note 6, at 551–52; Lobel, New
Governance, supra note 7, at 16.
190. Freeman, supra note 6.
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accountability literature largely does, on just one or two individual
accountability mechanisms. Enacting whistleblower protections by itself is
not enough. Requiring an algorithmic impact assessment by itself is not
enough. To achieve aggregate accountability in a collaborative governance
regime, regulators must put mechanisms in place to ensure balanced and
expert input and oversight over all three stages of governance: rule-setting,
implementation, and enforcement. And the designer of the regulatory system
must be particularly aware of how these mechanisms interact as a whole.
This requires designing multiple accountability mechanisms so that they feed
back into each other at different stages of regulation.191
For example, self-assessment or third-party auditing to ensure that an
algorithmic decision-making system is not biased might be released to a
regulator that in turn summarizes such results and publishes them to the
public.192 The public could then respond by avoiding a particular industry or
company (by deploying both shaming and a market mechanism as soft
enforcement) or by putting pressure on the regulator to enforce the law. Or
the public could respond to composite reports of particularly egregious
behavior by a sector of industry by voting to create new laws that will then
be newly implemented by a company, which in turn would be assessed by
third-party auditors. Thus the governance system iterates. Merely putting in
place a stand-alone auditing requirement would not achieve this regulatory
iteration, nor achieve accountability over the use of private-public
partnerships to govern.
Recharacterizing the conversation about algorithmic accountability as
a conversation about collaborative governance thus lets us draw on work that
the literature has already done. Rather than debating the value of
individualized transparency or of public disclosure, we can turn efforts
towards structuring an effective and accountable governance regime qua
regime. And rather than deploying accountability mechanisms one at a time,
we can more seriously begin to address how they interact in a system of
governance as a whole.
191. Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 7, at 425 n.351.
192. Freeman, supra note 6, at 644 (explaining that “[a] typical self-regulatory initiative” includes
the publication of “reports (sometimes to regulators only, sometimes both to regulators and to the general
public).”); Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 7, at 426 (describing a disclosure mechanism whereby
firms report to an agency, “which then releases the data in a yearly report for industries, consumers, and
nongovernmental stakeholders”). A similar concept of “stepped disclosure” can be invoked in an
enforcement context, requiring a report or disclosure to the government when something bad occurs,
followed by disclosure to the public if a firm fails to mitigate harm. See Bamberger, supra note 9, at 466
(describing stepped disclosure, although not using the term, as a system with in which disclosure is made
to regulator first and then to public).
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3. The Collaborative Governance of Algorithms
There are aspects of algorithmic decision-making that make it well
suited to collaborative governance.193 Algorithmic decision-making involves
complex systems that are better suited to regulation at earlier stages of
design,194 are constantly changing over time, require a high level of technical
expertise, have goals that are often articulated in terms of risk management,
and have regulatory goals that are not easily measured or precisely defined.
Moreover, algorithmic decision-making challenges at least some aspects of
our legal system such that, absent substantive legal changes, individual
challenges under existing laws may fail.195
Much of the literature on algorithmic accountability ports in various
techniques from collaborative governance, but without recognizing that it is
deploying collaborative governance and without an eye to building systemic
accountability for the governance regime itself. This means that it too lightly
dismisses public transparency, stakeholder input, and individual process as
aspects of producing a legitimate systemic regime.
This Article produces two important insights for the existing literature
on algorithmic governance. First many of the policy recommendations in that
literature are, in fact, techniques from the collaborative governance toolkit.
Auditing,196 expert input both individually and through expert boards,197
impact assessments,198 documentation,199 creating public interest causes of
action,200 and whistle-blower protections201 are, in fact, techniques deployed
in collaborative governance. Situating this conversation in the collaborative
governance literature both broadens the possible toolkit and makes us take a
193. Only a few scholars have called for the use of collaborative governance in regulating
algorithmic decision-making. See supra note 7. Most have done so in the particular contexts of copyright
and public health law, rather than contemplating what such a regime might look like for algorithmic
decision-making writ large. And none have coupled their suggestions with a system of individual rights.
194. Desai & Kroll, supra note 14, at 41–42; see also Kroll et al., supra note 14, at 695; Lehr &
Ohm, supra note 3, at 658.
195. Barocas & Selbst, Disparate Impact, supra note 4, at 701–12. For an alternative viewpoint, see
generally Grimmelmann & Westreich, supra note 4 (proposing how antidiscimination law might handle
machine learning algorithms).
196. Kim, supra note 14, at 190.
197. Kroll et al., supra note 14, at 703 (calling for appointing expert special masters); see also
Citron, supra note 14, at 1312.
198. See supra note 121; see also AI Now Inst., Algorithmic Impact Assessments: Towards
Accountable Algorithms in Public Agencies, MEDIUM (Feb. 21, 2018), https://medium.com/@AINow
Institute/algorithmic-impact-assessments-toward-accountable-automation-in-public-agencies-bd9856e6
fdde.
199. Selbst & Barocas, Intuitive Appeal, supra note 4, at 1129–38.
200. Desai & Kroll, supra note 14, at 56.
201. Id.; see also Katyal, supra note 8, at 126–29.
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systemic and governance-based point of view instead of deploying these
tools one or several at a time.
Second, understanding that the conversation about accountability in
algorithmic decision-making is, in fact, largely (though, not entirely) a
conversation about collaborative governance better frames how we talk
about transparency. Rather than arguing over the instrumental value of
individual notice or of publicly releasing source code, we should be
discussing how to obtain aggregate accountability across a firm’s decisionmaking, over time.
That is, most proposals to date largely delegate the governance of
algorithmic error, bias, and discrimination to private firms. We need to
establish accountability over how these firms set rules (determine what
constitutes “fairness” or “bias” and how to address it) and how they
implement those rules (ensuring firms deploy the tools they say are necessary
to solve the problems and that the deployed tools in fact address the
problems).
To some extent, analogies to individual procedural due process have
obscured this point. We impose accountability frameworks on companies
that deploy decision-making algorithms not just because those technologies
make decisions that look like the kind of serious decisions that traditionally
invoked procedural due process. We impose accountability because we
effectively rely on those firms to come up with and comply with substantive
rules preventing error, bias, and discrimination.202 Transparency, including
individual transparency and public transparency of some kind, is a necessary
component of accountability. But by itself it is not enough.203 Stakeholder
input, expert oversight, and a real threat of enforcement are also crucial
aspects of an accountable regime.
i. Designing Collaborative Algorithmic Governance
Collaborative governance is highly context dependent.204 We will need
to learn far more about the players in algorithmic decision-making, in
particular contexts, to structure an effective regulatory system. This Section
represents an initial attempt to outline both a portrait of the sector and what
202. Citron, supra note 14, at 1288 (“Computer programmers inevitably engage in rulemaking when
they construct an automated system’s code.”).
203. Ananny & Crawford, supra note 10, at 984 (“If we recognize that transparency alone cannot
create accountable systems and engaging with the reasons behind this limitation, we may be able to use
the limits of transparency as conceptual tools for understanding how algorithmic assemblages might be
held accountable.”).
204. See Freeman, supra note 7, at 32–33, 98.
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an effective collaborative governance regime might look like, with the caveat
that the development and use of algorithmic decision-making in may look
significantly different in different sectors.
First there are indications both of self-organizing and professionalism
within the industry and related academic circles.205 For example, the Institute
of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (“IEEE”), an international standardsetting organization, established the IEEE Global Initiative on Ethics of
Autonomous and Intelligent Systems.206 This initiative recently launched the
second edition of a treatise on ethics in autonomous systems. 207 Based on
this treatise, the IEEE Standards Association is actively working on new
standards related to AI (including a project to help users certify how to
eliminate bias in algorithms) and also now hosts a number of courses on
ethics and AI.
Outside of the IEEE, computer scientists are having robust
conversations about algorithmic accountability and explainability and how
to make such systems intelligible to individuals. One recent paper identified
nearly 300 core papers on explainable systems, with over 12,000 citing
papers in the literature.208 A growing annual, multidisciplinary conference
on fairness, accountability, and transparency in machine learning209 has, as
of 2018, joined the Association for Computing Machinery, an international
computing society and resource for computing professionals, embedding it
in the computing profession. One key question, however, is how much of
algorithmic decision-making will be built by established players and
professionals versus be deployed by smaller startups or by users potentially
less situated in the developing professional community.
205. Guihot and others note that the Partnership on AI led by Google, the Future of Life Institute’s
twenty-three Asilomar principles, and the IEEE’s self-regulatory efforts in the form of discussion papers
and projects, are related to AI and autonomous systems. Guihot et al., supra note 8, at 432–34. Katyal,
too, notes private sector standards from the Association for the Advancement of AI, the Association of
Computing Machinery (“ACM”), IEEE, and the British Computer Society. Katyal, supra note 8, at 109–
10.
206. See Ethics in Action, IEEE, https://ethicsinaction.ieee.org (last visited Aug. 4, 2019).
207. IEEE GLOB. INITIATIVE ON ETHICS OF AUTONOMOUS & INTELLIGENT SYS., IEEE, ETHICALLY
ALIGNED DESIGN (2017), http://standards.ieee.org/develop/indconn/ec/ead_v2.pdf.
208. Ashraf Abdul et al., Trends and Trajectories for Explainable, Accountable and Intelligible
Systems: An HCI Research Agenda, CHI 2018, Apr. 21−26, at 1, 1 (“We investigate how HCI researchers
can help to develop accountable systems by performing a literature analysis of 289 core papers on
explanations and explainable systems, as well as 12,412 citing papers.”).
209. ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (ACM FAT*), ACM FAT*
CONF., https://fatconference.org (last visited Sept. 3, 2019). This author has, since writing this Article,
been named a cochair of the law track of the 2020 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and
Transparency.
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There is a growing array of civil society actors concerned with
algorithmic decision-making, at least in the United States. Well-established
civil liberties organizations, such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation,
Center for Democracy and Technology, or the Electronic Privacy
Information Center, could participate in rule-setting or monitoring around
algorithmic decision-making. So could existing nonprofits, such as the
Southern Poverty Law Center or the American Civil Liberties Union, that
address related substantive concerns, including discrimination and civil
rights. Newer AI-focused organizations also have the potential for
involvement in a collaborative governance regime.210 These third-party
actors could be used in oversight mechanisms like expert boards or to
double-check auditing or in more formal negotiations of codes of conduct.
They will, however, likely need additional support and resources for
developing technological expertise and capacity.211
Given both the increasing professionalization of the field and the array
of possible third-party actors, a collaborative approach to algorithmic
accountability might work in practice. How, then, might the regime be
structured?
First we would need to establish clear liability for the kinds of failures
or systemic problems that we want to avoid—establishing it in broader
standards rather than specific rules, but bounding those standards to remain
tethered to the public interest, so companies cannot exploit limitless
flexibility.212 We would need to create a forceful mechanism for enforcing
these standards, whether through an existing agency, such as the FTC (which
currently addresses privacy harms through a consumer protection approach),
or through private rights of action or actions by federal prosecutors or state
attorneys general.213 There would need to be a strong “penalty default” in
place: a real threat of significant fines, like the GDPR’s 4 percent of
worldwide revenue. And the government agency responsible for
enforcement would have to issue fines often enough to scare private industry
210. See, e.g., About, AI NOW INST., https://ainowinstitute.org/about.html (last visited Sept. 3,
2019); About Us, PARTNERSHIP ON AI, https://www.partnershiponai.org/about (last visited Sept. 3, 2019).
211. See Freeman, supra note 7, at 32 & n.81 (noting that even the formal involvement of third
parties alone might not be enough, as third parties such as nongovernmental organizations often have a
lower bandwidth and fewer resources than companies whose interests are in tension with them).
212. The literature on rules versus standards has an eye to limiting what can be deregulated. Lobel,
The Renew Deal, supra note 7, at 468 (quoting Roderick A. Macdonald, Metaphors of Multiplicity: Civil
Society, Regimes and Legal Pluralism, 15 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 69, 77 (1998)) (“The idea that core
substantive arrangements are left open becomes, under certain conditions, insufficiently value-oriented.
We do not want a paradigm in which ‘conceptions of justice are . . . infinitely plural’ . . . .”).
213. See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 4, at 23; Crawford & Schultz, supra note 5, at 126–27.
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to the negotiating table or into establishing a real compliance regime. The
worldwide rush of companies to create internal compliance regimes to
comply with the GDPR suggests that its level of fines might be working at
doing just that. In the U.S. context, something would need to change. As I
have noted elsewhere, “[W]hat penalties there are in U.S. privacy law are not
high enough, or likely enough to be enforced against a particular industry
actor, to drive participation by most of the industry actors with whom the
government wants to co-regulate.”214
Against the backdrop of potential enforcement, we could either
formally create the opportunity to negotiate safe harbors in the form of codes
of conduct, with transparency to and input from at least third-party
stakeholders if not the public. Or, more informally, we could encourage
private actors to fill in the details of compliance in their particular context,
subject to independent monitoring (what Kenneth Bamberger refers to as
“regulation as delegation”).215 We could encourage the creation of
certification mechanisms to create private standards and systems of
compliance216 and have agencies issue guidance and convene workshops to
establish best practices in the field.217
We could require the establishment of professional and independent
“algorithmic decision-making officers”—that is, compliance officers—in
companies that deploy algorithmic decision-making. Or we could craft a safe
harbor from liability for companies that install such officers.218 We could
require companies to both make substantive commitments about their
systems and create impact assessments before their deployment.219 We could
require those impact assessments to clearly describe the system, detail
decisions around its design, address risk-mitigation measures, establish
potential benchmarks, and detail considered but rejected alternatives.220 We
could require periodic reporting or performance assessments, either to a
214. Kaminski, supra note 152, at 946.
215. See generally Bamberger, supra note 9 (exploring the delegation of decision-making in various
contexts and offering suggestions to improve accountability).
216. But see Edwards & Veale, supra note 15, at 80 (discussing the risks of self-regulation).
217. Guihot et al., supra note 8, at 397 n.43 (discussing the Obama-era White House’s early forms
of convening and guidance on AI).
218. See Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 7, at 421 (citing Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524
U.S. 742, 764 (1998)) (discussing how the Supreme Court has “recognized” that “the adoption of internal
antiharassment policies by firms” may be “a defense to sexual harassment suits”).
219. See supra note 121.
220. AI Now Inst., The 10 Top Recommendations for the AI Field in 2017, MEDIUM (Oct. 18,
2017), https://medium.com/@AINowInstitute/the-10-top-recommendations-for-the-ai-field-in-2017b3253624a7.
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government agency, to an independent expert board, or to the public.221 We
could instruct a government agency, such as the FTC, to release regular
industry-wide assessments to the public.
We could establish mandatory third-party auditing both during training
and as a company runs the model.222 We could require companies to include
nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”) or other experts on internal
oversight panels, revealing deeper information to these internal boards than
to the public, potentially including both source code and data sets.223 This is
particularly important because the instrumental goals of algorithmic
governance are not just technical, but have a significant normative-legal
component; engineers should not be defining “discrimination” or “fairness”
without extensive conversation with lawyers and impacted community
members.224 We could establish whistleblower protections for employees
who reveal bad actions in case corporate compliance culture misaligns with
public goals or outright fails.225
To encourage and enable private actor enforcement, we could explicitly
award standing to third parties for a cause of action against the behavior we
want to prevent.226 We could award attorneys’ fees or create other kinds of
monetary incentives.227 Federal agencies, again such as the FTC, could serve
in a capacity-enhancing role, hiring technologists and conducting relevant
research to aid NGOs and other private actors.
If these proposals sound familiar, it is because they have been peppered
across more recent contributions to the algorithmic governance literature.
They have not, however, been brought together as a whole. Nor has there
been much conversation about how different levers of accountability at
different stages—rule-setting versus implementation versus compliance or
enforcement—might feed back into each other.228 For example, a company
with an internal compliance officer might produce reports to an agency that
could then publish summary reports to the public, which might respond by
avoiding the company in the market, pressuring the agency to issue new best
221. Zarsky, supra note 14, at 1529.
222. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 4, at 21, 24–25, 28; Kim, supra note 14, at 190–91.
223. PASQUALE, supra note 118, at 160–65.
224. See Kim, supra note 14, at 193 (“[O]ne challenge is the ongoing disagreement about the
meaning of discrimination.”); Lehr & Ohm, supra note 3, at 705 n.187 (explaining that there are different
possible mathematical definitions of fairness and “optimizing for one precludes achieving another”).
225. Desai & Kroll, supra note 14, at 56–60.
226. Id. at 60–64.
227. Id. at 63–64.
228. For one exception, see generally Price, supra note 8 (arguing that the FDA should take a
collaborative approach to regulating medical algorithms).

1576

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92:1529

practices, pressuring legislators to produce new laws, or putting resources
behind civil society groups that could end up participating on oversight
boards of companies and contributing to the impact assessment process. If
there is no disclosure at any point to persons outside the company or
regulatory body, then the aspect of collaborative governance that harnesses
or even relies on the power of third parties in both setting publicly oriented
rules and producing compliance with them will fail.
In designing a system of collaborative governance for algorithmic
decision-making, then, we should be considering the system as a whole, not
introducing standalone mechanisms. Tools such as audits without a threat of
enforcement, impact assessments with no public transparency, even
oversight boards without the ability to enforce or, at least, report out (whether
to a regulator or the public) that are deployed individually do not create an
effective or legitimate governance regime.
ii. Potential Pitfalls
There are significant hurdles and costs to such a system, beyond the
more general problem of passing legislation through Congress, and beyond
the problem of capture discussed at length above.229 Some of these apply to
collaborative governance systems in general, but others may be more
specific to algorithmic governance.
There are problems to creating and enforcing broad, behavioral
standards rather than specific rules.230 Companies may mishandle the
delegation implied in standards, either intentionally or unintentionally.
Standards can be in tension with rule-of-law values about fair notice of
prohibited conduct by the law.231 We would have to be wary of producing
unfettered agency discretion.232 And there are costs to delaying the creation
of specific rules proscribing bad conduct, as companies escape liability by
arguing that a standard is too vague.233
Collaborative governance can favor incumbents who can afford to
229. See supra Section II.B.1.
230. See Birnhack, supra note 141, at 38–45; Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic
Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 561–62 (1992) (“One can think of the choice between rules and standards as
involving the extent to which a given aspect of a legal command should be resolved in advance or left to
an enforcement authority to consider.”); David A. Super, Against Flexibility, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1375,
1411–17 (2011).
231. Bamberger, supra note 9 at 434 (stating that standards can be in tension with “rule-of-law
values [that] demand that law—particularly law enforceable by criminal sanction—include sufficient
detail to provide fair notice of prohibited conduct”).
232. Freeman, Collaborative Governance, supra note 7, at 85–87.
233. See Super, supra note 230, at 1417–18.
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participate in rule-setting, potentially producing rules that favor them and
disfavor newer industry actors. It may also disfavor smaller enterprises that
can ill afford to take on compliance costs and culture. And if the field indeed
proves to be highly heterogeneous, then creating a collaborative governance
regime tailored to different subsectors may end up proving extraordinarily
costly to administer.234
One of the paradoxes of collaborative governance is that precisely those
subject matter areas that the approach would be best suited to—newer
technologies, complex and evolving technologies—are those areas that for
other reasons may be least suited to it.235 If there is a lack of a culture of
professionalism, big gaps between established players and new entrants, and
a lack of consensus within and between industry and outside players,
collaborative governance can be extremely challenging to implement.
A final and important criticism of collaborative governance regimes is
that they are ill-suited to determining the content of human rights. Unless we
are very, very careful to delineate the outer limits of what may be negotiated,
we may find private companies reasoning away rights protections in their
rule-setting or implementation of standards. This brings us back to why
binary governance is binary—why we need not just collaborative
governance but a system of individual rights as well.
C. COMBINING THE TWO APPROACHES
A systemic collaborative governance regime has important benefits
over other regulatory approaches in addressing instrumental concerns about
algorithmic decision-making. It addresses some but not all classes of
justificatory concerns about the legitimacy of the system. It does not,
however, adequately address dignitary concerns, nor address justificatory
concerns about particular individual decisions. For that reason, we need to
additionally establish a system of individual rights.
While collaborative governance is centrally concerned with
accountability, the kinds of accountability that it produces are not always
coextensive with the kinds of accountability we require in the context of due
process owed to individuals. Collaborative governance may produce a
regime that is adequately accountable and legitimate when it comes to
producing rules that govern algorithmic systems, but not adequately
accountable and legitimate when it comes to justifying individual decisions.
234. Bamberger, supra note 9, at 398 (“[T]he more a regulation prescribes broad policy goals, rather
than specific behavior as a measurable outcome, the more difficult it is to monitor compliance.”).
235. Kaminski, supra note 152, at 948–49.
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A system of governance through third-party audits, expert boards,
government inspection and enforcement, and performance reports might
produce better and more legitimate algorithms, but it might still not produce
a justificatory system that would be acceptable from the perspective of an
individual affected by a particular decision.
Yet as noted above,236 individual rights, especially individual rights
invoked ex post and triggered by a particular decision, will not be the best
way to create more accountable companies, improve management culture,
and correct algorithmic design. Thus to effectively govern algorithmic
decision-making, we need both. The two parts of this system, however, will
interact in complex ways.
1. The Two Systems as Complementary
In some aspects, the two parts of a binary system of governance will be
complementary. Individual rights can produce instrumental contributions, be
an important component of systemic accountability, give substance to the
rules in a collaborative governance regime, and address one of the problems
of using collaborative governance in this particular area—that oversight and
transparency can produce additional individual privacy harms. Collaborative
governance can, in turn, contribute deeper layers of accountability towards
justificatory goals than a system reliant just on individual rights.
Collaborative governance could help us define how rights will be
implemented in a particular technological setting.
First, individual rights can complement collaborative governance by
addressing individualized error, bias, and discrimination. As discussed
above,237 individual rights can help uncover and fix instrumental problems
with algorithmic decision-making. Individuals are best situated to know
when profiles contain factual error or erroneous inferences. Additionally,
individual narratives about discrimination or bias may be more palatable to
the public than agency-produced reports or statistics, and could feed back
into collaborative governance by contributing to ongoing policy
conversations about the broader governance regime.
Second, individual rights can be an important aspect of systemic
accountability. Proponents of collaborative governance might, in fact, be
surprised to see individual participation and process characterized as distinct
from aggregate accountability.238 Individual enforcement is quintessentially
236.
237.
238.

See supra Section II.B.
See id.
See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 6, at 587, 622 (referring to individual hearings).
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collaborative—it spreads the cost of obtaining compliance from the
government to private actors. And putting in place an individual right to
contest an algorithmic decision, or to obtain an explanation, or to obtain a
human in the loop could contribute to management reform within a company,
encouraging the establishment of compliance personnel or complimentary
review processes.
Third, individual rights can provide a check on substantive rule-setting
by private actors. The law might require, for example, that individuals be
given an explanation of an algorithmic decision, but leave it to private actors
to implement precisely what that explanation constitutes in practice. Making
this an individual right, rather than just a company duty, could ensure that
there is individual or even judicial review of any implementation. Individual
rights, in other words, can provide the substantive backstop for company
rule-setting, by subjecting rules or implementations to challenges,
potentially subject to judicial review. This potentially brings courts into
collaborative governance as important players that are more insulated from
politics and take into account both human rights regimes and fairness
concerns.
Fourth, an individualized disclosure regime could address one of the
central challenges to deploying collaborative governance in this space: that
releasing large amounts of information to the public threatens individual
privacy, among other informational interests.239 Collaborative governance
requires extensive monitoring and disclosure, but broader public disclosure
of profiles and personal inferences raises serious privacy concerns. Allowing
individuals to obtain this information produces oversight without necessarily
passing personal information on to the public. Relatedly, using collaborative
governance instead of command-and-control governance means that
information may be passed on to private third parties for oversight purposes
rather than to the government itself—which matters to the extent that we
want to protect individual privacy from government surveillance.
An accountable collaborative governance regime can also complement
individual procedural rights. Establishing systemic accountability in a
collaborative governance regime can bolster individual rights by providing
oversight in the name of affected individuals. Making a collaborative
governance regime systemically accountable also does work towards making
it individually justifiable.
This interaction of types of accountability envisions several types of
239.

See Kroll et al., supra note 14, at 658.
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differently purposed but complementary information flows.240 Individuals
may be provided with a simplified and understandable explanation of
algorithmic decision-making, giving them insight into whether a decision is
justified in their respective cases, at the same time that third-party auditors
assure them that the system, as a whole, is not biased or unjustifiable.
Moreover, a system of collaborative governance could bolster the ability of
individuals to enforce rights by producing an aggregate picture that can root
out systemic bias, when one-off, individual narratives might not.241
Finally, we could use collaborative governance to implement individual
rights. Several scholars have, for example, suggested that algorithmic due
process should require notice to individuals that allows them to tinker with
an algorithmic decision-making system through an easily comprehensible
interface.242 This is quintessentially a collaborative governance problem: we
would not want lawmakers to write specific and soon-outdated rules
dictating what such a system must look like. Instead, the law might put in
place a broad notice requirement, coupled with agency guidance, or a safe
harbor for those coming up and complying with a government-approved
industry code of conduct. As discussed in Part III, there is some evidence
that just such a process is beginning to take place in the EU.243
2. The Two Systems in Tension
The two systems will also, however, be in tension. An individual rights
regime can conflict with system-wide accuracy and bias. Second, a strong
individual rights regime may restrict regulators’ abilities to deploy
“responsive regulation”—that is, to calibrate enforcement measures up or
down in order to properly incentivize private collaboration.244 Third,
establishing accountability in a collaborative governance regime can raise
individual privacy concerns. Fourth, where systemic and individual
accountability can be complementary, there is also a danger of confusing one
kind of accountability for another and crafting a system that is accountable
along only one axis. And finally, while collaborative governance can do
240. See, e.g., Ananny & Crawford, supra note 10, at 983 (“Holding an assemblage accountable
requires not just seeing inside any one component . . . but understanding how it works as a system.”);
Citron & Pasquale, supra note 4, at 18–29; Selbst & Barocas, Intuitive Appeal, supra note 4, at 711.
241. Selbst & Barocas, Intuitive Appeal, supra note 4, at 1130−33.
242. See supra note 105.
243. Jef Ausloos et al., Position Paper Presented at CHI 2018: Algorithmic Transparency and
Accountability in Practice (Jan. 2018), https://uploads-ssl.webflow.com/5a2007a24a11ce000164d272/
5ac883392c10d1baaa4358f2_Algorithmic_Transparency_and_Accountability_in_Practice_CameraRea
dy.pdf.
244. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 12, 4–7.
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important work in the implementation of fundamental rights or human rights,
there is also danger in letting private parties do interpretative work instead
of courts or lawmakers.
A system of individual rights can conflict with system-wide accuracy
and system-wide concerns about bias. Individuals could use correction and
erasure rights to intentionally game a decision-making algorithm, by
changing or eliminating negative information about themselves.245 Even just
opting out of a system without actively introducing inaccuracies can affect
system bias. For example, if only well-educated, socioeconomically elite
individuals opt out, then the contours of a machine learning system would
come to reflect those who are less empowered and remain within it. Allowing
individuals to alter or erase their information changes the data set, which
changes the algorithm going forward. There are thus real tensions between
attending to individual dignitary or autonomy concerns on the one hand, and
addressing systemic bias and discrimination on the other.246
Second, a strong individual rights regime may prove to be too much of
a hammer. If collaborative governance relies on the ability of regulators to
soften regulation as an incentive for coming to the table, then giving
enforceable rights to individuals may remove that incentive. Companies
might decide not to take on the cost of participating in collaborative
governance, since they may end up facing costly individual legal challenges
after all.
A third point of tension, mentioned above,247 is that collaborative
governance centrally requires extensive monitoring and information
disclosure. Individual privacy concerns push back against this. So do other
informational interests, ranging from business interests in trade secrets to
security concerns.248 But there is a central problem with hinging a
collaborative governance regime not on disclosure to the public but on
disclosure to individuals. Not all individuals will invoke their individual
rights; individually targeted disclosure will function selectively based on
access to justice, cost, and both legal and technical expertise. A collaborative
governance regime with minimal public disclosure would, as we see below
in the example of the GDPR,249 need to carefully calibrate all of its other
accountability mechanisms in order to function.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

See Bambauer & Zarsky, supra note 118, at 34–43.
Id. at 23–32; Hildebrandt, supra note 14, at 48–49; see Zarsky, supra note 14, at 1505–10.
See supra Section II.C.1.
PASQUALE, supra note 118, at 12, 193; Kroll et al., supra note 14, at 639.
See infra Part III.
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Fourth, there is a danger of confusing the two kinds of justificatory
requirements entwined in a dual system. Individual justification requires
information that is legible to an ordinary individual.250 But systemic
accountability requires other kinds of checks, including deep disclosure to
experts and monitoring by third parties.251 Just because a binary system is
“transparent” along one axis does not mean it is transparent along others. A
system might adequately justify itself for purposes of producing individual
decisions but not for purposes of producing legitimate rules about preventing
system-wide discrimination, or vice versa. A binary system should, thus, be
assessed towards both individual and systemic accountability goals.
Finally, collaborative governance can be dangerous when applied to the
substance of fundamental rights.252 Companies are not courts; nor are they
agents of the federal government. They do not have individuals’ best
interests in mind, nor are they bound by constitutional norms. When
addressing serious human rights concerns, we must be careful not to use
collaborative governance tactics towards producing accountability measures
that function as enablement regimes.
III. THE TWO FACES OF THE GDPR
In the United States, despite repeated calls for transparency and
accountability,253 the policy landscape around algorithmic decision-making
remains largely a blank slate.254 Some requirements apply to some
government use of algorithms,255 but the United States lacks general law to
govern private sector and many government uses of algorithmic decision250. See, e.g., Gianclaudio Malgieri & Giovanni Comandé, Why a Right to Legibility of Automated
Decision-Making Exists in the General Data Protection Regulation, 7 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 243, 248–
50 (2017); see also Kaminski, supra note 86, at 213.
251. PASQUALE, supra note 118, at 56–58.
252. See, e.g., CHRISTINA ANGELOPOULOS ET AL., INST. FOR INFO. LAW, STUDY OF FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS LIMITATIONS FOR ONLINE ENFORCEMENT THROUGH SELF-REGULATION 52 (2015),
https://pure.uva.nl/ws/files/8763808/IVIR_Study_Online_enforcement_through_self_regulation.pdf.
253. See, e.g., Publications, AI NOW INST., https://ainowinstitute.org/reports.html (last visited Sept.
3, 2019).
254. Margot E. Kaminski & Andrew D. Selbst, Opinion, The Legislation That Targets the Racist
Impacts of Tech, N.Y. TIMES: THE PRIVACY PROJECT (May 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/
05/07/opinion/tech-racism-algorithms.html (discussing Senator Wyden, Senator Booker, and
Representative Clarke’s proposal); DJ Pangburn, Washington Could Be the First State To Rein In
Automated Decision-Making, FAST CO. (Feb. 8 2019), https://www.fastcompany.com/90302465/wash
ington-introduces-landmark-algorithmic-accountability-laws (discussing proposed Washington state law,
now off the table); Powles, supra note 183 (discussing a New York attempt at legislation, later watered
down); see also supra note 4.
255. Zarsky, supra note 14, at 1507–09.
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making.256
In Europe, however, this is not the case. The GDPR went into direct
effect on member states in May 2018. The GDPR governs processing of
personal data and applies to both the government and the private sector. The
GDPR contains an elaborate algorithmic accountability regime.
For the most part, the focus of the conversation about algorithmic
accountability in the GDPR has been on the individual rights regime and,
even more narrowly, on the so-called “right to explanation” of individual
algorithmically made decisions.257 This Article calls attention instead to the
binary nature of the GDPR. I argue that the GDPR is both a system of
individual rights and a complex compliance regime that, when applied to the
private sector, is constituted through collaborative governance.258 The
GDPR relies on both formal and informal tactics to create public-private
partnerships in governing algorithmic decision-making.259
256. Crawford & Schultz, supra note 5.
257. Edwards & Veale, supra note 15, at 44 (“In 2016, to the surprise of some EU data protection
lawyers, and to considerable global attention, Goodman and Flaxman asserted . . . that the GDPR
contained a ‘right to an explanation’ of algorithmic decision making. As Wachter et al. have
comprehensively pointed out, the truth is not quite that simple.” (footnote omitted)); see also Emre
Bayamlioglu, Contesting Automated Decisions: A View of Transparency Implications, 4 EUR. DATA
PROTECTION L. REV. 433, 444 (2018); Maja Brkan, Do Algorithms Rule the World? Algorithmic
Decision-Making in the Framework of the GDPR and Beyond, 27 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 91, 110−19
(2019); Bryan Casey et al., Rethinking Explainable Machines: The GDPR’s “Right to Explanation”
Debate and the Rise of Algorithmic Audits in Enterprise, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 145, 159–64 (2019);
Malgieri & Comandé, supra note 250, 246–50; Mendoza & Bygrave, supra note 14, at 92–94; Andrew
D. Selbst & Julia Powles, Meaningful Information and the Right to Explanation, 7 INT’L DATA PRIVACY
L. 233, 237–42 (2017); Wachter et. al, supra note 62, at 860–61; Sandra Wachter et al., Why a Right to
Explanation of Automated Decisionmaking Does Not Exist in the General Data Protection Regulation, 7
INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 76, 78–70 (2017); Bryce Goodman & Seth Flaxman, European Union
Regulations on Algorithmic Decision Making and a “Right to Explanation,” AI MAG., Fall 2017, at 50,
55–56.
258. I am not the first to observe that the GDPR has a dual nature. See, e.g., Roger Taylor, No
Privacy Without Transparency, in DATA PROTECTION AND PRIVACY 63, 74–76 (Ronald Leenes et al.
eds., 2017); Claudia Quelle, The Data Subject as a “Small-Scale Sovereign” – The Duties of Controllers
and the Rights and Powers of Data Subjects under the GDPR 1 (Dec. 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author); see also Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius, Informed Consent: We Can Do Better To
Defend Privacy, 13 IEEE COMPUTER & RELIABILITY SOC’YS, Mar.−Apr. 2015, at 103, 103–07
(distinguishing between (i) protecting and (ii) empowering people). Even as early as 2003, the European
Commission indicated its interest in private-public partnerships. See First Report on the Implementation
of the Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC), at 26, COM (2003) 265 final (May 15, 2003) (“[The
Commission] believes that self-regulation, and in particular codes of conduct should play an important
role in the future development of data protection in the EU and outside, not least in order to avoid
excessively detailed legislation.”).
259. Irene Kamara discusses formal coregulatory mechanisms, focusing on the incorporation of
technical standards in privacy by design. She does not discuss the overall collaborative system nor the
role of transparency in it. Irene Kamara, Co-regulation in EU Personal Data Protection: The Case of
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This observation matters for three reasons. First, it matters because the
GDPR contains not just a system of individual rights that can be invoked
after an algorithm is deployed, but an approach to governing algorithmic
system design from the onset, including the ability to affect the management
structure in companies.260 Second, this characterization shifts the
conversation about transparency in the GDPR from being about whether
individual transparency is necessary or useful to how to structure systemic
accountability. The question is not just how to make algorithms accountable
to affected individuals; it is how to hold private companies accountable in
developing the norms, policies, and technical tools involved in and providing
oversight over algorithmic decision-making.
Third, the GDPR’s binary governance approach provides an example
of how the two prongs of a binary governance system might interact. The
two systems in the GDPR—individual rights and collaborative
governance—are, as anticipated, often complementary. But they also may
prove to be in tension and will require careful calibration, in conversation
with each other, to be effective at governing algorithmic decision-making.
Intriguingly the GDPR’s absence of public-facing and stakeholder-facing
accountability suggests that individual transparency rights may have to serve
a crucial accountability role in its system of collaborative governance. Thus,
even for those focused on instrumental rather than dignitary or justificatory
goals, individual rights in the GDPR may be necessary for producing
effective systemic regulation, too.
The GDPR thus provides an illustration of the binary approach to
algorithmic accountability, in action. As the GDPR is enforced and policies
develop further over time, the regime will be a useful source of evidence
about when and whether this approach works in practice. Even now, at early
stages of implementation, the GDPR’s approach to governing algorithmic
decision-making provides lessons for the rest of the world.
Technical Standards and the Privacy by Design Standardisation ‘Mandate,’ 8 EUR. J.L. & TECH., no. 1,
2017, at 1, 15. Ed Lee has framed the “right to be forgotten” under the GDPR’s predecessor, the Data
Protection Directive, as coregulatory in nature, but has not extended this description to other rights in the
GDPR. See Edward Lee, Recognizing Rights in Real Time: The Role of Google in the EU Right To Be
Forgotten, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1017, 1066 (2016) (calling Google a “private administrative agency”
of the right to be forgotten). Others have also referred to Google’s role after the Google Spain decision
as a form of privatization of rights. ANGELOPOULOS ET AL., supra note 252, at 23−24.
260. See, e.g., Casey et al., supra note 257, at 39; Edwards & Veale, supra note 15, at 82.
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A. A PRIMER ON THE GDPR
First, a note about the GDPR for U.S. readers unfamiliar with the
regime: The GDPR, like its predecessor the Data Protection Directive,
creates an extensive data protection regime built primarily around the Fair
Information Practices (“FIPs”).261 The FIPs originated in the United States
but have become the international standard for data protection, under the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and now form
the basis for many countries’ data protection laws.262 Traditionally the FIPs
establish a number of individual rights, including access, disclosure, and
correction rights, along with general obligations respecting data gathering,
storage, and use. The GDPR thus contains a broad assortment of individual
rights and company obligations that apply beyond algorithmic decisionmaking, to personal data processing in general.263
This Article covers only those aspects of the GDPR that might apply to
or affect algorithmic decision-making. For a U.S. audience, however, it is
crucial to understand that the GDPR’s individual rights respecting
algorithmic decision-making do not stand in isolation. They exist against the
backdrop of more generally applicable law that applies to data processing.264
Thus, even if the specific rights that apply to algorithmic decision-making
prove in practice to be toothless (which does not appear to be the case given
regulators’ recent interpretations265), other aspects of the GDPR give
individuals substantial abilities to influence both profiling and consequent
decision-making, algorithmic or not.266
261. Article 5 of the GDPR lays out its version of the FIPs principles, which are further elaborated
in Articles 12 to 23 and elsewhere in the GDPR. These include the following: “lawfulness, fairness and
transparency”; “purpose limitation”; “data minimisation”; “accuracy”; “storage limitation”; “integrity
and confidentiality”; and “accountability.” Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, art. 5, at 35–36;
see also id. at 7; Paul M. Schwartz & Karl-Nikolaus Peifer, Transatlantic Data Privacy Law, 106 GEO.
L.J. 115, 128 (2017).
262. SEC’YS ADVISORY COMM. ON AUTOMATED PERS. DATA SYS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC.
& WELFARE, DHEW PUB. NO. (OS)73-94, RECORDS COMPUTERS AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS xxiii
(1973); Recommendation of the Council Concerning Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and
Transborder Flows of Personal Data, ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (Sept. 23, 1980),
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtransborderflowsofperso
naldata.htm. But see BORGESIUS, supra note 57, at 58−59 (suggesting FIPs-like principles arose around
the world in different places around the same time).
263. See generally Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 261 (describing European data privacy law).
264. See, e.g., Edwards & Veale, supra note 15, at 23, 38, 74, 82.
265. Kaminski, supra note 86, at 193, 209–17. For the recent guidelines, see generally Article 29
Data Prot. Working Party, Guidelines on Automated Individual Decision-Making and Profiling for the
Purposes of Regulation 2016/679, WP251 rev.01 (Feb. 6, 2018) [hereinafter Article 29 Data Prot.
Working Party, Decision-Making].
266. See generally Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Decision-Making, supra note 265
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Additionally, U.S. readers may be unfamiliar with the various
interpretative documents that surround the GDPR and their relative strength.
This, too, is worth clarifying before delving into substance. The GDPR, as
regulatory regime, consists of text (the Articles), a preamble (the Recitals),
and Guidelines from the European Data Protection Board (formerly the
Article 29 Working Party). Technically the GDPR’s text is the actual law.267
The Recitals may not create new law; they may, however, be used by courts
and regulators to interpret the text.268 The European Data Protection Board,
which consists of data protection authorities (regulators and enforcers) from
around the EU, issues Guidelines.269 Arguably these Guidelines serve both
an interpretative and a harmonizing role: they interpret and clarify GDPR
requirements for affected entities while also indicating how regulators
around the EU will act.270 Various individual Member State regulators, too,
issue guidance on how to interpret the GDPR.271
Throughout this Part, I indicate which of these sources I am citing in
support of arguments about what the GDPR does or does not require. A good
amount of the GDPR’s requirements for algorithmic accountability come
from the Recitals and Guidelines and not directly from the text. This does
not, however, mean that these requirements are legally toothless, as they are
used by courts, regulators, and companies to interpret what the text means.
Additionally, understanding the nature of these sources is necessary for
understanding the GDPR’s approach of combining layers of harder and
softer law—that is, the GDPR’s approach to collaborative governance.
B. INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
The GDPR contains a number of generally applicable individual rights
that affect algorithmic decision-making and related profiling, in addition to
several individual rights specific to algorithmic decision-making. This
Section provides an overview of the GDPR’s individual rights, dividing them
into three categories: notification and access rights, checks on data use and
retention, and Article 22’s version of algorithmic “due process” for “solely
(clarifying the GDPR provisions on profiling and automated decision-making).
267. See Kaminski, supra note 86, at 193–95.
268. See id. at 193–94.
269. Members, EUR. DATA PROTECTION BOARD, https://edpb.europa.eu/about-edpb/board/mem
bers_en (last visited Sept. 3, 2019).
270. Role of the EDPB, EUR. DATA PROTECTION BOARD, https://edpb.europa.eu/role-edpb_en (last
visited Sept. 3, 2019).
271. See, e.g., Guide to Data Protection, INFO. COMMISIONER’S OFF., https://ico.org.uk/for-organ
isations/guide-to-data-protection (last visited Sept. 3, 2019).
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automated” decisions.272
1. Notification and Access Rights
The GDPR contains a number of individual notification and access
rights. These are both established in the text of the GDPR273 and interpreted
into the GDPR, in connection to its consent requirements.274 I will explain
how these rights and requirements apply in the context of algorithmic
decision-making and related profiling.
The GDPR establishes a system of generally applicable notification and
access rights.275 Upon collecting personal information from an individual, a
company must provide the purpose for which data is gathered, the recipients
of the data, and the retention period of the data, among other things.276
Nearly identical information must be disclosed if a company obtains
personal data not directly from an individual but from another party.277
Additionally, the GDPR contains affirmative access rights for
individuals, including access to the source of the data and a copy of the data
itself.278 Access rights may be invoked at intervals and give individuals the
ability to regularly check in about what information a company has about
them, beyond the moment at which data has originally been obtained. The
GDPR also addresses how information must be communicated.279
Information must be communicated “in a concise, transparent, intelligible
and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language . . . .”280
These general notification and access rights have ramifications for
algorithmic accountability. Calls for algorithmic due process, discussed in
Section II.A above, include calls for access to one’s personal data281 and for
272. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, art. 22, at 46.
273. The notification and access rights are under the GDPR’s requirements of transparent
communication, notification, and access in Articles 12, 13, and 14. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra
note 13, art. 22, at 8, 39–42; Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Guidelines on Transparency
Under Regulation 2016/679, WP260, at 6, 13–23 (April 11, 2018).
274. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, art. 7, at 37; see also Article 29 Data Protection
Working Party, Guidelines on Consent Under Regulation 2016/679, WP 259 rev.01 (Apr. 10, 2018)
[hereinafter Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Consent]; Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party,
Decision-Making, supra note 265, at 12–13, 24 (discussing consent and explicit consent).
275. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, arts. 13–15, at 40–43.
276. Id. art. 13(1)(c), at 40, arts. 13(1)(e), 13(2)(a)–(b), at 41.
277. Id. art. 14, at 42 (providing that the controller will provide certain specified information “within
a reasonable period after obtaining the personal data, but at the latest within one month . . . .”).
278. Id. arts. 15(1)(g), 15(3), at 43.
279. Id. art. 12, at 39.
280. Id. art. 12(1).
281. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 4, at 20.
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identifying the sources of personal information.282 Whether obtained through
notification or through an access request, these kinds of disclosures can help
address all three categories of concerns about algorithmic decision-making:
dignitary (they enable an individual to begin the process of protesting
objectification); justificatory (they can reveal if not the details of a reasoning
process the factual basis for it); and instrumental (they can help uncover
error, bias, discrimination, or other kinds of unfairness).
Profiling as a subcategory of data processing triggers additional rights
under the GDPR.283 Individuals are entitled to be informed of the existence
of profiling.284 They are also entitled to be given some information about
how profiling works (a right to an explanation of profiling, if you will).285
They are entitled to request the data used as an input into their profiles, to
request information in the profiles, and to request information on how they
have been categorized—that is, inferences made about them.286 According
to the GDPR Guidelines, an individual must be informed of the existence of
decision-making based on profiling, regardless of whether or not that
decision-making is solely automated.287
282. Id.; Crawford & Schultz, supra note 5, at 125.
283. Profiling is defined under the GDPR as an automated form of processing, carried out on
personal data, to evaluate personal aspects about a natural person. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra
note 13, art. 4(4), at 33; Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Decision-Making, supra note 265, at 6–7.
It does not need to be solely automated, unlike the decisions referred to in Article 22. Council Regulation
2016/679, supra note 13, art. 22, at 46. Nor do decisions based on profiling need to have significant
effects to fall under this provision. See id.; Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Decision-Making, supra
note 265, at 6–8 (distinguishing automated decision-making from profiling).
284. Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Decision-Making, supra note 265, at 17 (“The data
subject has a right to be informed by the controller about and, in certain circumstances, a right to object
to ‘profiling’, regardless of whether solely automated individual decision based on profiling takes
place.”); see also Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, at 12.
285. Transparency of processing of personal data is a requirement of the GDPR for all kinds of
processing. See Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, art. 5(1)(a), at 35, art. 12(1), at 39; Article
29 Data Prot. Working Party, Decision-Making, supra note 265, at 9–11.
286. Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Decision-Making, supra note 265, at 17 (“In addition to
general information about the processing, pursuant to Article 15(3), the controller has a duty to make
available the data used as input to create the profile as well as access to information on the profile and
details of which segments the data subject has been placed into.”).
287. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, art. 13(1)(c), at 40, art. 14(1)(c), at 41 (requiring
disclosure of the purposes of processing); id. at 12 (“[T]he data subject should be informed of the
existence of profiling and the consequences of such profiling.”); id. (“Every data subject should therefore
have the right to know and obtain communication in particular with regard to the purposes for which the
personal data are processed . . . and, at least when based on profiling, the consequences of such
processing.”); see also Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Decision-Making, supra note 265, at 16
(“[W]here the processing involves profiling-based decision making (irrespective of whether it is caught
by Article 22 provisions), then the fact that the processing is for the purposes of both (a) profiling and (b)
making a decision based on the profile generated, must be made clear to the data subject.”).
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Thus even if no automated decision-making takes place, individuals
have more substantial notification and access rights with respect to profiling
than they do for data processing writ large. Because personal profiles are
often the basis of algorithmic decision-making, this has the effect of
governing algorithmic accountability whether or not a decision has been
reached. It also has the effect of governing algorithmic accountability
regardless of how automated the decision-making is.
Algorithmic decision-making itself, then, triggers yet more notification
and access rights. A company must proactively notify individuals of the
existence of solely automated decision-making.288 This is precisely what the
algorithmic due process literature has called for.289 A company must,
additionally, with respect to solely automated decision-making provide an
explanation of the algorithm: “[m]eaningful information about the logic
involved, as well as the significance and envisaged consequences of such
processing for the data subject.”290 An individual also has a right to
affirmatively request access to “meaningful information about the logic
involved” and information about its significance and consequences.291
What this information will constitute in practice has been subject to an
already extensive scholarly debate.292 I note here only that these particular
disclosure rights appear to be individual-centric, rather than systemoriented.293 They aim at giving individuals meaningful transparency in order
to enable other individual rights under the GDPR, such as the right of
correction or right of contestation.294 They are not expert-centric or aimed at
providing oversight over the construction, administration, or development of
an algorithm. But neither are they free of substance, and they appear,
according to related Guidelines, to require significantly more explanatory
depth than some have suggested.295
There is another source of individualized transparency in the GDPR: its
288. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, arts. 13(2)(f), 14(2)(g), at 41–42 (“[T]he
existence of automated decision-making, including profiling, referred to in Article 22(1) and (4) and, at
least in those cases, meaningful information about the logic involved, as well as the significance and the
envisaged consequences of such processing for the data subject.”).
289. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 4, at 28.
290. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, art. 14(2)(g), at 42.
291. Id. art. 15(1)(h), at 43.
292. See supra note 257.
293. For more extensive discussion, see generally Kaminski, supra note 86.
294. Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Decision-Making, supra note 265, at 27.
295. Compare Wachter et al., supra note 62, at 843, with Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party,
Decision-Making, supra note 265, at 25–26.
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consent requirements.296 Explicit consent is one of the three exceptions to
the GDPR’s prohibition of automated decision-making.297 For consent to be
valid, individuals must be making an informed choice; they must
“understand exactly what they are consenting to . . . .”298 If a company does
not adequately communicate to an individual both the purpose of data
processing and information about the use of data for automated decisions,
then consent may be deemed invalid.299
This again incentivizes disclosure of a particular kind: the kind
individuals can meaningfully understand that contributes to individuals’
ability to give or withdraw consent under the GDPR. This type of
transparency is not necessarily conducive to expert oversight over
algorithmic decision-making systems, but that is not its purpose. While the
GDPR’s individually oriented transparency provisions may have
instrumental consequences, their primary objective is to address dignitary
and justificatory concerns.
2. Other Checks on Data Processing
The GDPR does not just afford individuals transparency rights. It also
includes substantive prohibitions on particular uses of data, heightened
protections for certain kinds of data, and a number of FIPs-related individual
rights beyond transparency. I again discuss these measures here with respect
to automated decision-making and related profiling.
First, the GDPR contains substantive prohibitions on certain behavior—
prohibitions that can be characterized as individual rights to not be subjected
to something. One criticism of the FIPs is that they can be without substance,
providing individuals the illusion of control, while in practice allowing
companies to do nearly anything as long as they have gotten individuals to
click through an agreement.300 The GDPR attempts to provide backstops
beyond individual control.
296. See, e.g., Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Decision-Making, supra note 265, at 12–13.
297. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, art. 22(2)(c), at 46. Regular consent already
requires a “clear affirmative act[]”; explicit consent is even more stringent, requiring “an express
statement of consent,” often though not always in writing. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party,
Consent, supra note 274, at 18.
298. Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Decision-Making, supra note 265, at 13.
299. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Consent, supra note 274, at 13 (“If the controller
does not provide accessible information, user control becomes illusory and consent will be an invalid
basis for processing.”); see also Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Decision-Making, supra note 265,
at 12−13.
300. Woodrow Hartzog, The Inadequate, Invaluable Fair Information Practices, 76 MD. L. REV.
952, 964–77 (2017).
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The GDPR, in fact, prohibits solely algorithmic decision-making.301
The three exceptions are when such decision-making is necessary to a
contract (not merely subject to a contract), when member state law
specifically addresses automated decision-making, and when an individual
has explicitly consented to it.302 Outside of these three contexts, an individual
has a right not to be subject to solely algorithmic decision-making.
There is some discussion of whether the GDPR wholesale prohibits
automated decision-making about children.303 The applicable Guidelines toe
an interpretative line, by stating that data protection authorities will protect
children’s data more strongly.304 The Guidelines suggest that children’s data
will be subject to fewer than the above three exceptions to the general ban
on automated decision-making.
The GDPR throughout creates heightened requirements for certain
kinds of information, including sensitive information, such as race or
biometric data,305 referred to as “special categories of personal data . . . .”306
Special categories of data are, like children’s data, subject to fewer
exceptions to the ban on automated decision-making. They can be processed
only subject to explicit consent to processing “for one or more specified
purposes”307 or when “necessary for reasons of substantial public interest”
and, even then, only subject to proportionality assessment.308
Finally, individuals have numerous FIPs-based rights in the GDPR that
apply to data processing in general and, thus, to algorithmic decision-making
and profiling.309 For example, an individual has a right to rectification,
whereby he or she can request the correction of inaccurate personal data,
301. Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Decision-Making, supra note 265, at 23; see also
Kaminski, supra note 86, at 196–98 (discussing algorithmic accountability and the GDPR).
302. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, art. 22(2), at 46; Article 29 Data Prot. Working
Party, Decision-Making, supra note 265, at 23, (interpreting Article 22 as a prohibition).
303. The GDPR’s text does not prohibit automated decision-making about children, but Recital 71
suggests that it nonetheless does (“Such measure should not concern a child”). Council Regulation
2016/679, supra note 13, at 14.
304. Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Decision-Making, supra note 265, at 28–29.
305. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, art. 9(2), at 38–39.
306. Id. art. 6(4)(c), at 37.
307. Id. art. 9(2)(a), at 38, art 22(3), at 46.
308. Id. art. 9(2)(g), at 38.
309. See, e.g., Lilian Edwards, Data Protection: Enter the General Data Protection Regulation, in
LAW, POLICY AND THE INTERNET 77, 77−119 (Lilian Edwards ed., 2018); Bart van der Sloot & Frederik
Zuiderveen Borgesius, The EU General Data Protection Regulation: A New Global Standard for
Information Privacy 15–17 (Apr. 15, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (available at https://bartvander
sloot.com/onewebmedia/SSRN-id3162987.pdf).
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including inaccurate inferences.310 Individual rights also include, under some
circumstances, the infamous right to erasure (or, the “right to be
forgotten”),311 the right to restriction of processing,312 the right to object,313
and in the case of information processed subject to consent, the right to under
certain circumstances withdraw consent to processing.
The algorithmic due process literature, in fact, refers to a number of
these rights as necessary aspects of an individual’s opportunity to be
heard.314 These may not be rights to a hearing in a traditional sense, but they
give individuals the ability to intervene in data processing—and not just
solely automated processing—in ways familiar to those steeped in the
algorithmic due process literature.
Once again these individual rights serve both dignitary and justificatory
ends. They allow individuals to participate in the formation of their “data
double,” including through correction and sometimes deletion of
information. In allowing this participation, these rights potentially create
something like a dialogue between the individual and a company about the
rationale behind algorithmic decisions and other forms of personal profiling
and data processing. They serve instrumental purposes, particularly towards
correcting factual and inferential errors. But they do not allow for the
intervention of third-party experts or create a systemic governance regime.
3. Individual Algorithmic “Due Process” Under Article 22
The GDPR explicitly contains a version of algorithmic due process.
This significant development has been thus far overshadowed by the debate
about the so-called “right to explanation” of individual algorithmic
decisions. The GDPR’s Article 22 establishes not just the much-discussed
“right to explanation” but less discussed due process-like rights to human
intervention, to express an opinion, and to contest an algorithmic decision.315
Elsewhere, I have referred to Article 22 as stronger, broader, and deeper than
its predecessor in the Data Protection Directive, Article 15.316
310. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, art. 16, at 43 (establishing the rectification right);
Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Decision-Making, supra note 265, at 17–18 (discussing profiling on
output data versus input data).
311. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, art. 17, at 43–44.
312. Id. art. 18, at 44–45.
313. Id. art. 21, at 45–46.
314. See, e.g., Citron & Pasquale, supra note 4, at 28; Crawford & Schultz, supra note 5, at 126–
27.
315. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, art. 22, at 46.
316. Kaminski, supra note 86, at 201.
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First, in short, Article 22 does establish an individual “right to an
explanation” of an algorithmic decision.317 The text requires companies that
deploy “solely” automated decision-making to adopt “suitable measures” to
safeguard the rights of individuals.318 Recital 71 explains that these measures
include a right “to obtain an explanation of the decision reached after such
assessment.”319 The apparent discrepancy between text and Recital spurred
heated debate.320 The Guidelines on algorithmic decision-making appear,
however, to resolve this.321 The Guidelines reason that the Recital’s right to
explanation of an individual decision stems from an individual’s right to
contest a decision or express that individual’s view, both of which are
established in the GDPR’s text.322
Article 22 establishes not just a right to an explanation but an
opportunity to be heard. The GDPR requires that companies that use “solely”
automated decision-making institute (1) a right to obtain human
intervention, (2) a way to express one’s point of view, and (3) a way to
contest a decision.323 This is a version of algorithmic due process, combining
notice with several forms of an opportunity to be heard.
How this will work in practice is an open question. The Article 22 rights
around contestation appear, thus far, to be fairly weak. The GDPR does not
provide for a neutral arbiter.324 Applicable Guidelines suggest the right to
contest may be an internal company process.325 There are no guidelines as to
what this process must entail. This raises the question of whether a company
317. Id. at 204.
318. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, at art. 22, at 46.
319. Id. at 14.
320. See generally supra note 257.
321. Kaminski, supra note 86, at 204 (citing Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Decision-Making,
supra note 265, at 27)
322. Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Decision-Making, supra note 265, at 27 (“The data
subject will only be able to challenge a decision or express their view if they fully understand how it has
been made and on what basis.”).
323. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, art. 22(3), at 46. Note that these requirements
may or may not apply to member state law exception. Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, DecisionMaking, supra note 265, at 23–24.
324. Compare Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Decision-Making, supra note 265, at 32 (“[A
suggested human intervention mechanism is] for example providing a link to an appeals process at the
point the automated decision is delivered to the data subject, with agreed timescales for the review and a
named contact point for any queries.”), with Crawford & Schultz, supra note 5, at 127 (calling for a
neutral arbiter).
325. Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Decision-Making, supra note 265, at 32. This seems to
resemble some features of copyright’s notice-and-takedown process in the United States. See Margot E.
Kaminski & Jennifer Urban, The Right to Contestation 24−25 (Aug. 14, 2019) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author). See generally 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2018) (establishing “limitations on liability related
to material online”).
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whose interests do not always align with its users’ will be capable of
providing adequate process and fair results.326 There is room for substantially
more policy development in fleshing out this contestation right.327
The GDPR also requires the right to “obtain human intervention” in an
algorithmic decision.328 There is no explanation of what this means nor how
it is related to the rights to contest or to express an opinion. While the
applicable Guidelines discuss the extent of human involvement necessary for
decision-making to fall outside of Article 22,329 they do not discuss what
level of human involvement constitutes “human intervention” to satisfy
Article 22. As Danielle Citron has pointed out, due to “automation bias,”
human intervention by itself may be inadequate for addressing concerns
about algorithmic decision-making.330 Humans are inclined to accept what
algorithms tell them as true unless they are trained otherwise. And it is
unclear whether human intervention will, in fact, serve the goals of
algorithmic due process. There may be dignitary benefits to putting a human
on the loop, but there are also potential costs and dangers, including a
possible increase in systemic bias. Additionally, with a human in the loop,
blame can be misdirected at the intervening human rather than properly
directed at overall system design.331
Article 22, like its predecessor in the Data Protection Directive,
contains significant potential loopholes.332 Article 22 applies only to solely
326. This is similar to the conversation in the United States about collateral censorship. Felix T.
Wu, Collateral Censorship and the Limits of Intermediary Immunity, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 293, 298–
304 (2011). And the conversation in the EU about the right to be forgotten. See ANGELOPOULOS ET AL.,
supra note 252.
327. See Kaminski & Urban, supra note 326.
328. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, art. 22(3), at 46. For discussions of the human in
the loop, see infra note 331.
329. Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Decision-Making, supra note 265, at 21 (discussing
meaningful human involvement).
330. Citron, supra note 14, at 1271–72 (describing automation bias).
331. There are potential dangers to trying to solve the problems of automation by reinserting a
human in or on the loop. Requiring a system to be built for human intervention or even for human
oversight can affect its design, in ways that negatively impact other values, such as accuracy or even bias
correction. See Zarsky, supra note 40. Putting a human in or on the loop can result in moral—or legal—
blame being directed at that human, rather than focusing enforcement efforts more effectively on overall
system design. Madeleine Clare Elish, Moral Crumple Zones: Cautionary Tales in Human-Robot, 5
ENGAGING SCI., TECH., & SOC’Y 40, 42 (2019). Meg Jones has argued that moving a human in or out of
the loop can be “both ineffective . . . and dangerous.” Jones, supra note 85, at 134. She calls instead for
general automation design principles. Id. at 82–83. The GDPR’s insertion of a human into the loop of
automated decision-making is a significant policy move that should prompt far more discussion than it
has.
332. Bygrave, supra note 14, at 21–22.
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automated decision-making.333 It requires the decision to have legal effects
or similarly significant effects.334 Trade secret exceptions apply both to the
right to explanation and to the related notification and access rights
(disclosure of “meaningful information about the logic involved”), discussed
above.335 However, the Guidelines have weighed in on the scope and
strength of Article 22 and largely interpreted it to close or limit many of these
loopholes.336 Thus the GDPR establishes a version of algorithmic due
process oriented towards individuals and creates both notice and an
opportunity to be heard.
C. COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE
The GDPR, however, does not limit its governance of algorithmic
decision-making to individual rights. The GDPR also uses collaborative
governance.
The collaborative governance side of the GDPR has been overlooked,
particularly in the context of algorithmic decision-making. To the extent that
the literature on algorithmic accountability and the GDPR has looked past
individual rights, its focus has been on particular requirements companies
must meet, such as third-party audits and data protection impact
assessments,337 rather than on the fact that the GDPR as a whole uses
collaborative governance to address algorithmic decision-making.338
333. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, art. 22(1), at 46; Edwards & Veale, supra note
15, at 45; see also Mendoza & Bygrave, supra note 14, at 83; Selbst & Powles, supra note 257, at 234–
35; Wachter et al., supra note 257, at 88.
334. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, art. 22(1), at 46; see also Mendoza & Bygrave,
supra note 14, at 83 (quoting Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, art. 22, at 46); Edwards &
Veale, supra note 15, at 46; Selbst & Powles, supra note 257, at 234–35; Wachter et al., supra note 257,
at 88 n.66.
335. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, art. 13−15, at 40–43; see also id. at 12 (providing
in Recital 63 that the right of access “should not adversely affect the rights or freedoms of others,
including trade secrets or intellectual property”); Wachter et al., supra note 257, at 79 n.13, 84, 89; supra
Section III.B.1. But see Brkan, supra note 257, (manuscript at 21–23) (citing Council Directive 2016/943,
art. 5(d), 2016 O.J. (L 157) 1, 11 (EU)) (calling trade secrets and other IP concerns a “paper tiger”, and
noting that EU law “provides for an exception that allows for suspension of a trade secret ‘for the purpose
of protecting a legitimate interest recognized by Union or national law’” (citation omitted)).
336. Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Decision-Making, supra note 265, at 19–28.
337. Casey et al., supra note 257, at 170–84; Edwards & Veale, supra note 15, at 78 (“[T]he new
Article 35 is compulsory . . . and its definitions of ‘high risk’ technologies are almost certain to capture
many if not most ML systems.”).
338. One source evaluates the GDPR’s impact assessment requirement through the lens of
regulatory theory, identifying it as “meta-regulation,” a subcategory of collaborative governance. Reuben
Binns, Data Protection Impact Assessments: A Meta-regulatory Approach, 7 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 22,
29–30 (2017).
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Focusing on these individual requirements misses the forest for the
trees. Characterizing the GDPR as a system of collaborative governance
changes the conversation about accountability and transparency from a
discussion of individual tools to a system-wide evaluation that reveals both
strengths and weaknesses in the GDPR’s design, including in how its system
of collaborative governance interacts with its individual rights.
The GDPR contains not just individual rights but duties imposed on
companies. These duties are often voiced in broad terms that will be given
meaning and effect over time through a variety of collaborative governance
mechanisms—both formal, such as codes of conduct, and informal, such as
standards coupled with guidance coupled with interpretation by internal
company data protection officers (“DPOs”) in conversation with
regulators.339
I break down the toolkit of the GDPR into such formal and informal
collaborative modes below.340 The formally coregulatory aspects of the
GDPR might never be realized; codes of conduct have, thus far, rarely been
used in the EU.341 I argue that the informally collaborative nature of the
GDPR is both more overlooked and more practically relevant. First,
however, I begin with an overall assessment of the GDPR as a collaborative
governance regime.
1. The GDPR as Collaborative Governance
Rather than asking whether individual or institutional accountability is
more effective, we should be asking whether the GDPR works as
collaborative governance. Does it contain the right balance between hard and
soft law—between command-and-control mechanisms and responsive
regulation?342 Does it effectively delegate to the private sector while
bounding the level of deregulation a private company can achieve? Does it
create a deep enough system of structured accountability to make its
governance legitimate, both in the sense of eventually producing good
339. This feature of regulatory design is likely deliberate. See First Report on the Implementation
of the Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC), supra note 258, at 26.
340. See infra Sections III.C.2–.3.
341. See, e.g., Dennis D. Hirsch, In Search of the Holy Grail: Achieving Global Privacy Rules
Through Sector-Based Codes of Conduct, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1029, 1057 (2013); McGeveran, supra note
136, at 961 n.2 (noting codes of conduct are rarely used in Ireland). The European Commission noted as
early as 2003 its frustration with the failure of codes of conduct. First Report on the Implementation of
the Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC), supra note 258, at 26 (“The Commission is disappointed that
so few organisations have come forward with sectoral Codes of Conduct . . . .”).
342. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 12, at 101–33; see also McGeveran, supra note 136,
at 979–82.
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substantive law and in the sense of appearing legitimate as a system?
The GDPR is, along certain dimensions, fundamentally a hard law
regime. Law can be harder or softer along a spectrum that runs across
multiple dimensions: how precise a rule is versus how vague; how obligatory
a rule is versus how optional or advisory; and what enforcement mechanisms
exist.343 While the GDPR contains a number of what I would argue are
deliberately vague rules, it is for the most part hard law: an obligatory
regime, coupled with strong enforcement powers. A GDPR violation can
famously trigger administrative fines of up to 4 percent of worldwide
revenue.344 The GDPR consolidates and further empowers an extensive
national and transnational system of government regulators.345 It creates
broader enforcement powers for individuals—for example, allowing
individuals to authorize nonprofits to lodge complaints on their behalf.346
And the GDPR is backed by an increasingly involved court, the European
Court of Justice (“ECJ”), which has in recent years repeatedly ruled in favor
of data protection rights.347 In other words, the GDPR has potentially very
serious teeth. There are, thus, real incentives for companies to participate in
collaborative efforts to flesh out broader rules and to voluntarily comply with
the outcomes of those efforts to avoid government sanctions.
The GDPR is also hardish law when it comes to its formal requirements,
even where its substance is vague on its face. The vagueness of the GDPR is
still highly bounded.348 For example, the text of Article 22 does not
conclusively define what “suitable measures” are,349 but between the text,
343. See, for example, the three dimensions of hard and soft law defined by Kenneth Abbott and
others, Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT’L ORG. 401, 401 (2000); see also
Gunther F. Handl et al., A Hard Look at Soft Law, 82 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 371, 374–75 (1988)
(discussing the dimensions of content, signals of authority, and communications of intent to make the law
effective); Kal Raustiala & Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law, International Relations and
Compliance, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 538, 552 (Walter Carlsnaes et al. eds., Sage
Publ’ns 2002) (considering “the form of the agreement; the substance of the agreement . . . ; and the
structure for review of performance”);
344. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, art. 83(5), at 83.
345. Id. art. arts 51–59, at 65–70.
346. Id. art. 80, at 81.
347. Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (May 13,
2014), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=152065&doclang=EN; Joined
Cases C-293/12 & C-594/12, Digital Rights Ir. Ltd v. Minister for Commc’ns, Marine and Nat. Res. (Apr.
8, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=150642&doclang=EN; see also
European Court of Human Rights, Zakharov v. Russia, App. No. 47143/06 (Dec. 4, 2015), http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-159324. While the GDPR will primarily be interpreted by the ECJ,
European Court of Human Rights case law forms a backstop of human rights protection in the EU.
348. See Kaminski, supra note 152, at 946 (discussing bounded versus unbounded uncertainty in
collaborative governance).
349. See Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, art. 22, at 46.
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the Recitals, and the Guidelines, the GDPR qua regime provides a slew of
specific requirements, examples, and outer limits.
This is true of nearly every GDPR requirement. On the face of the text,
the GDPR is vague; coupled with its interpretative documents or earlier law
and practices arising out of the predecessor Data Protection Directive, there
is only so much room for companies to maneuver. On the one hand, this
potentially constricts collaborative governance, limiting the types of
solutions the private sector might offer or discouraging the private sector
from collaborating when it cannot change the rules. On the other hand, it
bounds private-sector lawmaking and creates a substantive backstop to
private-sector negotiations, in the name of protecting fundamental rights.
How the softer and harder aspects of the GDPR play out and interact in
practice will do a great deal to determine whether its attempts at collaborative
governance are effective. Authorities will need to show enough strength to
incentivize companies to meaningfully participate but enough gentleness to
discourage adversarial posturing.350 The GDPR risks being too hard in some
places and too soft in others, effectively encouraging companies to route
around harder law to seek out less regulated spaces.351
There is potential for similar arbitrage with respect to member state
variations. While the GDPR purports to harmonize EU data protection law,
it contains a number of opportunities for member states to vary their legal
systems, including in governing algorithmic accountability.352 There are
both costs and benefits to state-by-state variation. The potential benefit is
that variation could allow for policy experimentation, as federalism does in
the United States. But state-by-state variation can also increase compliance
costs and incentivize companies to target their resources at lobbying
individual Member State legislatures, rather than collaborating with data
350. It is possible that regulators’ opening gambits in negotiations with private companies are too
weak/conciliatory already, in an effort not to be seen as business killing. See, e.g., Lobel, The Renew
Deal, supra note 7, at 451 (discussing “positive slippage,” with standards as opening salvo).
351. For example, Facebook’s counsel discussed avoiding using consent for compliance and instead
taking the less onerous business interests route. Caroline Spiezio, In-House Leaders from Facebook, Uber
and Others Discuss the Complexity of Consent in GDPR, LAW.COM: CORPORATE COUNSEL (Apr. 20,
2018, 3:16 PM), https://www.law.com/corpcounsel/2018/04/20/in-house-leaders-from-facebook-uberand-others-discuss-the-complexity-of-consent-in-gdpr/?slreturn=20180326083826.
352. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, art. 22(2)(b), at 46 (discussing that a person’s
right not to be subject to solely automated decisions does not apply when the decision “is authorised by
Union or Member State law to which the controller is subject and which also lays down suitable measures
to safeguard the data subject’s rights and freedoms and legitimate interests”); see also Gianclaudio
Malgieri, Automated Decisionmaking in the EU Member States: The Right to Explanation and Other
“Suitable Measures” in the National Legislations, COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV., July 19, 2019, at 1,
5–18.
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protection authorities. From a managerial perspective, too, a more
harmonized regime can result in stronger centralized compliance culture in
a company, while a less harmonized regime may lead to a more fractured,
less effective internal compliance structure.
The GDPR heavily relies on government regulators—perhaps too
heavily, for a purportedly collaborative regime. Data protection authorities
and the European Data Protection Board are envisioned as active,
independent regulators, responsible for a wide variety of tasks.353 If the
GDPR’s regulators are too command-and-control minded, they may override
the collaborative nature of the system and eliminate envisioned benefits from
private sector involvement. If, on the other hand, they are not strong or
involved enough, then the GDPR has numerous potential weaknesses that
companies can exploit to effectively deregulate. In practice, in the recent
past, data protection authorities have faced limited resources.354
While the GDPR heavily relies on traditional government regulators, it
minimally invokes participation by third parties. This is perhaps the weakest
point in the entire system, and one I discuss at greater length below.355 The
GDPR for the most part envisions collaboration as taking place between
regulators and regulated private parties, to the exclusion of third parties, such
as civil society or external experts. This threatens both the substance and
legitimacy of the regime. To some extent, this design flaw may reflect the
relative weakness of civil society in the EU.
Before I return to this central problem of structured accountability,
however, I outline the details of the GDPR as a collaborative system. The
GDPR consists of both formal and informal collaborative mechanisms that
together create the outlines of an extensive collaborative governance regime.
2. Formal Coregulation
The GDPR contains a number of formal mechanisms for policy
collaboration between companies and regulators, including codes of conduct
353.
354.

Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, at 22, art. 52, at 66, art. 69, at 76.
See, e.g., J. TREVOR HUGHES, INT’L ASS’N OF PRIVACY PROF’LS, DATA PROTECTION
AUTHORITIES 10 (2011), https://iapp.org/media/pdf/knowledge_center/DPA11_Survey_final.pdf (stating
the average European budget is under €5 million); see also DAVID BARNARD-WILLIS & DAVID WRIGHT,
TRILATERAL RESEARCH & CONSULTING, U.K., CO-ORDINATION AND CO-OPERATION BETWEEN DATA
PROTECTION AUTHORITIES 9, 143 (2014), http://www.phaedra-project.eu/wp-content/uploads/PHAED
RA-D1-30-Dec-2014.pdf (“The consortium recognises that many [data protection authorities] face
constraints, by way of human and/or budgetary shortages, institutional and legislative rules and other
factors.”) (citing limited budget or human resources as constraining cooperation).
355. See infra Section III.C.4.
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and certification.356 Both of these formal coregulatory mechanisms are cited
in the Guidelines on algorithmic decision-making.357 And even though the
incorporation of technical standards is not yet explicitly part of the GDPR’s
approach to algorithmic decision-making, I discuss it briefly here.358
First, the GDPR might formally coregulate algorithmic decisionmaking through codes of conduct.359 Industry groups are encouraged to
prepare codes of conduct to clarify the application of the GDPR in sectorspecific or even technology-specific areas.360 Codes of conduct act as safe
harbors from the GDPR: once a code has been approved by the relevant
government authority, a company that follows it can be assured it will not be
held liable.361 Some codes may even be eventually implemented as EU-wide
law.362 Thus companies could come together to create a code of conduct for
auditing machine-learning algorithms363 or a code of conduct outlining other
suitable measures to be applied to prevent algorithmic bias or discrimination
or privacy violations.
Certification is a softer coregulatory mechanism.364 It does not create a
safe harbor from GDPR enforcement365 but instead seeks to use market
measures to incentivize industry participation. It works as follows: groups of
companies would create certification standards and consumers would seek
out those companies that are certified, like purchasers who search for goods
or companies certified by the Better Business Bureau or Certified
Humane.366 While it does not create a safe harbor, certification potentially
reduces enforcement risks for companies. Supervisory authorities or the
356. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, arts. 40–42, at 56–59.
357. Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Decision-Making, supra note 265, at 30.
358. Id. at 32 (referring to “agreed standards,” but leaving unclear whether this refers formally to
technical standards).
359. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, arts. 40–41, at 56–58.
360. Id. art. 40(2), at 56–57.
361. Id. art. 40(5), at 57 (“The supervisory authority shall provide an opinion on whether the draft
code, amendment or extension complies with this Regulation and shall approve that draft code,
amendment or extension if it finds that it provides sufficient appropriate safeguards.”) (describing how
the Board shall issue an opinion if the activity applies in more than one Member State).
362. Id. art. 40(9), at 57 (“The Commission may, by way of implementing acts, decide that the
approved code of conduct, amendment or extension submitted to it pursuant to paragraph 8 of this Article
have general validity within the Union.”).
363. See Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Decision-Making, supra note 265, at 32.
364. See Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, art. 42, at 58–59.
365. Id. art. 42(4), at 59 (“A certification pursuant to [Article 42] does not reduce the responsibility
of the controller or the processor for compliance with this Regulation and is without prejudice to the tasks
and powers of the supervisory authorities . . . .”).
366. Lilian Edwards & Michael Veale, Enslaving the Algorithm: From a “Right to an Explanation”
to a “Right to Better Decisions”?, 16 IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY, May-June 2018, at 46, 52 (“There is
also little proof users regard seals and certificates as indicators of trust . . . .”).
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Board are involved in the creation of certification criteria.367 Since those
same authorities are responsible for GDPR enforcement, they are unlikely to
pursue a company that is compliant with certification standards.
A third formal coregulatory mechanism involves the development of
technical standards and the incorporation of them by reference into the
regulation.368 There is in fact a formal process in the EU whereby the
European Commission can issue a request to the European Standardization
Organizations to establish “an agreed way of meeting legal requirements,”
through technical standards.369 There is evidence that this process will be
used for a number of GDPR requirements.370 Several articles of the GDPR
explicitly reference technical standards,371 and other provisions leave space
for the process.372
With respect to algorithmic decision-making, there are several possible
hooks for the incorporation of technical standards. The Guidance on
algorithmic decision-making references the use of “agreed standards,”373 and
the Recital language on profiling suggests that companies use “technical and
organisational measures” to prevent inaccuracies and error.374
3. Informal Collaborative Governance
In addition to these formal coregulatory mechanisms, the GDPR
contains a number of informal tools that appear to be central to its system of
governing algorithmic decision-making. These include broad legal standards
367. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, art. 42(5), at 59.
368. Kamara, supra note 259, at 15; see also Bremer, supra note 164, at 147–50.
369. Kamara, supra note 259, at 7 (citation omitted).
370. Id. at 14 (discussing standards on “how to address and manage privacy and personal data
protection issues during the design and development and the production and service provision processes
of security technologies” and standards that “specify[] the privacy and personal data protection
management processes with an explanation how [sic] to realise them”). In 2015 the European
Commission issued a request for the development of standards addressing privacy by design under the
Data Protection Directive; this process is ongoing.
371. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, art. 21(5), at 46 (“[T]he data subject may exercise
his or her right to object by automated means using technical specifications.”) (discussing the right to
object and certification); id. art. 43(9), at 60 (“The Commission may adopt implementing acts laying
down technical standards for certification mechanisms . . . .”).
372. Kamara, supra note 259, at 8 (“[S]everal provisions of the GDPR could be the basis for
development of technical standards in the field. One prominent example is the provisions that establish
technology design obligations, such data protection [sic] by design and by default . . . .”).
373. Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Decision-Making, supra note 265, at 32 (discussing
“agreed standards”).
374. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, at 14 (“[T]he controller should use appropriate
mathematical or statistical procedures for the profiling [and] implement technical and organisational
measures appropriate to ensure, in particular, that factors which result in inaccuracies in personal data are
corrected and the risk of errors is minimized . . . .”).
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interpreted over time through softer regulatory guidance and private sector
efforts; management reform, such as the requirement that companies appoint
Data Protection Officers (“DPOs”) and abide by reporting requirements; and
requirements of third-party oversight, such as audits or expert boards.
In its governance of algorithmic decision-making, as elsewhere,375 the
GDPR uses broad legal standards to articulate company duties and fills them
in through collaborative mechanisms. One such standard is Article 22’s
“suitable measures” requirement. Article 22 tasks companies that conduct
algorithmic decision-making with implementing “suitable measures to
safeguard the data subject’s rights and freedoms and legitimate
interests . . . .”376 This is a broad, technology-neutral standard.377 The GDPR
itself does not indicate how a company operating in a specific sector or using
a specific technology might comply. The text of the GDPR provides some
specific requirements, discussed above. But this list is not exhaustive, as the
debate over the right to explanation makes clear.
The Guidelines, as part of the collaborative governance ecosystem,
begin to fill out what this broad legal standard will look like in practice. Over
time, enforcement by data protection authorities or even court decisions may
create more specific standards or even specific rules. Until then, “suitable
measures” will largely be constituted in part by hard law, in part by guidance,
and in part by internal company practices.
The GDPR’s principle of “fairness” is another example. The GDPR
establishes the broad principle of “fairness” in its hard-law text.
Accompanying softer law documents interpret the broad requirement of
“fairness” to include at least accuracy and non-discrimination; this
interpretation applies to algorithmic decision-making.378 The Guidelines
several times refer to fairness, non-discrimination, and accuracy in the same
breath.379
375. See e.g., Lee, supra note 259, 1027–29.
376. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, art. 22(3), at 46.
377. Kamara, supra note 259. at 10–11 (discussing “technology neutrality”).
378. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, at 14, art. 5(1)(a), at 35 (“In order to ensure fair
and transparent processing . . . , [companies must] ensure . . . that factors which result in inaccuracies in
personal data are corrected and the risk of errors is [sic] minimized . . . .”) (discussing the application of
principles of lawfulness, fairness, and transparency to personal data processing). To meet the GDPR’s
broad requirement of fairness, companies must “prevent[] . . . discriminatory effects on natural persons
on the basis of racial or ethnic origin, political opinion, religion or beliefs, trade union membership,
genetic or health status or sexual orientation . . . .” Id. at 14. The GDPR Guidelines echo this
interpretation. The Guidelines refer to inaccuracy, discrimination, and the perpetuation of existing
stereotypes as harms caused by algorithmic decision-making. See Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party,
Decision-Making, supra note 265, at 5–6.
379. Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Decision-Making, supra note 265, at 14 (discussing
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These softer law documents explicitly turn to the private sector to
determine how these goals will be met in practice. Recital 71 calls for
algorithmic error and discrimination to be addressed through “appropriate
mathematical or statistical procedures” and the implementation of “technical
and organisational measures,” the precise nature of which will be determined
by the private sector or perhaps through technical standards setting,
discussed above.380 The Guidelines call for companies to address these goals
through a robust combination of management reform,381 technical measures
that include regular testing,382 third-party auditing,383 and expert review
boards.384
Thus the broad standards established in the GDPR’s text feed into an
elaborate system of collaborate governance. As part of this system, the
GDPR repeatedly attempts to institute internal management reform. It
requires, for example, certain companies to hire an internal but independent
DPO385 tasked with monitoring compliance with the GDPR.386 Most
companies using algorithmic decision-making will be subject to this
requirement.387
The GDPR additionally attempts to influence management reform
through recording requirements, impact assessments for some kinds of
processing (including most algorithmic decision-making), and the
suggestion that companies perform regular quality checks and internal
auditing. The GDPR generally requires companies (with some exceptions
“safeguards aimed at ensuring fairness, non-discrimination and accuracy in the profiling process”). See
also id. at 16 (“Controllers should introduce appropriate procedures and measures to prevent errors,
inaccuracies or discrimination on the basis of special category data.” (footnote omitted)).
380. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, at 14.
381. Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Decision-Making, supra note 265, at 29–31 (discussing
data protection impact assessments (“DPIAs”)).
382. Id.
383. Id. at 30.
384. Id.
385. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, art. 38, at 55–56.
386. Id. art. 39(1)(b), at 56.
387. Companies who use algorithmic decision-making include those companies whose core
activities involve processing especially sensitive personal data (such as racial or ethnic origin, biometric
data, and health data) and those companies whose business model involves systemic large-scale
monitoring. See id. art. 9, at 38–39, art. 37(1)(b)–(c), at 55. The DPO is described as being “a person with
expert knowledge of data protection law and practices . . . .” Id. at 18. And the DPO is responsible for
training staff about their GDPR responsibilities. Id. art. 39(1)(b), at 56.
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for small companies)388 to keep records of data processing.389 These reports
are not necessarily geared towards creating detailed external oversight,
though they are accessible to regulators upon inspection.390 Recording
requirements may by themselves instigate reform within a company, as
technical experts are required to assess and describe their systems for these
records.391
In addition to keeping records for outside inspection, most companies
deploying algorithmic decision-making will have to create impact
assessments.392 Impact assessments are mandatory under the GDPR in some
circumstances, including in algorithmic decision-making.393 The Guidelines
envision impact assessments as an iterative, ongoing process that includes
documentation, monitoring, and review.394 This is largely an internal
388. Id, art. 30(5), at 51. Article 30 explains that certain record keeping obligations
shall not apply to an enterprise or an organisation employing fewer than 250 persons unless
the processing it carries out is likely to result in a risk to the rights and freedoms of data
subjects, the processing is not occasional, or the processing includes special categories of data
as referred to in Article 9(1) or personal data relating to criminal convictions and offences
referred to in Article 10.
Id.
389. Id. art. 30, at 50–51. These records must include the purposes of processing, a description of
the categories of individuals and data, and a description of where the data goes, among other things. Id.
390. These records might not be detailed; for example, cybersecurity records need only give “a
general description” of measures employed. Id. art. 30(1)(g), at 51.
391. See also Selbst & Barocas, Intuitive Appeal, supra note 4, at 1129 (suggesting recording
requirements as reform).
392. Edwards & Veale, supra note 15, at 77–80.
393. The GDPR mandates internal impact assessments when a company engages in “high risk”
processing, which includes personal evaluations “based on automated processing” and with significant
effects. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, art. 35, at 53–54 (stating that a DPIA is required
only if processing is “likely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons”). The
Working Party Guidelines read this as including the solely automated processing covered by Article 22,
in addition to algorithms that involve more substantial human oversight. Article 29 Data Prot. Working
Party, Decision-Making, supra note 265, at 29–31. Impact assessments are also required when there is
“systematic monitoring of a publicly accessible area on a large scale.” Council Regulation 2016/679,
supra note 13, art. 35(3)(c), at 53. This could reach a good amount of sensor processing (say processing
information gathered by smart cars or drones) regardless of whether it involves a decision with significant
effects on a person or is solely automated. Id. at 18–19, art. 35(3)(a), at 53. In fact, Recital 91 provides
the following:
A data protection impact assessment should also be made where personal data are processed
for taking decisions regarding specific natural persons following any systematic and extensive
evaluation of personal aspects relating to natural persons based on profiling those data or
following the processing of special categories of personal data, biometric data, or data on
criminal convictions and offences or related security measures.
Id. at 18–19.
394. Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Decision-Making, supra note 265, at 29-30; Article 29
Data Prot. Working Party, Guidelines on Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) and Determining
Whether Processing Is “Likely to Result in a High Risk” for the Purposes of Regulation 2016/679, WP248
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process. Only “high risk” assessments require consultation with the
government.395 For the rest, if a company has a DPO, the impact assessment
must involve the DPO.396 While this is not equivalent to direct government
involvement, it may put in place both internal oversight and internal
compliance efforts.
For high-risk activity, the GDPR’s impact assessment process could be
characterized as a soft version of premarket approval: requiring a company
to be in conversation with the government and to adjust its risk-management
process before releasing automated decision-making on the public.397 Even
for non-high-risk impact assessments, the government still plays a role in
ensuring accountability because impact assessments are subject to retention
and updating requirements and potentially to government disclosure.398
Impact assessments may play a potential role in rule setting, as well.
They do not create an industry-wide standard. Over time, however, impact
assessments may end up affecting general compliance standards, as the
government repeatedly assesses individual use cases.399
rev.01, at 16 (Apr. 4, 2017) [hereinafter Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, DPIA] (providing a chart
of impact assessment processes).
395. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, art. 36, at 54–55 (“The controller shall consult
the supervisory authority prior to processing where a data protection impact assessment under Article 35
indicates that the processing would result in a high risk in the absence of measures taken by the controller
to mitigate the risk.”). Unfortunately the guidelines give little explanation of what activity will require
prior government consultation. Instead, the Guidelines provide the following:
It is in cases where the identified risks cannot be sufficiently addressed by the data controller
(i.e. the residual risks remains high) then the data controller must consult the supervisory
authority. An example of an unacceptable high residual risk includes instances where the data
subjects may encounter significant, or even irreversible, consequences, which they may not
overcome . . . and/or when it seems obvious that the risk will occur . . . . Whenever the data
controller cannot find sufficient measures . . . (i.e. the residual risks are still high), consultation
with the supervisory authority is required.
Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, DPIA, supra note 394, at 18–19 (footnote omitted); see also Council
Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, at 18.
396. Companies whose core activities involve processing especially sensitive personal data (such
as racial or ethnic origin data, biometric data, and health data) or which “by virtue of their nature, their
scope and/or their purposes, require regular and systematic monitoring of [individuals] on a large scale”
must appoint a DPO. See Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, art. 9, at 38–39, art. 37(1)(b)–(c),
at 55. If a company has a DPO, then it must consult with that officer when it conducts impact assessments.
Id. art. 35(2), at 53.
397. Price, supra note 8, at 43, at 449–51 (describing the FDA Class III premarket approval for
medical devices); Tutt, supra note 14, at 111 (calling for premarket approval of algorithms).
398. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, art. 36(3)(e), at 54–55; Article 29 Data Prot.
Working Party, DPIA, supra note 394, at 18 (“[R]egardless of whether or not consultation with the
supervisory is required based on the level of residual risk then the obligations of retaining a record of the
DPIA and updating the DPIA in due course remain.”).
399. Antoni Roig, Safeguards for the Right Not To Be Subject to a Decision Based Solely on
Automated Processing (Article 22 GDPR), 8 EUR. J.L. & TECH., no. 3, 2017, at 1, 2 (describing DPIAs
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Beyond appointing a DPO, meeting reporting requirements, and
conducting impact assessments, the Guidelines suggest a wealth of
additional internal company practices geared at instrumental goals. The
Guidelines caution that as part of “suitable measures” to protect individuals’
rights, companies should perform “regular quality assurance checks of their
systems to make sure that individuals are being treated fairly and not
discriminated against . . . .”400 Companies should also perform “algorithmic
auditing,” regularly testing algorithms to ensure they are “not producing
discriminatory, erroneous or unjustified results . . . .”401
Finally, at least in the context of algorithmic decision-making, the
GDPR’s softer law guidance envisions substantial third-party oversight. It is
possible to interpret Recital 71 to require auditing.402 The Guidelines more
explicitly suggest deploying third-party audits and establishing ethical
review boards.403 These suggested accountability requirements, although not
in the GDPR text itself, are likely to have a significant practical impact on
the industry as it searches for guidance on how to comply with the GDPR.404
The GDPR’s collaborative governance regime is aimed not just at
protecting privacy or ensuring accountability but at what should now be
familiar instrumental goals of preventing error, bias, and discrimination in
algorithmic decision-making.405 The GDPR’s required “safeguards” that
must be applied to automated decision-making are not just individual due
process rights but an iterative system of management reform and third-party
oversight.406 Thus the text of the GDPR—both its formal coregulatory
as “data generator[] for policy purposes”).
400. Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Decision-Making, supra note 265, at 32.
401. Id.
402. Malgieri & Comandé, supra note 250, at 258 (“[W]e argue that Articles 13(2)(f), 14(2)(g) and
15(1)(h) state a duty to perform an auditing of decision-making algorithms . . . .”).
403. Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Decision-Making, supra note 265, at 32 (suggesting
audits “where decision-making based on profiling has a high impact on individuals”). For third-party
auditing, the Working Group envisions a deeper form of transparency, explaining that it will be good
practice to “provide the auditor with all necessary information about how the algorithm or machine
learning system works . . . .” Id. The Working Party additionally envisions harnessing companies
themselves as oversight, suggesting that companies contractually require third parties to conduct auditing
and testing and ensure compliance with “agreed standards.” Id.
404. Casey et al., supra note 257, at 171–74.
405. Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Decision-Making, supra note 265, at 6 (“The GDPR
introduces new provisions to address the risks arising from profiling and automated decision-making,
notably, but not limited to, privacy.”); id. at 10 (“Profiling may be unfair and create discrimination . .
. .”); id. at 14 (referring to “the safeguards aimed at ensuring fairness, non-discrimination and accuracy
in the profiling process”).
406. Id. at 28 (“Controllers should introduce appropriate . . . measures to prevent errors,
inaccuracies or discrimination on the basis of special category data. These measures should be used on a
cyclical basis; not only at the design stage, but also continuously . . . . The outcome of such testing should
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provisions and its less formal collaborative mechanisms—combined with the
context of interpretative guidance together establishes a binary approach to
regulating algorithmic decision-making under the GDPR.
4. The GDPR’s Accountability Problem
It is important to understand the GDPR as a system of collaborative
governance, because this reveals its potentially significant weakness. The
GDPR, for all its coregulatory and collaborative measures, does not establish
adequate public-facing or even expert-facing accountability. The lack of
public transparency coupled with a lack of mechanisms for third-party
involvement, both expert and stakeholder, threatens both the substantive
output and procedural legitimacy of the GDPR as a collaborative governance
regime. This Section points out the gaps in the GDPR’s system of structured
accountability, starting with several of its formal coregulatory mechanisms
and then turning to the example of impact assessments.
The GDPR’s process for establishing codes of conduct does not require
public transparency or the involvement of third parties. The GDPR primarily
envisions a back-and-forth between companies and government
authorities.407 (Recital 99 suggests that companies should consult
stakeholders when drawing up codes of conduct but does not require it.)408
Codes of conduct are to be published after they are completed.409 The GDPR
then envisions using third parties to help monitor compliance,410 imagining
that they will lodge complaints with a compliance body. 411 But these third
parties have no information-finding powers over companies. It is unclear
how they will be meaningfully capable of identifying violations of codes of
conduct if they have no way to see what companies are doing internally.
The GDPR’s certification process similarly lacks public
accountability.412 Again the process of creating certification standards does
feed back into the system design.” (footnotes omitted)) (discussing a special category data).
407. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, art. 40(5), (7)–(8), at 57 (describing the processes
in individual Member States, involving the Board and Commission in the case of several Member States).
408. Id. at 19 (“[Drafters of a code of conduct should] have regard to submissions received and
views expressed in response to such consultations.”).
409. Id. art. 40(6), at 57.
410. Id. art. 41(2)(c), at 58 (“[A compliance body must set up] established procedures and structures
to handle complaints about infringements of the code or the manner in which the code has been, or is
being, implemented by a controller or processor, and to make those procedures and structures transparent
to data subjects and the public . . . .”).
411. Id. art. 41, at 58.
412. Recital 100 seems to characterize certification itself as a form of transparency, as shorthand
for info data subjects can use “allowing data subjects to quickly assess the level of data protection of
relevant products and services.” Id. at 19.
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not appear open to the public or to third-party participation. Again, as with
codes of conduct, the GDPR envisions that third parties will be able to
complain about a lack of compliance with certification standards.413 But they
are not involved in setting standards nor in ongoing monitoring or oversight.
Impact assessments, too, only minimally involve third parties at the
creation phase. Unlike with codes of conduct or certification, companies are
required to consult with third parties in forming impact assessments. But this
consultation is required only “[w]here appropriate” and with an eye to
guarding commercial secrets.414 The Guidelines further explain that thirdparty views can be sought in a variety of ways, including through studies or
questionnaires or surveys, rather than giving third parties a seat at the
table.415 These modes of consultation do not necessarily bring meaningful
external oversight into the process of creating the substance of an impact
assessment.
The most striking gap in public and third-party accountability in the
GDPR is its approach to releasing—or not releasing—algorithmic impact
assessments. While the GDPR’s impact assessments have been heralded as
a model for algorithmic accountability,416 the process does not in fact involve
releasing information to the public. A company is merely encouraged, not
required, to publicly release its impact assessments.417 Even where
publication is encouraged, the Guidelines envision only partial release or
release of a summary.418 This differs crucially from the model of impact
assessments usually employed in collaborative governance literature.419
Publicly disclosed impact assessments are used as a soft form of regulation
413. Id. art. 43(2)(d), at 60–61 (providing that to be accredited a certification body must “establish[]
procedures and structures to handle complaints about infringements of the certification or the manner in
which the certification has been, or is being, implemented by the controller or processor, and to make
those procedures and structures transparent to data subjects and the public”).
414. Id. art. 35(9), at 54.
415. Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, DPIA, supra note 394, at 15. A company should
document its reasons for not seeking third-party views or for making a decision that diverges from the
outcome of its surveys
416. AI Now Inst., supra note 198.
417. Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, DPIA, supra note 394, at 18 (“Publishing a DPIA is not
a legal requirement of the GDPR, it is the controller´s decision to do so. However, controllers should
consider publishing at least parts, such as a summary or a conclusion of their DPIA.”).
418. Id. (“The published DPIA does not need to contain the whole assessment, especially when the
DPIA could present specific information concerning security risks for the data controller or give away
trade secrets or commercially sensitive information . . . [T]he published version could consist of just a
summary of the DPIA’s main findings . . . .”).
419. Freeman, supra note 6, at 663 (“When publicly disclosed, the commitments in the FPA might
serve, moreover, as the benchmark against which wholly independent third-party monitors could hold
both the agency and the firm to account.”).
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to trigger market mechanisms and other forms of third-party oversight and
feedback. An impact assessment, in other words, is supposed to be a tripartite
conversation between a regulated entity, the regulator, and third parties such
as impacted persons or civil society organizations.420 In the GDPR, it is
largely used internally or, at most, in conversation with regulators.
It is possible that despite the GDPR’s lack of public transparency and
input by third parties, impact assessments and maybe draft codes of conduct
will be made available to the public through other means. Freedom of
information law might be used to obtain public disclosure. These efforts will
encounter various exceptions—not to the GDPR but to local freedom of
information law—including for trade secrets. But by making the “how” of
transparency in this space a pull mechanism (freedom of information law)
rather than a push mechanism (required public release), the GDPR increases
transparency’s costs and lowers the likelihood that it will be achieved.
This, then, is the central question about the GDPR as a system of
collaborative governance: Are the various forms of both government and
third-party oversight outlined in the GDPR’s text, Recitals, and Guidelines
adequate to ensure high-quality collaborative governance in the absence of
true public transparency?421
The answer will depend on a number of factors. It will depend on the
government’s independence and resources—how effective, in practice, data
protection authorities will be. It will depend on how government authorities
enforce the GDPR, including how they interpret individual disclosure
requirements and whether they receive adequate legal training to push back
on overclaims of corporate secrecy. It will depend on the ability of NGOs
and other policy advocates to harness the GDPR’s system of individual
transparency rights coupled possibly with freedom of information laws to
obtain both enforcement and transparency.422 To accomplish meaningful
oversight, both NGOs and the press will need to link individual disclosures
into politically effective group narratives, revealing what is going on over an
algorithmic decision-making system as a whole. This will be costly and timeconsuming and will involve much coordination. Still, it may be possible over
time.
The GDPR’s effectiveness at collaborative governance will also depend
420. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 12.
421. Thanks to Sarah Eskens for helping to formulate the question.
422. There is no class action mechanism in Europe, generally speaking, but the GDPR envisions
forms of third-party representation that could do some of this work. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra
note 13, art. 80, at 81.
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on companies themselves. As industries come together to determine codes
of conduct and certification criteria and relatedly the content of appropriate
technological design, will they (voluntarily) engage external stakeholders,
including members of impacted communities? Will they use these systems
to try to constrain rogue bad actors within industry?423
Perhaps the GDPR’s extensive individual transparency rights could go
some way to providing access to third parties. Although the GDPR contains
significant subject access rights,424 it is not a general-purpose freedom of
information law. The GDPR’s transparency measures are derived from the
FIPs and oriented towards individuals, not the public. But because the GDPR
relies on collaborative governance, its attempts at individual transparency
must serve a dual role. Absent policy changes, the GDPR’s individual
transparency provisions will need to serve both individual dignitary and
justificatory ends and as a crucial element of structured accountability in its
collaborative governance regime. It is not clear that, as currently interpreted
to provide information useful to individuals but not to experts, they will be
capable of this dual function.
There thus remain significant gaps in the structured accountability of
the GDPR regime. Individual disclosure of an individually explanatory
nature will likely fail to trigger market mechanisms or drive new policy
efforts. It will also likely fail to incorporate external expertise, because
information of an explanatory nature cannot be effectively evaluated by
outside experts with a view to auditing a system. The GDPR’s third-party
audit mechanisms or expert boards (which are Guideline suggestions, not
GDPR text) conversely allow for expert oversight but envision no way for
the public to be alerted by regulators to problems with a particular
algorithmic system once experts identify it. These gaps in the GDPR’s
system of structured accountability mean that the rules governing
companies, implementation of these rules, and compliance with them will
lack public and third-party involvement and oversight. This will hamper both
expert input into the system and the substantive and procedural legitimacy
of the regime.
423. See Thaw, supra note 152, at 371–74 (noting it can be in the self-interest of an industry to
monitor risk across an industry as a whole to prevent political backlash when bad things happen because
of the behavior of a rogue company).
424. Jef Ausloos & Pierre Dewitte, Shattering One-Way Mirrors—Data Subject Access Rights in
Practice, 8 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 4, 28 (2019) (reviewing subject access rights in practice and arguing
for their importance in providing checks and balances both individually and collectively).
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D. INTERACTION BETWEEN THE TWO PRONGS
This brings us to potential interactions between the two prongs of binary
governance in the GDPR. The GDPR, as discussed, is primarily hard law
and is strongly individual rights-oriented. At the same time, the GDPR’s
collaborative face will play a significant role in constituting individual rights
and relatedly determining what duties companies owe. Depending on how
the GDPR is implemented in practice, these two prongs can strengthen or
weaken each other and may in places inevitably conflict.
1. Where the Two Prongs Are Complementary
The GDPR’s nature as hard law—backed by serious enforcement
penalties and a rights-protective ECJ—will in some ways create a
complementary relationship between individual rights enforcement and
collaborative governance. As companies fear both lawsuits425 and
investigations sparked by individual complaints,426 they may be more likely
to come together with regulators to help to define what is and is not feasible
in their particular sector.
For example, a company that fears being fined for failing to put in place
suitable safeguards in automated decision-making is more likely to negotiate
a code of conduct or put in place compliance procedures and infrastructure
(for example, audits, DPOs, impact assessments, and so forth) that match the
Guideline suggestions, in order to credibly argue that it is in compliance.
Individual litigants enforcing their individual rights can, thus, serve as a
penalty default, a credible threat that will drive companies to collaborate and
negotiate. By participating in collaborative governance, companies can
effectively help to create their own safe harbors from the GDPR’s extensive
regime of individual rights.
The GDPR’s system of individual rights can relatedly complement its
collaborative regime by spreading the cost of compliance from the
government to individual actors and their delegated NGOs. Cost is a huge
problem for the GDPR. Audits will be expensive, and someone will have to
pay for them or determine a system of reputational benefits to incentivize
algorithmic auditing.427 Bringing technical expertise into the government
will be expensive. Monitoring companies will be expensive. If the backstop
of the GDPR’s system of collaborative governance of algorithms is the
government, the government must be well resourced—and it is far from clear
425.
426.
427.

See Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, art. 79, at 80.
See id. art 77, at 80.
Thanks to Natali Helberger for this point.
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that it will be.428 This means that individual rights bearers and their proxies
may have to do a good deal of monitoring and even enforcement work—
including by invoking judicial remedies when regulators fail to act.429
The GDPR’s system of individual rights will in some cases make
instrumental contributions that will also serve the goals of its collaborative
regime. The individual right of correction, for example, may help make
algorithmic decision-making systems less erroneous, by correcting incorrect
facts and inferences. Making the right of correction an individual right puts
correction in the hands of the least cost avoider—the people who best know
what information is correct about themselves. Other individual rights—of
access and notification, for example—may help address other systemic
problems, such as discrimination, by revealing individual instances of
unjustifiable decision-making.
Individual transparency rights can also be an important component of
structured accountability in collaborative governance. This is important
especially if regulators do not otherwise address the lack of third-party and
public accountability mechanisms in the GDPR. If aggregated by third
parties—the media or civil society—individual stories can trigger soft
accountability mechanisms, like market responses or naming-and-shaming.
The question is whether the individual transparency produced in the GDPR’s
individual rights vindication provisions will be adequate to serve those
functions in its collaborative governance regime.
Similarly, the GDPR’s individual due process rights can function as a
component of structured accountability for purposes of collaborative
governance. By allowing individuals to challenge individual algorithmic
decisions, the GDPR potentially makes companies accountable to an
external force. How useful this is will depend a great deal on how substantive
Article 22’s right to contest an algorithmic decision ends up being in
practice.
The GDPR’s collaborative regime may, conversely, strengthen its
individual rights regime. First, collaborative approaches may lead to more
effective systemic accountability, by imposing audits and third-party
oversight rather than relying on individual challenges alone. This may, if it
428. Matt Reynolds, Lords AI Report Warns of ‘Big Five’ Data Grabs and Ethical Failures,
WIRED (Apr. 16, 2018), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/house-of-lords-artificial-intelligence-reportethics-monopolies (quoting Michael Veale: “With those bodies, you wonder if they’re spreading too
thinly.”).
429. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, arts. 78–79, at 80 (providing individuals a right
to lodge a complaint against a supervisory authority and a right to judicial remedies generally).
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works, create better systemic protection of individuals’ rights, without the
cost of constant individual challenges.
Second, collaborative governance will in fact give substance to
individual rights—and this may in places be a good thing. By using
collaborative governance, the GDPR may end up creating more workable
solutions, rather than solutions that look good on paper but do not function
in reality. For example, the requirement that companies build products with
individual rights in mind from the onset—data protection by design and by
default—is textually broad or even without substance. Over time and
collaboration, however, companies and standards bodies may in
conversation with regulators be able to come up with workable and concrete
requirements that will apply to protect everyone and not rely on individuals’
capacity to withhold consent or raise challenges.
2. Where the Two Prongs Are in Tension
The GDPR’s dual systems of individual rights and collaborative
governance will also, however, run into tension with each other. Some of the
same features that could be complementary may also end up creating conflict
between the two systems. How or whether these tensions will be resolved is
a story that will play out over time and court decisions.
Structurally the hard-law nature of the GDPR could create problems for
its envisioned collaborative relationships. One aspect of the collaborative
governance toolkit—known as “responsive regulation”—is that regulators
be able to graduate their responses to violations in order to incentivize and
encourage good faith behavior by companies.430 Under the GDPR’s new
system of administrative fines, there may still be room for this kind of
calibrated reaction.431 But the rights provided to individuals—including the
right to a judicial remedy against government actors for nonaction and the
right to a judicial remedy against a company directly432—will create
penalties even when regulators choose not to act and may push regulators
towards implementing harsher penalties or towards more investigations to
begin with.433 While from an individual rights perspective this is a good
430. McGeveran, supra note 136, at 979–88.
431. Id. at 1019 (citing Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, art. 83, at 82–83) (discussing
GDPR graduated administrative fine system).
432. Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, arts. 78–79, at 80.
433. Id. art. 78(2), at 80 (providing a right to judicial remedy “where the supervisory authority which
is competent pursuant to Articles 55 and 56 does not handle a complaint or does not inform the data
subject within three months on the progress or outcome of the complaint lodged pursuant to Article 77”).
Thanks to Comandé for pointing this out.
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thing, it may from a collaborative governance perspective make it less
possible for regulators to create safe-harbor-like rewards for collaborating
companies and thus lead to lower degrees of voluntary collaboration.
The GDPR’s system of strong individual rights may, too, favor
individuals at the cost of correcting systemic problems, running counter to
the instrumental goals of its collaborative governance system. Allowing
individual correction and deletion can lead to gaming, which can distort the
data set and the algorithm.434 Even when done in good faith, individual
correction and deletion can make an overall decision-making system less
accurate (if individuals take themselves out of the data pool), less fair (as it
skews the data set), and even discriminatory (reflecting access to justice
rather than fact). The same is true of the right to human intervention in the
case of algorithmic decision-making—it may be the case that adding a
human in the loop will respect individual dignity but could make accuracy
of the overall system worse, thus negatively impacting other individuals
subject to the algorithm.
The debate over the right to explanation reveals another tension: that
the kind of transparency that is necessary for one part of the system
(individual rights) may not be adequate for the other (collaborative
governance). Under the GDPR, individual transparency is intended to be
understandable to and actionable by individuals.435 That makes it less useful
for other kinds of oversight, including expert oversight. The kind of
information that individuals need to make choices and invoke their
respective rights is not the same as the kind of information that experts need
to assess whether an algorithmic decision-making system is functioning
correctly. But making individualized transparency more useful to experts
may make it less useful to individuals.
Individual rights also run in tension with efforts to solve the
accountability gap in the GDPR’s collaborative regime, by releasing more
information to the general public. If we attempt to solve the GDPR’s
accountability gaps by increasing public transparency, we risk exposing
more individuals’ information and threatening individual privacy. Even if
we increase structured accountability by adding in layers of third-party
oversight, that comes at the cost of distributing personal information to more
parties.
Perhaps the biggest source of tension between the two systems,
434.
435.

Bambauer & Zarsky, supra note 118, at 25–28.
Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 13, art. 12, at 39–40.
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however, is the tension that arises over trying to constitute individual rights
through a collaborative regime. The GDPR is aimed at protecting
fundamental rights. Yet, its requirements are largely given substance in
collaboration with private companies. The question in the EU is particularly
loaded because of the fundamental rights backdrop to the GDPR regime: Is
it appropriate to use collaborative governance to constitute fundamental
individual rights?436
Private companies are not reliable rights guardians, and their interests
often misalign with the interests of individuals. The privatization of
fundamental rights protection is prevalent throughout the GDPR. It is not
just that companies are charged with protecting the rights of citizens.437 It is
that companies are charged with codetermining with the government the
actual content of rights.438 There is a substantial question of whether the ECJ,
given its recent attention to data privacy, will find the GDPR’s collaborative
approach to be adequately protective of fundamental rights.439 Alternatively,
recent case law suggests the ECJ may end up functioning as an aspect of the
collaborative regime, constraining companies’ behavior but still buying in to
company participation in determining how fundamental rights are
implemented in specific contexts.440
CONCLUSION
Governing algorithmic decision-making is hard. The technology is
complex and opaque and a fast-moving target. But in significant part, solving
the governance problem is hard because we cannot agree on why to regulate.
A growing literature now focuses on regulating algorithmic decision-making
in order to solve problems such as error, bias, and discrimination, but ignores
or brushes over legitimate dignitary and justificatory reasons for regulating.
436. ANGELOPOULOS ET AL., supra note 252, at 3–4. But see Claudia Quelle, Does the Risk-based
Approach to Data Protection Conflict with the Protection of Fundamental Rights on a Conceptual Level?
3–4 (Feb. 3, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abs
tract_id=2726073) (arguing that there is no conflict).
437. Schwartz & Pfeifer, supra note 261, at 126 (“[T]hese rights have ‘horizontal’ effects; that is,
these interests reach within ‘private-on-private’ relations as contrasted with merely ‘vertical’ applications
that concern ‘government-on-private’ matters.” (citing Case C-144/04, Mangold v. Helm, 2005 E.C.R. I10013)).
438. See Lee, supra note 259, at 1066.
439. Thanks to Nico van Eijk for this point.
440. The ECJ itself appears to have not just endorsed but established collaborative governance over
fundamental rights in its recent “right to be forgotten” decision in Google Spain, delegating
implementation of the right to Google. Lee, supra note 259, at 1023–25. For the decision, see generally
Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) (May 13, 2014),
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62012CJ0131.
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The law’s role is not just instrumental; it legitimizes and delegitimizes,
validates or invalidates other decisional systems, and protects individual
rights even against private actors.
To serve all three goals, I propose a binary approach to algorithmic
accountability that couples individual rights with systemic collaborative
governance. The EU’s GDPR, at least on paper, comes close to realizing
such a regime. The GDPR reveals, however, that in building a dual system
we must constantly evaluate the role of a particular tool in both systems.
The devil, as always, will be in the details: creating the right balance
between hard law and soft, between flexibility and accountability, between
bounded rights and room for private innovation. But binary governance is
the scaffolding on which those details should be built. If we take only an
individual rights approach, we risk failing to correct serious systemic
problems with algorithmic decision-making. If we take only a systemic
approach, we disregard real concerns about dignity and justification in such
systems. The future of good algorithmic governance is a binary system of
governance—one that may slide more towards one pole or the other,
depending on the subsector-specific features or consequences of a particular
type of decision—but one that addresses dignity and autonomy, systemic and
individual legitimacy concerns, in addition to error and bias in algorithmic
decision-making.

